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Abstract 
This study proposes an empirical investigation of whether and how the Chinese 
firms that make solar photovoltaic (PV) components are developing only the minimum 
knowledge necessary to adopt and assimilate externally developed technology or 
whether they can make substantial technological improvements and/or generate new 
production processes or products. 
Previous studies of PV development in China have left industrial development 
and firm-level capability building almost unexplored. Moreover, the literature about 
firm-level technological change in developing countries has largely focused on 
analysing the development of a minimum knowledge base necessary to 'use' imported 
engineering-based technology, along with a static view of what induces firms to learn 
and to innovate. 
By combining and contrasting two approaches — one with a technological 
capability and intra-firm learning focus and the other with a wider systemic perspective, 
the study explores the Chinese PV firms' effort towards innovation leadership and the 
static and systemic factors that influence their innovativenss. 
The study is based on a survey conducted in China from May to July 2005 with 
a selected number of PV manufacturers, as well as on personal interviews with other 
PV stakeholders. 
The analysis shows that PV firms in China had progressed well beyond basic 
operational capabilities and were quickly moving away from being mere users of 
imported PV components. Although knowledge has been accumulated in the PV 
technology family that is closest to maturity (i.e. c-Si) and despite considerable 
differences between the firms, the Chinese firms can be competitive beyond cheap 
labour and have learnt to be more efficient and to reduce production costs through 
technological capability improvements and the acquisition of other non technological 
and proprietary assets. This is because of (a) a learning process that has emphasised in-
house R&D for quality improvements and for the development of new production 
processes and products; and (b) because of a domestic innovation system that has 
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grown and has helped firms to enhance their capabilities. International surges in solar 
PV demand, together with promotional schemes to support PV installed capacity in 
several mature economies (most notably Germany), have provided the Chinese firms 
with opportunities and motivation to add technological and qualitative value. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Picture 1 A sign on the Great Wall, Beijing - China 
Picture 2 Detail of a street in Shanghai - China 
Source: Pictures taken by the author during fieldwork in China, May-July 2005 
This thesis is an empirical investigation of the innovation effort underway in a 
rapidly industrialising country, China, to develop domestic technological capacity for 
the manufacturing of renewable energy technologies (RET). The study seeks to 
understand whether the Chinese firms involved in one fast-growing RE technology, 
solar photovoltaic (PV), are developing only the knowledge necessary to adopt and 
assimilate externally developed technology and innovation or whether they are able to 
make substantial technological improvements or even to generate completely new 
production processes or products. Moreover, the study aims to explore the factors that 
have determined the current level of knowledge, how they have changed over time and 
what could drive firms to improve further. 
The thesis' main focus is hence on the nature and determinants of the 
technological effort underway in the PV sector in China. In other words, it explores 
what PV firms in China can do, how and why they can do it, and seeks insights into 
their potential for further innovative activity. 
Since its 'opening' in 1978, China has shown that it can be the cheapest and 
biggest manufacturing subcontractor in the world. The crucial questions which rest at 
the heart of growth are, however: can China innovate and, more importantly, can it 
innovate in environmentally-sound energy technologies, given the pressing need to 
restrain its carbon dioxide emissions and to secure affordable energy supplies to fuel its 
growing economy and population'? 
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Two literatures have contributed to this study's insights into the nature and the 
determinants of technological change in solar PV: the literature about technological 
capability accumulation and learning in firms in developing countries (Bell, 1984, Lall, 
1992, Bell and Pavitt, 1993, Dutrenit, 2000, Romijn, 2002) and the innovation system 
literature (see among others Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 1992, Freeman and Soete, 1997), 
in particular the branch of the latter that has been recently applied to better understand 
the emergence and the diffusion of RET (Foxon et al., 2005, Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2004). 
The Venn diagram in Figure 1 depicts the theoretical approaches, represented 
by the shaded circles, and the empirical areas of application covered by the study. The 
intersection of the different areas constitutes the core of this research. 
Figure 1 The theoretical tools and empirical coverage of the thesis 
Empirical coverage 
Source: Author's elaboration 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 1.1 presents the background of the 
study by briefly introducing the four areas that compose the empirical and the 
theoretical setting of the thesis (as illustrated by the four circles in the Venn diagram). 
Section 1.2 introduces the core research problem and its main motivations. Section 1.3 
details the research objectives and questions while Section 1.4 provides some working 
definitions. Section 1.5 provides an overview of the methodological approach, together 
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with the key analytical and empirical challenges faced by the thesis. Section 1.6 
discusses the thesis' novelty and original contribution. Section 1.7 presents the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Background 
Modern societies are increasingly dependent upon the use of large quantities of 
energy, most of it in the form of fossil fuels, for virtually all aspects of life. However 
the extensive use of fossil fuels (i.e. oil, natural gas and coal), which constituted two-
thirds (66.1%) of the world's total electricity generated in 2004 (IEA, 2006), is under 
scrutiny for its negative impact on the local and global environment and for the 
dependence of many countries upon scarce energy resources concentrated in restricted 
regions of the world (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001). 
Renewable energy technologies (RET), especially 'new' RET, which include 
small hydro, modern biomass 1 , wind, solar PV and geothermal, can address these 
concerns both because of their limited (although non-uniform) impacts on the 
environment and because they are inexhaustible sources of energy that can be accessed 
locally. A number of further reasons make them a particularly attractive option also for 
many developing countries (Clini and Moody-Stuart, 2002, Martinot et al., 2002). 
These include the possibility of reaching remote locations and rural areas currently not 
reached by the national grid (i.e. opportunities for off-grid applications) and the 
possibility of creating jobs, capital, and sources of revenue to local communities (i.e. 
opportunities for local development). 
Despite their attractiveness, RET, in particular some like PV, have not yet 
reached full technological and commercial maturity and cannot compete with 
conventional fossil fuels on costs, except in some niche markets. They therefore need 
policy support to stimulate technical progress and speed up the technological learning 
necessary to drive down costs. 
Although several policy instruments have been used to encourage a larger 
market diffusion of RET (Menanteau et al., 2003, Reiche and Bechberger, 2004), 
emerging evidence (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Foxon et al., 2005) suggests that 
The expression 'modern biomass' refers to biomass produced in a sustainable way, which: "[. ..] 
excludes traditional uses of biomass as fuel wood and includes electricity generation and heat 
production, as well as transportation fuels, from agricultural and forest residues and solid waste" 
(Goldemberg and Teixeira Coelho, 2004, p. 711). 
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policy interventions in this area cannot be exclusively viewed in market terms but need 
to be understood in a wider 'innovation perspective' that also encompass technological 
and industrial development. 
Innovation as a systemic process 
There has been increasing recognition in the literature that technological 
change, and more specifically innovation in energy technology, is best understood as a 
process which results from the interactions with the system in which the technology is 
embedded (Sagar and Holdren, 2002, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Foxon et al., 2005). 
The central idea behind the 'innovation system' approach is that technological 
development and diffusion are both an individual and a collective act, where firms, 
institutions and other actors, like for instance research organisations, all work towards 
innovation. Therefore, the determinants of technological change are not only to be 
found within the individual firm but also within the broader innovation system in which 
they operate. 
The literature shows that if we want to understand more about RET 
development and diffusion and most of all to guide the policy process aimed at 
speeding up technological learning, we need to have a better understanding of the 
innovation system that surrounds RET. 
PV production and market 
Cost reductions via technical progress and market diffusion, together with a 
better understanding of the innovation process involved, are particularly important for a 
specific RET like solar PV. 
A recent study highlights the contribution solar PV might make to both future 
global electricity supply and the mitigation of climate change (Greenpeace and EPIA, 
2006). This study points out that in twenty years' time enough solar power could be 
produced to satisfy the electricity needs of 20% of the entire EU-25. In environmental 
terms this would mean reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 353 million tonnes, 
equivalent to the current combined emissions of Australia and New Zealand 
Although solar PV has witnessed significant growth rates in the last decade and 
as a consequence the cost of the product has been declining, it must fall further for this 
expansion to continue. To meet this challenge, innovation in all PV technology families 
(Green, 2001) and new advances in applications (Barnham et al., 2006) will be crucial. 
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China's need for innovation and RET 
Developing countries might benefit more than other countries from a wider use 
of PV and RET more broadly, because these are the countries where the strongest 
growth in the use of energy is expected in the years to come 
(Energy Information Administration, 2008). This particularly applies to rapidly 
industrialising countries, like India or China, where robust economic growth is driving 
the increase in energy demand and in CO2 emissions (Wang and Watson, 2008). 
China's rapid economic development has been driven so far by exports fuelled 
by an abundant and cheap labour force (OECD, 2007). In order to remain competitive 
in an increasing global economy, however, China must climb up the value-chain and 
put technical change and innovation at the heart of growth. This ability is foremost 
important in low carbon energy technologies, not only because China's current energy 
demand is dominated by fossil fuels and an increased attention to RE production and 
demand could lead to a more sustainable energy future, but also because RET represent 
a rapidly expanding international market (Martinot, 2008) and there are profits to gain 
in growing value-added faster than leading-edge competitor firms in other countries. 
Manufacturing in developing countries 
The promotion of technological innovation in developing countries is becoming 
a fashionable academic subject. Increasing interest in the literature stems partly from 
the fact that the set of liberalisation and deregulation policies that have dominated the 
development agendas of many industrialising countries in recent years have shown 
limits in promoting sustainable growth in the developing world (Aubert, 2005). This is 
particularly true for the waves of restructuring that have washed over electric utilities in 
both industrialised countries and, at an increasing pace, also in many developing 
countries (Besant-Jones, 2006). These trends are shrinking the involvement of the state 
in the energy sector while broadening the role of private entrepreneurs (Wamukonya, 
2003). If this was done to increase sectoral efficiency and to maximise revenues from 
the sales of government assets, there are concerns that private companies might 
emphasise short term returns, putting innovation at a disadvantage. This is particularly 
critical for the development of RETs, which need innovation to drive down costs and 
policy support to take them to a level playing field with electricity from mature fossil 
fuel technologies. 
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These developments call for a greater attention to how technology is created, 
enhanced and diffused in developing countries (Aubert, 2005). Since technology is 
developed largely in firms, understanding technological change means looking within 
manufacturing firms (Forbes and Wield, 2002). 
1.2 The problem definition and the motivation 
The manufacture of RET and more specifically of PV components (i.e. modules, 
cells, etc.) has a role to play in developing countries because it can help local industrial 
development and provide at the same time, potentially secure and more sustainable 
sources of energy. Although manufacturing of PV system components has been so far 
concentrated in mature economies (mainly in Germany and Japan), rapidly 
industrialising countries like India or China are quickly emerging as PV component 
producers. 
Until the late 1990s, the Chinese PV industry had an extremely limited 
production capacity. It used out-of-date technology on a small scale (Zhu, 2004) and 
was described as weak when compared to foreign competitors, constrained by 
bottlenecks in equipment, resources and knowledge, and unable to deliver good quality 
products at competitive prices (Dai and Shi, 1999). 
Only five years later, in the first half of 2005, China's PV module 
manufacturing capacity ranked fifth in the world (Chen, 2004) and one of its module 
manufacturers was about to become one of the top five PV producers in the world. 
How has this been possible? Is China only assembling foreign PV cells (that 
have high knowledge content) into modules, thanks to its abundant cheap labour, or it 
is moving up the value chain and developing the skills necessary to change the 
technology? 
The factors that lie behind the emergence of the Chinese PV industry have never 
been explored before and are the main concern of this thesis. Existing studies about PV 
in China have either focussed on the demand side (seeking to explore market 
development options, see for instance: Wallace et al., 1998, Byrne et al., 2001) or on 
the development of those skills useful to install, operate and maintain imported PV 
system (IEA-PVPS, 2003, Ling et al., 2002). The few studies that have addressed 
industrial development or firm-level capability building in PV in China (Dai and Shi, 
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1999, Zhu, 2004, Zhao, 2004) have done so in a descriptive way that can only be used 
by this study as background information. 
We believe a better understanding of what China is doing to build up its own 
PV manufacturing industry and what is driving it towards innovation might have a 
bearing not only for the development of the PV industry in China and possibly in other 
developing countries but also, more broadly, for our understanding of innovation 
dynamics in these countries. 
Previous studies that have addressed firm-level innovation in developing 
countries have been concerned about the development of a minimum base of 
knowledge necessary to acquire, assimilate and eventually improve, to suit specific 
local conditions, technology developed elsewhere. Innovation, in this specific 
development context, thus means 'using' and reproducing existent technologies. 
Although we do not deny that this effort is of fundamental importance for firms to 
acquire and enhance capabilities, especially in certain engineering-based technologies, 
it does not pay attention to firms as autonomous generators of technologies, which is 
what we seek to understand in the context of the PV firms in China. This is in an 
environment in which, it has been argued, the ability to compete effectively at home 
and in international markets will largely determine the survival of a production venture: 
"[...] being borrowers (or say imitators) of technology rather than innovators leaves the 
developing countries at a distinct disadvantage since they are unable to derive 
monopoly profit in any of their production activities" (Huq, 2003, p. 1). 
Moreover, the fact that firms are part of a larger innovation system which is 
becoming more and more complex, calls for a broadening of the analytical focus: firm-
level factors of technological accumulation and improvement are simply no longer 
enough to understand more complex dynamics. 
This study hence aims at understanding the nature and the determinants of the 
innovation effort underway in China to develop domestic technological capacity for the 
manufacture of PV components. 
In so doing, the study not only explores an area, the technological 
innovativeness of the PV industry in China, that has not attracted scholars' attention so 
far, but also aims at a wider contribution about innovation for low carbon energy 
technologies in rapidly industrialising countries. 
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1.3 Objectives and research questions 
The analysis of this thesis focuses on the firms involved in PV production in 
China and on the innovation system that surrounds them. This choice rests on the 
following considerations: 
- Firms are at the centre of this study's analysis because, as explained 
previously, technology is developed largely in firms and looking inside the 
black box of technological change means looking within firms that are the 
`engine' of economic development. 
— Technological development is regarded in this study as a systemic 
phenomenon in which the component parts of the economic system evolve 
alongside each other and influence each other with continuing feedback. 
Firms are part of this system. 
The aims of the study are to: 
- Explore the innovative effort of the Chinese PV manufacturers by 
developing an analytical framework specific to solar PV and that combines 
insights from both the technological capability (TC) and the innovation 
system (IS) literatures. 
- Apply the analytical framework to a selected number of Chinese PV 
manufacturers, in order to identify the requirements and constraints to 
innovation, as well as the characteristics of the enabling environment and, 
therefore, the opportunities for intervention. 
- Discuss the relevance of the findings for other developing countries and the 
implications for their strategies and policies to enter PV manufacturing and 
more broadly, other RET. 
To reach these objectives this study is guided by two research questions: 
1. How advanced is what PV firms in China can do? 
2. What factors affect the knowledge accumulation process, how 
have they changed over time and how might they drive the firms' 
innovation effort further? 
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1.4 Working definitions 
We believe some initial working definitions could be useful at this point. These 
definitions, which draw upon both the TC and the IS literatures, will be further 
explored throughout the thesis and revisited in Chapter 7. 
Innovation 
The term 'innovation' covers a broad range of activities, including 
organisational, financial, marketing and technological innovation. This study focuses 
on the latter, which can be defined as: "[...] a process by which firms master and 
implement the design and production of goods [...] that are new to them, irrespective of 
whether or not they are new to their competitors - domestic or foreign" (Ernst et al., 
1998, pp. 12-13). 
With such a definition, the emphasis is not exclusively on innovation as a single 
event, a 'big bang', but rather on the: "[...] process of implementing innovative 
activities that permit firms to learn and master the underlying principles and 
characteristics of the knowledge which might be externally or internally produced but 
which are new to the firm' (Kiggundu, 2006, p. 19). 
This definition embraces also, but not exclusively, the notion of non-frontier, 
adaptive and incremental innovation activities often undertaken in developing country 
contexts. 
Two 'types' of technological innovation are taken into account by this thesis: 
`product innovation', the knowledge about how to create or improve products, and 
`process innovation', the knowledge about how to produce them. 
Innovation system 
An 'innovation system' is defined in this study as: "[...] the elements and 
relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and 
economically-useful, knowledge" (Lundvall, 1992). 
Technological capabilities 
In line with the approach adopted by the TC literature (see Chapter 2), this study 
conceptualises technical change in firms in terms of the acquisition of 'technological 
capabilities', defined as: "[...] the knowledge and skills needed for firms to choose, 
29 
install, operate, maintain, adapt, improve and develop technologies" (Romijn and 
Albaladejo, 2002, p. 1054). 
Commercial state of the art 
Manufacturing PV products that are commercial state of the art refers, in this 
study, to the capability of the Chinese PV firms to produce within the dominant PV 
technology family (i.e. c-Si) at the same technical and qualitative level as the 
international technology leaders. For example, it refers to the capability of producing c-
Si cells or modules with the same conversion efficiency and qualitative performance as 
the international competitors. 
Technology frontier 
Being at the technology frontier is understood by this study as: 
a) the ability to undertake (or evaluating to undertake) new technological 
choices, within the dominant (c-Si) technology family, that would allow the firm to 
further improve this technology family and to take it forward by driving down the costs 
of the final products. An illustrative example would be the ability of the PV firms to 
adopt emerging and alternative c-Si production techniques, such as, for instance, 
growing ribbons of multicrystalline Silicon to reduce the costs of the c-Si final products 
b) showing a forward view by entering or investing in PV technology families 
different from the dominant family (i.e. c-Si) and that are currently in their infancy (for 
instance some thin film technology families, organic PV but also PV under 
concentration) but that may well start to significantly penetrate the market after 2010-
2015 (de Moor et al., 2004). 
Developing and industrialising countries 
According to the World Bank classification, countries with low or middle levels 
of GNP per capita are defined as 'developing countries'2. China, despite its rapid and 
prolonged economic growth, but because of the unevenness of its development, is 
classified by the World Bank as a lower-middle-income economy3. 
2 See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0„contentMDK 
:20420458—menuPK:64133156—pagePK:64133150—piPK:64133175—theSitePK:239419,00.html 
3  The extent to which results obtained by studying the innovative behaviour of the Chinese PV 
firms could be extended to other developing countries is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Industrialising countries are those developing countries that are undergoing 
rapid industrialization and that are technologically self-reliant in some standard modern 
technologies but remain dependent on advanced countries for technology, especially 
innovative technology. 
Based on these definitions China is considered by this study as a developing and 
an industrialising country. 
1.5 Research methods: an overview 
The first step in the research method was to develop the analytical framework. 
An extensive literature review was conducted together with in-depth interviews with 
key PV experts in Europe. These have been necessary to deepen understanding of the 
PV sector and to adapt to the specific PV context a more general framework inspired by 
the theory. 
The empirical part of the research has employed a firm-level survey based on a 
questionnaire administered in face-to-face interviews with a selected number of PV 
firms in China, during plant visits and fieldwork from May to July 2005. 
Semi-structured interviews with other relevant stakeholders of the Chinese PV 
sector (i.e. R&D representatives, policy makers, etc.) were also conducted, to define 
the innovation system surrounding PV and to understand its evolution over time and 
how it facilitates or constrains innovation in firms. 
The design of a methodology suitable to study the technological capabilities of 
the Chinese PV firms and the innovation systems of which they are part presented 
several analytical and empirical challenges. These are briefly summarised in what 
follows and then discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
1.5.1 A brief note on some analytical and empirical challenges presented by the 
study 
It is a challenging task to investigate if and how Chinese firms involved in the 
PV industry are accumulating technological capabilities and innovating, not least 
because it involves international comparison. The task is rendered difficult also because 
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as will be highlighted in Chapter 4, the term 'photovoltaic' (TV') refers to a number of 
technology families that are at different levels of technological and commercial 
maturity. Assessing the complexity of the technological capabilities accumulated by 
firms and the role of the innovation system in promoting further advancements, means 
bearing in mind mature and emerging technologies alike. Moreover, different 
productive processes along the PV value chain present different levels of technological 
complexity. For example, assembling solar modules is technologically less intensive 
than producing crystalline Silicon (c-Si) wafers (see discussion in Chapter 4). 
Developing a technological assessment of this industry requires taking into account 
these differences. 
Furthermore, what is going on in PV in China depends on developments in the 
rest of the world (e.g.: China relies on export markets to sell between 70 and 80% of its 
domestic solar cell and module production) and this should be accounted for in the 
analysis. 
Besides the complexities determined by the technology itself, the country under 
analysis, China, presents several unique features. The story of PV development in 
China, and indeed the accumulation of technological capabilities in firms, dates back to 
the early 1960s, when China was a planned economy (see Chapter 5). Since the 
economic reforms started in 1978, the country has experienced tremendous changes 
that have contributed to creating an increasingly complex system within which to study 
PV development. 
All these technology and country specific factors have contributed to enriching 
the context within which the analytical framework of the research has been developed 
and to enlarging the challenges faced by the research. 
In terms of the empirical analysis it has been necessary to collect data and 
information at both the firm and the national levels and to gain access to the relevant 
sources of information. This has been particularly challenging and has required an 
understanding of the country and of the culture upon which the study is based. China is 
a country with which the author of this thesis is familiar and that has been the focus of 
several research projects she undertook in the past. Moreover a fluency in spoken 
Mandarin has been an advantage in conducting in-depth interviews, not only with 
industrialists but also with representatives of the R&D sector and with policy makers. 
This capability has allowed her to collect valuable first hand information (without the 
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mediation and possible distortion of an interpreter) and to develop a unique body of 
empirical evidence (see the thesis' empirical contribution in Section 1.6) on the sector, 
which is extremely rarely obtained by non-Chinese researchers. 
Considerable effort and time were also spent before leaving for fieldwork, to 
create a suitable network upon which to rely once in China. Chinese RE associations, 
academics, local and international organisations with strong and far-reaching links with 
domestic PV firms were also contacted and engaged in the research project, to secure 
not only access to the necessary information but also to create a positive attitude 
towards the researcher and her study. 
1.6 Novelty and original contribution of the thesis 
This thesis makes significant novel contributions of three kinds: methodological, 
empirical and theoretical. While the details of these contributions are discussed in 
Chapter 9, we summarise here only the main points. 
Methodological contribution 
To understand how advanced is what the PV firms in China can do and what 
influences their innovativeness, this study develops an analytical framework, which 
departs from the existing approaches and improve them in the following ways: 
- It is specifically developed to study the PV sector. 
- It combines and contrasts two well-defined approaches that have been so far 
applied largely separately: the firm-level technological capability approach and 
the innovation system approach. 
Empirical contribution 
It is the first time that the Chinese PV industry has been studied from an 
innovation view point and that an innovation systems approach has been applied to the 
PV sector in China. This allows us to map for the first time the main actors and 
interactions of the Chinese PV innovation system and to study its evolution over time. 
Moreover, contemporary and primary data on the state of the Chinese PV 
manufacturing industry are gathered, organised and presented for the first time (Marigo, 
2007). 
33 
Theoretical contribution 
The thesis makes the following contribution to the existing theory and more 
specifically to the technological capability (TC) and innovation system (IS) literatures 
that underpin this study: 
— It adds to the debate about what we mean by innovation in developing countries 
and 'how' and 'why' firms in these economies accumulate technological 
capabilities that are specific for RET and PV. 
— It also adds to the debate on how RET emerge and diffuse in the market, by 
providing specific insights derived from the study of the PV innovation system 
in China. 
— It provides new and enhanced policy guidelines for developing countries 
wishing to undertake PV component production and more broadly, RET 
manufacturing. These derive from the combined insights obtained by applying 
both the TC and the IS analytical approaches. 
1.7 Structure of the thesis and coverage 
This thesis has nine chapters. Their short titles and the main issues they address 
are summarised and presented graphically in Figure 2. 
Although the thesis follows an apparent linear flow (as suggested by the order 
in which the different Chapters follow each other), the research process has been 
characterised by numerous feedback loops between the activities described in the 
different Chapters. This is better explained below and illustrated in Figure 2 by the 
double arrows that connect several chapters. 
Following this introduction, Chapter Two reviews critically the two main 
bodies of literature that underpin the theoretical understanding of this research: studies 
about technological change in firms in developing countries and innovation systems 
studies, with a particular reference to those that have been applied to RET. This chapter 
discusses the main issues emerging from these literatures, their relevance to this study 
and their main limitations. This chapter also reviews critically alternative approaches 
(based on the use of quantitative indicators) to the understanding of innovation, and 
assesses the extent to which they are appropriate in depicting and explaining innovation 
in China. 
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• 
Chapter 3 Analytical framework and 
methodology 
How to 'measure' innovation in firms and 
what determines it; how to collect the data 
Figure 2 The structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
Problem definition, aims and 
novelty of the study 
• 
Chapter 2 Critical literature review 
Theoretical underpinning: TC and IS 
literatures 
4 	
it 
it 
I I 
I 	I 
I '  
it 
• 
Chapter 4 PV technology and market 
development 
PV technology families, innovation 
avenues, manufacturing processes and 
policy drivers 
Chapter 5a Chinese domestic 
environment 
The evolution of the NIS 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• S 
Chapter 
domestic 
5b Chinese 
environment 
Chinese macro PV 
(industry, market and 
policies overview) 
Chapter 6 Empirical findings 
Results from firm-level survey and semi- 
structured interviews with stakeholders 
The 
picture 
Chapter 7 Theoretical implications of the 
empirical findings 
Relating the findings to the existing theory: do 
Chinese PV firms innovate? How is this possible? 
Chapter 8 Policy implications 
Implications for further development of the PV industry in China 
and for developing countries willing to enter the same industry 
• 
Chapter 9 Conclusions 
Note: TC = Technological Capability; IS = Innovation System NIS = National Innovation System 
Chapter Three develops the analytical framework adopted by this thesis to 
study technological capabilities and the innovation system that surrounds PV 
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technology in China. This chapter also presents a detailed description of the 
methodology adopted, the data collection approach and the fieldwork undertaken in 
China. 
Chapter Four is the first of two chapters (together with Chapter Five) devoted 
to developing a better understanding of the empirical setting of the research. This 
chapter briefly introduces PV technology, manufacturing processes and market 
development. It also discusses PV-specific innovation avenues together with policy 
measures adopted to promote a larger diffusion of this technology. 
Chapter Five is China specific. It tackles two separate topics: the evolution of 
the national innovation system over time and the macro domestic PV picture (these are 
indicated as 5a and 5b in Figure 2). Information contained in this second part of the 
chapter was collected, as noted, during fieldwork in China from May to July 2005 and 
is located here to provide a broad national PV-specific background for the 
understanding of the firm-level results presented in Chapter 6 and discussed in Chapter 
7. 
The non-linear nature of the research process mentioned above has 
characterised in particular Chapters 3, 4 and 5. While a preliminary version of the 
analytical framework was drafted earlier on in the research process, its final version 
came only after Chapters 4 and 5 were firmly in place. It appeared in fact rapidly clear 
that a thorough understanding of the PV manufacturing process and of the possible 
innovation avenues viable in PV technological development (all issues discussed in 
Chapter 4), were necessary to inform the analytical framework and to make it suitable 
to understand the technology under study. Similarly, in order to get deeper insights into 
the specificities of the Chinese context, it was necessary to have a thorough 
understanding (as discussed in Chapter 5) of the profound changes experienced by its 
innovation system over time. 
Thus the final version of the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3 is the 
result of a great number of feedbacks with Chapters 4 and 5, which are to be considered 
integral parts of the analytical framework necessary to study innovation in PV firms in 
China. For reasons of simplicity, however, the three chapters are presented and 
discussed sequentially. 
Chapter Six presents the results obtained from the empirical part of the study. 
While the first part of the chapter presents the findings pertaining to the nature of 
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innovation in the Chinese PV firms, the second part presents the results about the 
factors that affect their ability to undertake technological change. 
Chapter Seven takes a critical look at the empirical results presented in Chapter 
6 and pulls out the main theoretical insights by discussing how they relate to the theory 
that underpins this study (presented and discussed in Chapter 2). 
Chapter Eight discusses the main policy implications of this thesis for China's 
future PV industrial development and innovation-led economic growth. Broad 
implications for other developing countries wishing to enter the same industry are also 
discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis by summarising the principal findings, 
highlighting its contribution to the existing knowledge and discussing its limitations. 
The chapter also points the way forward in terms of further research 
Appendices provide the name of the firms and people interviewed during 
fieldwork in China and a list of the questions asked to non-firm stakeholders. An 
appendix also provides the complete version of the questionnaire, as administered to 
the firms during the interviews. 
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2 CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
Picture 3 The window of a cloth shop in Hangzhou, China 
Source: Picture taken by the author during fieldwork in China, May-July 2005 
2.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter we lay down the theoretical foundation of the thesis. This 
research does not exist in a vacuum: there is a pre-existing body of knowledge that 
serves as its source of grounding and inspiration but also as its point of departure. This 
Chapter has hence two main purposes: (a) to illustrate and discuss what is already 
known about innovation for emerging energy technologies in developing countries, 
particularly in China; and (b) to identify what remains unexplained or unexplored in the 
existing (academic) literature that covers these issues. This is so because the ultimate 
purpose of this study is to address these limits and to take our knowledge about the 
topic forward. 
The material in this chapter also serves as a basis for the analytical framework 
proposed in Chapter 3, where we will translate some of the theoretical concepts 
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reviewed in this chapter into observable and empirically testable variables. For example 
we will propose a way in which the concept of technological capabilities discussed in 
section 2.5 can be empirically observed and measured in firms. Moreover, in Chapter 7 
we will discuss the extent to which the results obtained in the empirical analysis and 
presented in Chapter 6, relate to the ideas debated in this chapter. 
As briefly anticipated in Chapter 1, two streams of literature form the academic 
grounding of this thesis and lie at the core of this chapter: 
a) One stream understands technological change as a systemic process where 
different actors (e.g. academic and technology developers, governments, etc.) 
and their interactions contribute to innovation. This body of literature will be 
referred to in this study as the Innovation System (IS) literature. Within this 
literary tradition a group of studies that has applied the IS approach to RET 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, Foxon et al., 2005, Jacobsson et al., 2004), 
stands out for its relevance to this study and for its interest in understanding 
innovation in PV in the Chinese firms. 
b) The other stream of literature, commonly used in studies focusing on 
technological development in less-developed economies, conceptualises firm-
level technological change in terms of the acquisition of technological 
capabilities and emphasises the contribution of learning in this acquisition 
process. This body of literature is often referred to in the literature as 'latecomer 
innovation research' (Hobday et al., 2004), 'latecomer company literature' 
(Figueiredo, 1999) or 'technological capability accumulation' by firms in 
developing countries (Dutrenit, 2007). In this study it will be simply called 
Technological Capability (TC) literature. 
Although these two streams of literature have been chosen to form the 
theoretical core of this thesis, they are not the only possible approaches that could be 
adopted to understand technological change. Quantitative indicators, like R&D 
expenditure or patents, are often adopted to describe key dimensions of technological 
change. This is not a formal theory or a conceptual tool, as it is the case of the TC and 
IS literatures, but rather a method widely used in the literature, especially when an 
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empirical measurement of technological change is needed/. Since China's innovative 
performance has often been explored and assessed by using quantitative indicators, we 
devote the initial part of this Chapter to critically reviewing this method and the picture 
it conveys about innovation in China. 
This part of the review serves two main purposes: 
a) To provide initial motivations on why we decided to adopt the IS and TC literatures 
instead of undertaking the more conventional quantitative indicators route. In other 
words, although other approaches exist and could be used to enhance the understanding 
of innovation, we believe the combination of the IS and TC literatures better serves our 
purposes; 
b) To sketch a picture of China's innovativeness, as it results from the use of 
quantitative indicators, against which the findings obtained by this study by adopting 
the IS and TC literatures, could be compared and contrasted6. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 critically examines the 
adoption of quantitative indicators to understand technological change and uses them 
(section 2.2.3) to sketch a picture of China's innovation (i.e. how 'innovative' does 
China look like when conventional quantitative indicators are used?). The same section 
also explains why we believe this method is insufficient to understand the nature and 
the determinants of innovation in the Chinese PV firms and to address the research 
questions in this thesis. 
Sections 2.3 to 2.5 constitute the theoretical core of the thesis. Section 2.3 set 
the theoretical scene by briefly explaining why two apparently different streams of 
literature have been both taken into account. Section 2.4 reviews the IS literature, its 
main insights and the limits in understanding technological upgrading in PV firms in 
China. Particular attention is given both to a variant of the IS approach - the National 
Innovation System (section 2.4.6) - for its relevance in the study of innovation in 
developing countries, as well as to the application of the IS approach to the study of 
RET (Section 2.4.7). 
Section 2.5 critically reviews some selected strengths and limits of the TC 
literature as they relate to the main purpose if this study. 
Section 2.6 closes the chapter, by summarising the main points discussed in the 
Chapter. 
4 See Smith (2005) for a discussion of the quantitative measurement of innovation. 
5 Section 2.3 in this chapter explains in detail why this study adopted both literatures. 
6 This aspect will be specifically discussed in Chapter 7. 
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We start with Section 2.2, where we critically examine the approach that is most 
commonly used to understand technological change (i.e. the use of quantitative 
indicators) and assess its robustness and appropriateness in studying the innovation 
behaviour of the Chinese PV firms. 
2.2 A critical examination of the use of quantitative 
indicators to study innovation in the PV firms in China 
The technological change process and the driving forces that are behind it can 
be studied from a number of perspectives. A common approach is to develop 
quantitative indicators that could be used to measure and assess the innovation 
behaviour of countries, industries or firms. The importance of developing indicators 
rests upon the need to provide a sound enough and 'measurable' basis for comparing 
the innovative effort of different economies (or firms) in a range of sub-sectors (Smith, 
2005) and a hands-on tool for the design of appropriate policies aimed at stimulating 
innovation (OECD and Eurostat, 1997). 
In this and the following section we will focus on this quantitative approach and 
critically assess the extent to which it helps a better understanding of firm-level PV 
innovation in China. In Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 we discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses of two broad and widely adopted families of innovation indicators: the so-
called input-output indicators and trade data. In Section 2.2.3 we use these indicators 
to picture China's innovativeness and to discuss critically the extent to which they 
provide a sound enough analytical basis to understand innovation in the context of the 
Chinese firms involved in PV production. 
2.2.1 Input-output innovation indicators 
A common way to design innovation indicators is to reason in terms of 'input-
output factors'. It is assumed that for innovation to take place a certain number of 
inputs are needed (e.g. funds should be put into R&D activities) and that the results of 
these inputs could be observed by considering, for instance, proxies like the number of 
patents issued by a firm or by a certain industrial sector. It follows that R&D 
expenditure or data on patent applications are among the major established quantitative 
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indicators that have been used for innovation analysis (Smith, 2005, Griliches, 1990, 
Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003)7'8. 
R&D expenditure 
Innovation input measures, such as R&D expenditure at the national level or as 
a percentage of a firm's sales, have the merit of being collected through national 
surveys over time9 . This can allow for time series analysis and could provide a 
consistent basis for comparisons across projects and industries and therefore be used as 
a guide for policy implementation. 
Although widely adopted in innovation surveys19, R&D data presents a number 
of limitations in describing innovation. First, although it is a key input to innovation 
and it is clearly related to technical change (i.e. one can reasonably expect that limited 
R&D expenditure will not create a fertile enough ground for innovation to emerge), it 
does not measure it. The R&D input can in fact be used more or less efficiently: a high 
R&D expenditure does not necessarily correspond to a lot of new products being 
developed and diffused on the market (OECD and Eurostat, 1997, Smith, 2005). 
Secondly, the indicator does not capture other inputs closely related to innovation such 
as design, product engineering, trial production, training of employees and technology 
service expenditures (Kleinknecht et al., 2002). 
When this indicator is used in a developing country context, additional 
difficulties can be encountered. The use of R&D expenditure in fact poorly represents 
technology development investments in those firms (often of small dimensions and 
resources) that lack distinct R&D laboratories or other units with separate functional 
and accounting identity (Kleinknecht et al., 2002). These features tend to be common in 
Keith Smith, in a comprehensive review of innovation measurement, mentions other important 
classes of indicators: 1) bibliometric data, that is: data on scientific publication and citation; 2) 
technometirc indicators, which explore the technical performance of products; 3) databases on specific 
topics developed as research tools by individuals or groups; 4) synthetic indicators developed for 
scoreboard purposes by consultants (Smith, 2005). 
8 Besides the traditional and most common innovation indicators that are discussed here, there is a 
recent research project (funded by the European Commission) aimed at developing indicators and 
statistics 	specific 	for 	eco-innovation. 	More 	details 	are 	available 	at: 
http://www.meritunu.edu/MEI/index.php  
9 Eurostat regularly collects data on R&D expenditure and personnel, see: 
http://epp.eurostatec.europa.eutportal/page?_pageid=0,1136250,0215572552&_dad=portal&_schema=P  
ORTAL 
I° One of the most authoritative innovation surveys (available at EUROSTAT) is the Community 
Innovation Survey (CSI), which, as of 2007, had been carried out five times in all the EU Member States 
(CIS 5). Some non-EU countries perform very similar surveys according to the methodology suggested 
by the OECD Oslo Manual (OECD and Eurostat, 1997). These include Canada, USA, Australia and 
South Africa. 
42 
firms in developing countries (Romijn, 2002), where technical change often occurs 
through less formal and non easily quantifiable sources like learning by doing or 
learning to improve at the shop-floor' l (Lundvall, 1992, Bell, 1984, Forbes and Wield, 
2002). Moreover, it has also been noted (Forbes and Wield, 2000) that what matters 
more for firms in developing countries, is not the amount of the R&D expenditure 
(which is unlikely to match that of firms in mature economies), but its focus, i.e. the 
purpose for which R&D is undertaken'2. 
It follows that using the amount of R&D expenditure as the unique indicator to 
derive conclusions on a firm's or a country's innovation performance could provide 
only a partial picture of a more complex reality, especially in developing countries. 
Patents 
Innovation output indicators, like patents granted by national patent offices, 
present a number of advantages in gaining insights into innovation activities. Patents 
applications are regularly collected and searchable in publicly available data bases13 
(Cooper and Merrill, 1997). Moreover, the detailed classification by technical field 
allows some hints as to the direction of technological change. 
A number of drawbacks are also encountered when using patents as an 
innovation indicator (Griliches, 1990, Pavitt, 1988, Archibugi and Planta, 1996), 
however. Not all inventions are patented because firms might, for instance, decide to 
protect their innovations with alternative methods, most notably secrecy (Archibugi and 
Planta, 1996). Moreover, "[...] many patents correspond to invention with a near zero 
technological and economic value, whereas a few of them have very high value; many 
patents never lead to innovation" (OECD and Eurostat, 1997, p. 13). 
The use of patent statistics to measure innovation taking place in developing 
countries is even more problematic. In these countries innovative modifications may be 
made to foreign technologies, which may be copied or adapted to suit local conditions 
and specific requirements. "These minor improvements, although locally relevant and 
`new', are not straightforwardly translated into patents. Local learning may exist 
without local patenting" (da Motta e Albuquerque, 2000, p. 1048). 
11 Different types of firm-level learning are discussed in detail in section 2.5.4. 
12 As will be discussed in more detail in the following part of this thesis (section 2.5.4), it is 
suggested that firms in developing countries should direct their R&D effort towards the enhancement of 
independent design and product development capacity (Forbes and Wield, 2000). 
13 The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) 
have up-to-date databases on all the patents filed in the USA and in Europe. 
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As in the case of R&D expenditure, patent data cannot provide a comprehensive 
picture of technological upgrading, especially in developing countries where innovation 
could occur in non-conventional ways that are instead common in industrialised 
countries (i.e. in-house formal R&D followed by patent applications). 
2.2.2 Trade data as indicators of innovation 
A second broad group of indicators has been developed to specifically address 
product innovation. International trade statistics could be used to "capture the 
upgrading performance of different economies in a range of sub-sectors" (Kaplinsky 
and Readman, 2005, p. 680). It is in other words possible to infer a country's 
technological performance by looking at the high-tech content of the products it exports. 
The main limitation of looking at trade data is that they can give indication only 
on product innovation, for which they have been specifically designed, but not on other 
types of innovation such as process innovation (i.e. improvements in the way in which 
goods are produced) or indeed organisational innovation (i.e. new ways to organise 
production and distribution). Moreover the use of trade data to asses a country's high-
tech endowment may well give an indication of what that specific country does at that 
point in time, but it cannot tell us what the country could do in the future. Today's trade 
figures do not capture the time and effort needed for technological change and 
innovation to occur because these are gradual and cumulative processes. Therefore 
trade data offer, at best, a snapshot of current product innovation but do not shed light 
on the technological accumulation path of enterprises and on their potential for 
innovation in the future. Furthermore, international trade statistics do little to explain 
the determinants of innovation (Kaplinsky and Readman, 2005). 
As in the case of the two previously presented indicators, trade data are an 
imperfect indicator to use to derive definitive conclusions on one country's 
innovativeness and innovation potential. 
2.2.3 Depicting China's innovative potential by using quantitative indicators 
Quantitative indicators, like the ones reviewed in the previous sections, have 
been widely adopted in the literature to assess technological upgrading in both mature 14 
14 As a reference, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) mentioned at the beginning of Section 
2.2.1, could be cited. The survey collects a wide number of information, including R&D expenditure and 
number of patents held by the firms interviewed. 
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and developing countries, China included (see among others: Rosen, 2003, Cheung and 
Lin, 2004, Hu and Mathews, 2008). 
China's outstanding economic growth in the last twenty-eight years has 
prompted questions, both within China (Gu, 1996, Chen and Xu, 2000, Fan, 2006, 
Guan et al., 2006, Liu and Lundin, 2006, Shen, 1999) and among foreign observers 
(Rosen, 2003, Yam et al., 2004, Steinfeld, 2004, Sigurdson, 2005) about the future 
prospects for the country's economic development and the extent to which this will be 
driven by technology-based gains. Moreover, China's growing share of world exports 
has spurred concerns about the extent to which the country will be able to compete in 
international markets with high value-added products and pose, in this way, a possible 
competitive threat to mature economies, and to its Asian neighbours (Lail and 
Albaladejo, 2004). Studies addressing these issues and backing their findings with 
quantitative indicators have then started to emerge and to form a growing body of 
empirical evidence. 
Table 1 Depicting China's technological progresses with quantitative indicators 
Indicator 
% GDP spent on R&D 
Annual rate of growth in 
government R&D budget 
Share of world scientific 	2.05% 
publications 	 6.52% 
Applications for invention 
patents15 
Growth rate of invention 
patent applications 
China's exports of high-tech 
products (% of all exports) 
China's imports of high-
tech products 
Year Source 
OECD, 2006, National Bureau of Statistics 
and Ministry of Science and Technology, 
2002 and 2006 
National Bureau of Statistics and 
Ministry of Science and Technology, 2006 
Zhou and Leydesdorff, 2006 
2005 	SIPO, 2005 
1995 	National Bureau of Statistics and 
2002 	Ministry of Science and Technology, 2003 
1995 	National Bureau of Statistics and 
2002 	Ministry of Science and Technology, 2003 
Quantity 
0.6% 
1.3% 
19.2% 
173,000 
23% 
annually 
since 2000 
6.8% 
20.8% 
16.5% 
28.0 
1995 
2005 
2005 
1995 
2004 
2005 	SIPO, 2005 
15 There are three types of patents available in China: design, utility models and inventions. "A 
design pertains to the shape, pattern, colour or their combination in a product, which creates an aesthetic 
feeling and is fit for industrial application although it cannot be required to have a technical solution 
[...]. For utility models 'inventiveness' requires the utility model to have substantive features and 
represent progress compared with the technology existing before the date of filing. For inventions, the 
`inventiveness' requirement is greater than for utility models—the invention must have prominent 
substantive features and represent notable progress" (Fai, 2005). 
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Table 1 uses some of the most recently available quantitative indicators to 
sketch a picture of the state of China's science and innovation and how this has 
changed over time. 
The table reveals some interesting, yet complicated, trends, about China's 
innovativeness. By looking at the indicators, there has certainly been an improvement 
over time in China's innovation performance: the percentage of the GDP spent on R&D 
has more than doubled since 1995 (from 0.6% of GDP in 1995 to 1.3% in 2005) with 
China becoming in 2006 the world's second highest investor in R&D after the United 
States (OECD, 2006); the number of scientific publications has risen from around 2% 
of the world share in 1995 to 6.5% in 2004; China's exports of high-tech products has 
increased from 6.8% of all products exported in 1995 to 20.8% in 2002. 
A closer look to the indicators in Table 1 provides a more complex picture, 
however. By analysing China's trade data, Rosen notes that, although 21% of Chinese 
exports in 2002 was listed as high-tech (National Bureau of Statistics and 
Ministry of Science and Technology, 2002), these were dominated by parts and 
accessories for finished information technology products (Rosen, 2003). Moreover, 
when looking at China's trade data by type of enterprise, 60% of China's high-tech 
exports in the period Jan-Aug 2003 were done by wholly foreign owned enterprises 
(Rosen, 2003). These findings are further confirmed by a study about technology 
transfer and trade specialisation in China (Lemoine and Unal-Kesenci, 2004), where the 
authors argue that the country's competitive industries are dominated by foreign 
affiliates that coexist with a traditional export sector that lags behind and is dominated 
by wholly Chinese firms. They claim that the links and spillovers between the two 
sectors are quite weak. Although the specialisation of China in assembling high-tech 
products has allowed the country to rise the level of its exports (from low tech content-
products to high-tech ones), the dissemination of foreign technology to the rest of 
China's industrial capacities has been slow. 
A similarly mixed picture emerges from bibliometrics data. If the number of 
China's scientific publications has recently increased sharply, as is illustrated by 
Table 1 above, China's citation rate, which is used as a proxy for the quality of the 
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scientific publications, is low, with only 2 Chinese scholars cited in the top 100 most 
cited international scientists (People's Daily, 2006)16. 
Invention patent filings, one of the three types of patents recognised by the 
Chinese patent law and the one with the highest innovative content, have increased in 
the country by 23% annually since 2000. Although 54% of all the invention patents 
filed in 2005 were made by Chinese firms (against 46% by foreign firms), the bulk of 
all the domestic patent applications in 2005 were still patents for utility models and 
industrial designs (i.e. the two types of patents with the least significant technical 
improvements). As a comparison, of the three types of patents filed by foreign firms in 
China in 2005, the majority (85.5%) were patents for inventions. 
As far as the data pertaining to firm-level innovation are concerned, a report 
published by the OECD (2002a) notes that in-house R&D expenditure and personnel 
involved in R&D, are extremely low when compared to mature economies. 
Looking at recent data on innovation inputs and outputs can hence provide 
useful, yet incomplete, information on how China's technological upgrading is 
changing. However, it is precisely by using quantitative indicators that China is 
commonly perceived to have a poor science and innovation performance. China's high-
tech production is often described as being 'not so high-tech, nor so Chinese' 17 (Rosen, 
2003, Gilboy, 2004); the country is depicted as possessing weak technological 
capabilities (Dahlman and Aubert, 2001, OECD, 2002a) and as having a competitive 
advantage based on low-end commodity manufacturing where cheap labour plays an 
important role (Steinfeld, 2004, Arayama and Mourdoukoutas, 1999). 
These common perceptions and the data they are based upon, do not take into 
account that there are emerging evidence that in certain sectors China is indeed making 
progress towards indigenous innovation. Nanoscience and nanotechnology are two 
notable examples of how the scientific community in China has made: "remarkable 
advances across the R&D spectrum, from fundamental scientific research to studies 
into the potential societal implications of new nanotechnologies" (Wilsdon and Keeley, 
2007, p. 24). Also in other sectors, like public digital switching systems, China has 
developed technological capabilities not only in production, operation and maintenance, 
16 Also this Figure does not deliver a univocal picture of the quality level of the Chinese 
publications because a low citation rate could be equally due to poor-quality science but also to language 
and cultural factors (Zhou and Leydesdorff, 2006). 
17 Recall the point made in the previous page about China's exports. 
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but also in innovation and creation of new technological knowledge (Shen, 1999, p. 
188). China is also moving forward in more traditional sectors like textile where the 
PRC has established a strong competitive advantage not only because of its low labour 
costs but also by significant technological upgrading. "[...] Many Chinese companies 
are in fact already offering improved supply-chain management and value-added 
services in design" (Sigurdson, 2004, p. 4). 
2.2.4 Concluding remarks on the use of quantitative indicators to study 
innovation in PV firms in China 
What all the discussion done so far in this section adds up to is that taking 
quantitative indicators at face value tells us only part of the story about technological 
upgrading. This is particularly true in a country like China where differences across 
regions, industrial sectors and actors that take part in the economic process (i.e. state 
owned enterprises vs private or foreign firms) are enormous; where the speed of change 
is formidable and where what is true today might well be outdated in five years time. 
Moreover the situation is further complicated by the way in which the national 
economy is more and more bound up in global networks and flows of knowledge, 
capital and talent. 
Although approaches based on quantitative indicators certainly add to our 
understanding of innovation, they are not powerful enough to capture a much more 
complex dynamic, especially in developing countries, where innovation often should be 
understood as a dynamic adaptation process and where formal indicators developed to 
depict behaviour common in mature economies (i.e. patenting, in-house R&D) do not 
seem always appropriate. Entire chapters could be written about China's innovativeness 
on the potential interpretations of each of the statistics in the Table 1, but the dominant 
message to convey here is just how fast the country and its innovation system is 
changing to be depicted by numbers alone. Based on these considerations we have 
decided not to follow the quantitative indicator approach but to adopt an alternative 
route to gauge how technological change is taking place in China. We will focus on a 
high-tech industry (i.e. solar PV), which has also been the fastest growing power 
generation technology in latest years (Martinot, 2006), and assess how China is 
performing here and what is driving its firms forward. We will do so by combining 
insights coming from both the TC and the IS literature in the hope that this could 
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provide a richer picture of the nature and the drivers behind technological change in the 
country. 
The remaining part of the chapter explains in depth the theoretical point of 
departure of this thesis. 
2.3 Technological capability and innovation system 
literatures: why do they both constitute the theoretical 
underpinning of the thesis? 
When the literature review for this thesis started in 2003, it appeared clear that 
there was no group of studies directly and specifically addressing the same problem of 
this thesis, i.e. innovation for renewable energy technologies in firms in developing 
countries, particularly in China. Only one study existed (Dai and Shi, 1999), to the best 
of the author's knowledge, but it was not based on a sound analytical approach that 
could be used as a point of departure. 
It followed that to provide the study with a suitable theoretical underpinning it 
was necessary to turn to the available literary traditions that more closely addressed 
issues similar to those of this thesis: what is the process through which RET emerge 
and diffuse on the market? What is relevant in their development and what can 
contribute to their further diffusion? How does technological change take place in firms 
in developing countries? How does this happen and through which accumulation 
processes? 
As noted in Chapter 1 and at the beginning of this Chapter, two literatures 
appeared suitable and provided useful, yet, as explained below, partial, insights: the 
innovation system (IS) and the technological capability (TC) literatures. 
Recently a group of studies belonging to the IS literature has started to emerge 
and to address the factors and forces governing the innovation process for RET (Foxon, 
2003, ICCEPT and E4Tech, 2003, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Jacobsson and Johnson, 
2000, Foxon et al., 2005). One of the articles on the topic (Jacobsson et al., 2004), 
where a technology-specific innovation framework was developed and applied, among 
other RE technologies, to solar PV in Germany was the departing point of this thesis. 
Innovation is understood in this article as both an individual - at the firm level - and a 
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collective act, where organisations, institutions and the links between them all concur 
in the emergence of a new energy technology. This aspect, together with the 
identification of a number of factors contributing to the success of the German solar PV 
industry (Jacobsson et al., 2004) were all elements considered of relevance for this 
thesis. However, as discussed in Section 2.4.8, the article did not provide any specific 
insight into knowledge accumulation and technological improvement in firms, which 
are among the key concerns of this thesis. Firms are analysed by the article only as part 
of a broader innovation system and in terms of systemic dynamics. Furthermore, the 
fact that the technology specific framework of the article was developed and applied to 
RE technologies in a mature country context (i.e., Germany) prompted the author of 
this thesis to question its appropriateness for a rapidly industrialising country context. 
In developing countries it has been argued that: "[...] very few patterns of the socio-
economic behaviour regarding innovation at national level can be viewed as working in 
a system-like manner" (Arocena and Sutz, 2000, p. 58). 
For these reasons the use of the IS approach as the unique theoretical 
contribution on which to ground the thesis was considered not sufficient and the 
attention was turned to another extensive body of literature: the so-called technological 
capability literature where firm-specific dynamics are studied and where firm-level 
innovation is understood in terms of capability accumulation and technological learning. 
This literature, particularly the part with a focus on developing countries 
(Dahlman et al., 1987, Katz, 1984, Bell, 1984, Lall, 1992, Bell and Pavitt, 1995, Mani 
and Romijn, 2004, Romijn, 1997), suggests that elements such as access to knowledge 
external to the country or the firm, the firm's endowment in terms of education and 
entrepreneurial culture together with the effort put in learning (via formal R&D but 
more often through daily improvements on the shop floor) are critical factors in the 
development and diffusion of new technologies in firms in developing countries. 
The two bodies of literature adopt two different analytical perspectives: a 
systemic macroeconomic one versus a micro-economic, firm level one. They both 
contribute to our understanding of technological change and they are both relevant for 
this thesis. However, as it is detailed in the following pages of this chapter, each of 
them yields only partial insight towards the understanding of the nature and the 
determinants of innovation in PV firms in China, which are the central problems of the 
study. This is the reason why they both constitute the theoretical underpinning of the 
50 
research and have been used to develop the analytical framework discussed in Chapter 
3. 
In what follows the insights coming from these two literatures, their relevance 
but also their limits in addressing the core concern of the thesis are discussed in details 
in separate sections. 
2.4 The Innovation System literature 
This section presents an overview of the innovation system (IS) approach. The 
first part, sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.5, reviews broad analytical aspects of the IS approach: 
why the concept of system is useful in the study of innovation, how a system is 
structured and performs, how it evolves over time and what are the policy implications 
of a systemic understanding of innovation. 
The second part of the review narrows down the discussion by focussing first on 
one specific variant of the more general IS approach: the national innovation system 
(section 2.4.6) and then on the empirical findings of a group of studies that have 
applied the IS approach to the study of renewable energy (section 2.4.7). Section 2.4 
ends with a discussion of the limits of the IS approach in understanding the nature and 
the determinants of the innovation effort underway in the Chinese PV firms (section 
2.4.8). 
2.4.1 Why do we need a system to study innovation? 
In early economic models (Schumpeter, 1934) innovation was perceived as a 
linear sequence of stages that starts with an invention (understood as a practical 
demonstration of an idea), goes through innovation (the first commercial application of 
the original idea in the market) and terminates with diffusion (the spreading of the 
innovation on a large commercial scale). 
More recent approaches (Lundvall, 1985, Freeman, 1987, Nelson, 1993, Dosi et 
al., 1988, Carlsson et al., 2002, Fagerberg et al., 2005, Bergek et al., 2008, Edquist, 
1997) have shown that this early understanding of innovation is an oversimplification 
and that innovation is better understood as a process of matching technical possibilities 
to market opportunities (Freeman and Soete, 1997). The innovation process involves 
multiple and bi-directional interactions between the different stages that contribute to 
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the development of new technologies: research, development, demonstration, 
commercialisation and diffusion (ICCEPT and E4Tech, 2003)18. Practical needs of the 
consumers, which pertain to the diffusion of technologies, affect the type of research 
that is conducted, for instance, by research institutes or private firms. This in turn, 
affects the path that is followed to disseminate new technologies on the markets 
(Fagerberg, 2005). Frequent overlaps and feedbacks between the different stages of 
technological development distinguish innovation as a non-linear, dynamic and multi-
agent process where technologies are continuously adapted and improved to better fit 
conditions and requirements. 
However, there is more to this dynamic understanding of innovation since also 
framework conditions affect the process through which technologies emerge and 
diffuse in the markets (Edquist, 2005). This is for instance the case of government 
policy intervention19 or of the different investment options available on the market. 
Policies promoted by a government affect the behaviour of the business community, 
which, in turn, affect the government's action. 
Recognition of the importance of the relationship between the many 
counteracting stages and elements of the innovation process suggests that innovation 
would be better understood within a systems framework (Lundvall, 1985, Freeman, 
1987, Nelson, 1988, Dosi et al., 1988, Edquist, 1997). The innovation system approach 
can then be considered as a conceptual tool we use to better illustrate and understand 
complex system dynamics and performance (Bergek et al., 2008). 
The understanding of innovation as a dynamic, multi-agent, non-linear and 
systemic process is represented in Figure 3. 
18 It should be noted that this subdivision of the innovation process in different stages is here 
adopted to provide theoretical underpinning to the way in which the technological maturity and the 
market penetration of the different PV families is presented in Chapter 4. 
19 As an example, the recent diffusion of RE technologies on the market, and in particular of solar 
PV, has been driven by support policies promoted in different EU countries (Blok, 2006), Japan and 
more recently in some states in the US (Martinot, 2005). More details on policy intervention to support 
PV could be found in Chapter 4. 
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Two ideas are central to the innovation system approach2° and recur in all 
studies: the role of learning and of institutions. The IS approach puts knowledge 
creation, diffusion and hence learning at the centre of the innovation process (Lundvall, 
1992). This reflects the understanding that innovation is a cumulative process that 
involves: "[...] producing new knowledge or combining existing (and sometimes new) 
elements of knowledge in new ways as well as diffusing and utilizing it. Thereby the IS 
approach distinguishes itself from approaches where technological change and other 
innovations are regarded as exogenous" (Johnson et al., 2003, p. 6). Moreover, a wide 
set of sources of innovation is taken into account: innovation reflects not only formal 
learning that occurs via R&D, but also interactive learning taking place in connection 
with ongoing activities in procurement, production and sales (Johnson et al., 2003). 
As explained above, the IS approach emphasizes interdependence and non-
linearity (Johnson et al., 2003). This is based on the understanding that innovation is 
both an individual (at the firm level) and a collective act. Firms do not innovate in 
isolation but interact with other organizations through complex relations that are 
characterized by reciprocity and feedback mechanisms in several loops. These 
interactions occur in the context of institutions—e.g., laws, rules, regulations, norms 
and cultural habits (Johnson et al., 2003). It follow that to explore the technological 
20 The term 'approach' is here used because the IS perspective cannot be considered a formal 
theory, in the sense that it does not provide specific propositions regarding causal relations among 
variables. Edquist suggests to call IS an approach or a conceptual framework rather than a theory 
(Edquist and Johnson, 1997, pp. 28-29). 
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dynamics of innovation it is crucial to study the interplay between organizations and 
institutions (Balzat and Hanusch, 2003). 
It should be noted that the term 'institutions' is controversial in the IS because it 
is used in different senses by different authors. In a narrow sense, institutions are 
conceived as types of organizations and include, for instance, universities or technology 
institutes. In broad terms, institutions include the political context, habits, practices, 
norms and the rules regulating relations and interactions between people as well as 
shaping social interaction (Johnson, 1992). 
Since its first adoption in the mid 1980s (Lundvall, 1985), the IS concept has 
been explored and widely adopted in the literature by different scholars (Freeman, 1987, 
Dosi et al., 1988, Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993, Carlsson et al., 2002) as well as by 
international organisations, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 1997, OECD, 1999, OECD, 2002b) which has used it to 
examine innovation patterns in different sectors21, and, more recently, by the United 
Nations Commission on Trade and Development (Nassif, 2007). 
2.4.2 How a system is structured and how it performs 
The IS approach aims at improving our understanding of the innovation process 
and of what determines it. This goal can be achieved by the identification and study of 
the different system components and by understanding what is going on in the system, 
i.e. by identifying and studying both the structural characteristics of the system and 
those processes that have a direct impact on the performance of the system (Edquist, 
2005, Bergek et al., 2008). In what follows we discuss in turn these two aspects by 
borrowing from the technological innovation system (TIS) tradition (see among others: 
Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, Bergek et al., 2008). This is a variant of the more 
general IS approach, where the innovation system is focussed: "[...] on the 
development, diffusion and use of a particular technology (in terms of knowledge, 
product or both)" (Bergek et al., 2008, p. 408). 
Since the TIS approach has been adopted by several authors interested in 
innovation for RET22 and because this study has a technology specific focus, we 
21 The technological sectors include energy, pharmaceutical biotechnology and knowledge 
intensive service activities (OECD, 2003/2004). 
22 For the specific empirical findings of the IS approach applied to RET see Section 2.4.7. 
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believe the insights offered by this IS variant to study a system's structure and 
performance are particularly appropriate for our purposes. 
System structure 
An IS, and more specifically a TIS, is described in the literature (Carlsson et al., 
2002, Edquist, 2005) as having two types of constituents: the components (also called 
`elements') and the relations among them. 
The components can be distinguished in: organisations and institutions. 
Organisations can be defined as "formal structures that are consciously created 
and have an explicit purpose" (Edquist, 2005, p. 188). Organisations, which are also 
defined in the literature as actors (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, ICCEPT and E4Tech, 
2003), include for instance, firms, universities, users, venture capitalists, etc. 
Institutions are instead the habits, norms, routines and rules or laws that 
determine and affect the behaviour of the organisations or actors (Edquist, 2005, 
Bergek et al., 2008). 
In other words, organisations can be regarded as the players and the institutions 
as the rule of the game23. 
Relations or networks that exist among the different system's components are 
created and used to transfer knowledge and information (Lundvall, 1992). Knowledge, 
financial inputs, people (who detains both tacit knowledge and know-how), policy 
regulations and market inputs are all part of the flows that connect a system together 
(Niosi, 2002, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2006)24. 
23 Some authors prefer a slightly different classification of the systems components by identifying 
the actors according to the role they play in the system. In this case we can have actors involved in 
creating and/or sharing knowledge, who include academics and technology developers; actors 
disseminating and using knowledge in the form of intellectual property (IP) and commercial products, 
such as project developers and end-users; and actors setting the framework conditions. They include 
government departments and regulators, research founders and financial investors (Foxon et al., 2005). 
24 Bergek et al. (2008) distinguish between formal and informal networks. The former are created 
to solve a specific task and may include, for example, standardization networks, technology platform 
consortia, public—private partnerships, etc. The latter are instead formed and evolve in a less orchestrated 
way. Buyer—seller relationships or university—industry links could be taken as example of informal 
networks. 
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System performance: functional dynamics25 
In terms of 'how' a system works and what can have a direct impact on its 
functioning, scholars from Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden, have 
undertaken thorough reviews of the literature (Johnson, 1998, Johnson and Jacobsson, 
2001) to understand what actually 'happens' within an innovation system and more 
specifically in a TIS26. They identified (Bergek et al., 2008), following a number of 
subsequent refinements (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2006), 
seven key processes that are referred to in the literature as being important (and 
therefore that could be expected to occur within a system) for innovation to emerge and 
diffuse. They name these key processes as fiinctions27 . Whereas a system has an overall 
function, which can be conceptualized as the generation, diffusion and use of 
innovation (Edquist, 2005), the seven key processes can be understood as sub-functions 
that concur in the achievement of innovation (i.e. the overall function). 
The seven sub-functions are (Bergek et al., 2008): 
I. Knowledge development 
This function is concerned about the knowledge base of the system. This is 
because the existence and performance of a system critically depends on the 
creation and diffusion of knowledge. The function encompasses different types 
of knowledge (like, scientific, production, logistics and design knowledge) as 
25 The discussion of the system performance is mainly focused, as said previously, on the TIS 
perspective and on the analytical contributions provided by scholars of Chalmers University in Sweden 
(Johnson, 1998; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Bergek et al., 2008). Since their insights have been applied 
to the analysis of emerging RE innovation systems and they are of particular relevance to this study. 
26 A review of the literature has also been undertaken by Hekkert et al. (2007b), who have 
identified a number of requirements (or functions) that need to be accomplished for well-performing 
innovations systems. 
27 Other IS studies have identified key processes that occur within a system. Edquist (2005) refers 
to activities and identifies 10 of them that he groups in four main categories: a) activities that are 
important to provide knowledge inputs to innovation. They include provisions of R&D, as well as 
education and training; b) activities relevant for the demand side of innovation and its diffusion on the 
market. Formation of new product markets and the articulation of quality requirements for improved or 
new products are all included in this category; c) activities that are conducive for the emergence of the 
constituents of the system. These include creating and/or changing organisations and institutions, as well 
as, stimulating networking through markets and other mechanisms; d) activities that can provide 
innovation-specific services in firms. Providing consultancy services of relevance for innovation 
processes (e.g. technology transfer, commercial information, and legal advice), financing innovation and 
offering access to facilities or administrative support are examples of the activities in this category. 
Although conceptually quite similar to the functions identified by Bergek et al. (2008), the 
activities put forward by Edquist are structural in nature (see the activities in group c above) and, being 
quite specific, do not include all the more general functions found in Bergek and colleagues. For these 
reasons we prefer to focus on the functional approach suggested by Bergek (and by the TIS approach) 
rather than on the activities described by Edquist. 
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well as different sources of knowledge, like R&D, learning by doing or by 
experimenting and imitation. 
2. Influence in the direction of search 
For a TIS to work and for innovation to be achieved, a whole range of 
organisations, and indeed firms, have to choose to enter the system. This could 
be achieved if there are sufficient incentives for the firms or the organisations to 
do so. Incentives could include a belief in growth potential, a favourable 
regulatory or policy framework and demand from leading customers (Bergek et 
al., 2008). 
3. Supply of resources 
Similarly to the key role played by knowledge, different types of resources are 
needed for a system to emerge and evolve. These include, but are not limited to: 
human capital to be enhanced through education in specific scientific and 
technological fields; financial capital as well as services and network 
infrastructure. 
4. Creation of positive externalities 
When the system moves from an early formation period (see discussion in 
Section 2.4.3) to a more mature stage with a larger number of actors 
participating in the innovation process, networks between them are created 
where information is exchanged and where self-reinforcing mechanisms of 
cause and effect are created. These lead to positive externalities that could 
include both network externalities and other spillovers such as, for instance, the 
effect of the R&D done by one company on another one. The entrance in the 
system of new firms is particularly important in this process (Bergek et al., 
2008). As an example, new firms entering the system contribute to the 
formation of markets which in turn can strengthen the technology legitimation 
and the institutional framework. Producer and user networks could be formed 
facilitating the exchange of information and the development of knowledge. 
"New entrants may contribute to a process whereby the other functions are 
strengthened, benefiting other members of the IS. This function is therefore not 
independent, but rather one which indicates the dynamics of the system" 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2006, p. 692). 
5. Facilitation of market formation 
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For innovation to develop and diffuse, markets are needed. In an emerging TIS 
markets may not exist or can be difficult to access because existing and 
embedded technologies may prevent emerging technologies from accessing 
these potential markets (Hekkert et al., 2007b). New technologies need hence to 
be supported in their market search progression. One way of doing this is to 
create a protected space: the formation of temporary niche markets for specific 
applications of a technology (Kemp et al., 1998, Schot et al., 1994). 
6. Stimulus of entrepreneurial experimentation 
Innovation involves a high degree of technological, market and application 
uncertainty. As an example that will be discussed in more details in Chapter 4, 
not necessarily the PV technology family that now dominates the market (i.e. 
crystalline Silicon, hereafter c-Si) is the one that will have the largest market 
share in the years to come. For this reason it is important to facilitate 
entrepreneurial experimentations so that a wide range of ideas, designs or 
market applications could be tried out. Many will possibly fail along the way 
but some will succeed and a social learning process will be initiated (Kemp et 
al., 1998). 
7. The legitimation of nascent technologies or industries 
To develop well, a new technology has to become part of an incumbent regime 
and to gain a technological, market as well as a political space. Parties with 
vested interests could be expected to oppose the emergence of the new 
technology. Advocacy coalitions are then needed, "[...] they put the new 
technology on the agenda, lobby for resources and favourable tax regimes and 
by doing so create legitimacy for a new technological trajectory" (Hekkert et al., 
2007a, p. 4679). 
Functions influence each other. The fulfilment of a certain function will quite 
likely influence the fulfilment of other functions (Hekkert et al., 2007b, Bergek et al., 
2008). It could for instance happen that an increased legitimation of an emerging 
technology could have a positive fall out on the creation of markets 28 . Multiple 
interactions between functions affect the performance of the system and can initiate a 
28 This is indeed what happened in the case of solar cells in Germany, where pressure groups 
succeeded in lobbying in favour of the new technology (i.e. in legitimating it) and in pushing the 
government towards the promotion of the feed-in tariff. This had, in turn the effect of stimulating 
installed capacity and the on-grid market (Jacobsson et al., 2004). 
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virtuous circle trough which the different functions strengthen each others and pave the 
way for innovation to diffuse on the market (Bergek et al., 2008). 
The adoption of the concept of functions, i.e. the key processes that can be 
expected to occur in a system and that are conducive to the formation and diffusion of 
new technologies, provides a useful analytical tool in the study of the innovation 
process. It allows in fact to separate the system's structure from its functioning and to 
identify key issues upon which to focus in policy intervention (Bergek et al., 2008). 
This is analytically important because systems with similar structure could well 
perform quite differently. Moreover, how do we know whether the existence of a 
particular actor in a system is a strength (i.e. it concurs in the achievement of 
innovation) or a weakness? (Bergek et al., 2008). 
The importance of this aspect (i.e. the distinction between structure and 
performance) could be appreciated by quoting a recent study on the Chinese innovation 
system (Liu and White, 2001). Liu and White notice that describing only the elements 
of a system — categories of actors, institutions and policies — poorly represents 
differences across systems with different departing points. They argue that: "[...] using 
organizational categories such as 'research institute', 'firm' or 'government' can 
generate more confusion than insights, since, in different national or industrial contexts, 
these may have very different meanings in terms of the range of activities they 
undertake" (Liu and White, 2001, p. 1093). In the case of China, as will be explained in 
Chapter 5, during the planned economy period (1949-1978), the role of actors like 
firms or research institutes was much more restricted than in other countries (firms did 
not have, for instance, the mandate nor the incentive to undertake their own R&D, but 
were executers of limited and specific activities — production — decided and managed 
by the central government). In recognition of the analytical problems that arise from 
comparing different innovation systems on the basis of their structure, Liu and White 
reach similar analytical conclusions as scholars from Chalmers University and suggest 
in their article to adopt a functional analysis focused on the performance implications 
of the system29 (Liu and White, 2001). 
The functional concept is hence a useful analytical tool especially when, as in 
the present research, one wants to better understand technology-centred innovation 
systems different from those to which the IS analysis was originally applied. The 
29 Liu and White specifically talk about five activities - R&D, implementation, end-use, 
education, linkages — and focus on a number of system-level characteristics, including the effectiveness 
of the system in introducing, diffusing and exploiting technological innovations. 
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emphasis on functions does not mean that we can disregard or neglect the 'components' 
of an IS, however. On the contrary, we need to study both the structure and the 
performance of a system to understand innovation processes and to design innovation 
policy (Edquist, 2005). 
Assessing the 'goodness' of a system performance: inducement and blocking 
mechanisms 
If we know how a system is structured and how it works (i.e. what functions are 
known to be conducive to innovation), we can also study the present state of a system 
(Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001), i.e. 'how well' a given system performs with respect to 
the goal of achieving innovation. Since there are many factors that can affect the 
functioning of a given system, scholars from Chalmers University (see for instance 
Bergek et al., 2008) suggest that it can be analytically useful to reason in terms of 
mechanisms that in a particular situation induce or block the system's functions. As an 
illustrative example, which is particularly useful in the context of RET, one can think 
about climate change. Concerns about environmental pollution have in fact prompted 
several governments in mature and developing countries alike to promote ad hoc 
policies for a wider diffusion of RET. These polices have contributed in expanding the 
markets for RET3° (i.e. they have contributed to the 'market creation' function), but 
also in stimulating new firms in entering the RET industry because attracted by 
remunerative markets supported by the government (i.e. government's polices have 
affected the function concerning the influence on the direction of search). Climate 
change has thus acted as an inducing mechanism for some of the functions of the TIS 
that surrounds the different RET. 
Clearly there could be a number of different mechanisms inducing or blocking 
the emergence and the diffusion of an IS and the good functioning of its internal 
processes (i.e. the functions). Differences could for instance depend on the specific 
technology one seeks to study or on the development phase the given technology is in 
(i.e. formative phase or market diffusion)3I. 
Bergek and colleagues provide a few illustrative examples of inducing and 
blocking mechanisms (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Bergek et al., 2008): 
3° The effect had by the feed-in tariff promoted by the German government on wind or PV 
installed capacity is particularly illuminating in this case (Sijm, 2002; Agnolucci, 2006). 
31 See the discussion in section 2.4.3 
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1) Institutions may fail to align to the new technology. They could, for instance, 
not provide a favourable regulatory framework. 
2) Market may not be formed; this could for instance depend on the 
availability of alternatives that could serve similar purposes as the 
technology that is trying to emerge. 
3) New firms may not take part in the emerging system because of the lack of 
markets. 
4) Networks between the different system's components can be weak or non 
existent. 
As in the case of the functions, also the different blocking and inducing 
mechanisms influence and reinforce each other. 
Since inducing and blocking mechanisms are system specific it is not possible 
to provide a general lists that encompasses all of them. In section 2.4.7 in this chapter 
we will specifically focus on those inducing and blocking mechanisms that have been 
identified in the case of RET. 
What is important here to emphasise is that they provide a useful tool to study 
the performance of a system and to suggest appropriate policy intervention that can 
stimulate or remove specific inducing or blocking mechanisms32. 
Figure 4 summarises the theoretical issues we have discussed so far pertaining 
to a system's structure and performance. 
32 Specific policy interventions that have been suggested to remove blocking mechanisms and to 
stimulate certain functions in the emergence and diffusion of RET are discussed in Section 2.4.7 
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Figure 4 System's structure, functions and blocking and inducing mechanisms 
Note 1: the conceptualisation offitnctions and blocking and inducing mechanisms is borrowed from the 
TIS variant of the IS approach. 
Note 2: as specified in the text, there are numerous feedbacks between the inducing and blocking 
mechanisms as well as between the functions. These feedbacks are not illustrated in the Figure in order 
to keep it simple and readable. 
Source: Adapted by the author from Bergek et al. 2008 
2.4.3 Stages of system evolution over time 
For analytical purposes the growth of an emerging TIS can be divided into two 
main development phases: a formative phase and an expansion phase (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004). 
In the formative phases the constituent elements of the system (i.e. actors, 
institutions and the networks) begin to be put into place. New firms and other actors 
(such as, for instance and among others, research institutes) enter the system, markets 
begin to emerge and a process of 'institutional alignment' (which works in favour of 
the emerging technology) is initiated (Jacobsson et al., 2004, Bergek et al., 2008). The 
literature emphasises that this formative period is characterised by a range of 
competing designs, small markets, many entrants and high uncertainty in terms of 
technologies, markets and regulations (Afuah and Utterback, 1997, Kemp et al., 1998, 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). Moreover the rate of the technology diffusion is slow 
and many technological and applicative experiments take place (Bergek et al., 2008). 
At some point in time, the TIS needs to 'change gear' (Bergek et al., 2008) and 
to move into a self-sustaining diffusion phase. This phase, where the TIS expands, is 
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characterised by large-scale technology diffusion through the formation of fast growing 
mass markets. A number of causal interrelationships are likely to occur as a result of 
positive feedback loops that involve all the functions and components of the enlarged 
innovation system (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
The basic idea behind this evolution of the innovation system into phases is that 
each higher level of the system's development has: "a greater degree of stability and 
resistance to change, due to interactions and linkages between the elements forming 
that [system] configuration" (Foxon, 2003, p. 15). As explained below (section 2.4.4) 
higher levels of system development impose constraints on the direction of change of 
innovation systems at a lower level of development (this is due to lock-in mechanisms), 
reinforcing trajectories and consolidating path dependency (see discussion below). 
It is reasonable to expect that the technological and policy requirements of the 
two phases will be different and that, as a consequence, certain functions, among the 
seven identified above, would be more important in a phase than in the other (Bergek et 
al., 2008). In the formative phase one could for instance expect entrepreneurial 
experimentation to be particularly important given the presence of many competing 
designs. Technological variety and experimentation will possibly need to be 
encouraged to give rise to knowledge creation, but at the same time the direction of 
search will need to be influenced to guide the entrepreneurial efforts (for example, a 
number of technological and application approaches are likely to be explored in this 
phase but only few of them will eventually succeed). Resources will need to be 
mobilised to encourage more firms (and in general, more actors) to enter the system and 
a process of technological legitimation (where the new technology is given a positive 
institutional backing) could be expected to be initiated. 
In a formative phase the entry of new firms in the system could be expected to 
play an important role as an inducing mechanism. Firm entry is in fact crucial to kick 
off a positive mechanism of self-reinforcing externalities: more firms entering the 
system means more networks could be developed, more knowledge could be created 
and diffused, more markets could emerge and a stronger legitimacy could be promoted 
around the new technology. 
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In an expansion phase, the need for resource mobilization is likely to increase 
by orders of magnitude and legitimation may become even more important to support 
the growing system (Bergek et al., 2008). 
As a consequence of the different stages in a system's development and of the 
different strength with which the different functions are likely to be served over time, 
also policy measures aimed at stimulating technological change and at ensuring the 
good functioning of the system are likely to change over time 
A cautionary note is important before moving to the next section. The 
distinction we have presented above between the formative and the expansion phase of 
an IS, does not imply that all ISs follow exactly the same development pattern (Bergek 
et al., 2008). Indeed: "the whole point of the functional dynamics approach is that ISs 
differ so much that there are no 'one size fits all' policy implications. Hence, although 
some features in IS development are arguably common to many innovation systems, we 
fully acknowledge that the determining factors, time frames, etc., differ between cases" 
(Bergek et al., 2008, p. 420). 
The identification of phases of development in an IS is rooted in the way in 
which a system is theoretically understood and analytically approached. As is explained 
in the following section, this pertains to the evolutionary and cumulative nature of the 
innovation process. 
2.4.4 Broader perspectives in the evolution of a system: path dependency and 
`lock-ins' 
Studying innovation from a systemic perspective implies not only studying its 
structure and performance (as has been explained in the previous section), but also 
appreciating that in innovation history matters. The IS approach employs an historical 
and evolutionary perspective33 (see among others Freeman and Pavitt, 2002). This 
means that the process of innovation develops over time and involves the influence of 
many factors and feedback processes (Johnson et al., 2003). The concept of path- 
33Although an 'optimal' or 'best practice' system of innovation cannot be specified (because there 
are too many variables and dynamics involved), the evolutionary perspective allows making illustrative 
and instrumentally useful comparisons between different innovation systems, i.e. what has been relevant 
in the emergence of a given innovation system for a specific technology (i.e. solar PV, in the case of this 
thesis) can provide useful insights for the study of the emergence of a new IS, for instance in a different 
country, based on the same technology. 
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dependence is often used to describe innovation as a learning and cumulative process 
that depends on previous experience and choices. The nature of the accumulated 
experience, which involves technological skills as well as managerial and 
organisational capabilities but also depends on previous framework conditions (e.g. on 
policies and regulations that have been promoted, etc.), influences the learning process 
for the adoption of a new technology and ultimately influence tomorrow's production 
technologies. 
As the use of technologies expands they become more and more interrelated 
with many other technologies but also with institutional and social factors. One could, 
for instance, expect networks between the different actors to become stronger and the 
existing system to work in favour of the established technology. This tendency of 
technologies to become more attractive and widespread the more they are developed 
and hence more intertwined with the surrounding environment, might favour incumbent 
technologies and make it more difficult for newcomers to catch up (Foxon, 2002). This 
can lead to sub-optimal outcomes when firms become locked-in to specific 
technological configurations and do not longer respond flexibly to changing 
circumstances. 
These insights into the broader understanding of the evolution of an IS, together 
with the importance of studying its structural components and performance (section 
2.4.2), provide important analytical tools that will be used by this study (see Chapter 3) 
to map the components of the Chinese IS for PV and to study its performance and 
evolution over time. 
2.4.5 Policy implications of a systemic understanding of innovation 
Although specific policy measures to strengthen innovation system performance 
could only be suggested after an assessment of the conditions under which emerging 
technologies have a high chance of becoming successful (i.e. after an assessment of 
system specific blocking and inducing mechanisms), several remarks could be made on 
the way in which policy should be understood when we adopt a systemic understanding 
to innovation. 
Policy intervention is crucial to unleash innovation and needs to be approached 
from a systemic and networking perspective. Since the IS approach regards 
technological development and innovation as a dynamic and systemic phenomenon in 
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which the component parts of the economic system evolve alongside each other and 
affect each other, it follows that policy interventions need to be similarly viewed: "[...] 
unless interventions take place within a systemic policy framework the results are 
likely to be less than completely successful" (Juma and Clark, 2002, p. 2). Within an 
innovation system perspective, policy design and implementation need to reflect the 
systemic and dynamic nature of the innovation process (Foxon et al., 2004). 
Effective policy should also recognise that technologies are diverse and face 
different challenges over time. "It is thus important that policy is 'joined up' and 
supports innovation through its various stages, targeted if necessary to address specific 
barriers in the innovation cycle. [...] A successfully performing technology would then 
be able to progress smoothly from the early stages to the final stage where it can 
compete without direct support (given, for example, a generally supportive 
environmental tax or trading scheme). Thus, there are several elements to a policy, not 
one 'magic bullet'; the kind of instrument needed varies with the phase of a 
technology's development. These policies should take into account technological and 
institutional factors leading to lock-in' of existing carbon-based technologies" (Foxon 
et al., 2005, p. 2134). 
Moreover policy intervention should be such as to allow continued monitoring 
and revision on the part of relevant stakeholders, because economic systems are never 
static but continue to evolve in ways that are difficult to predict for analysts and policy 
makers (Juma and Clark, 2002). 
What all this adds up to is that policy intervention in the area of innovation 
cannot be viewed in traditionally 'technological' terms but it instead needs to be seen in 
a wider perspective where the dynamic nature of the innovative process, the many 
feedback loops involved and the different technological requirements over time are also 
taken into account (Juma and Clark, 2002). 
2.4.6 The development of the IS concept: the national system of innovation and 
its relevance for the study of developing countries 
Since Lundvall first introduced the modern version of the innovation system 
concept (Lundvall, 1985), several levels of analysis within the innovation systems 
framework have been conceptualised. 
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Some scholars have delimited systems on the basis of technological, industrial 
or sectoral characteristics. Both the previously mentioned technological systems 
(Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991, Bergek, 2002) and sectoral innovation systems 
(Malerba, 2002) belong to this category. Other authors have instead adopted a spatial or 
a geographic point of view to study the innovation system and have taken the nation or 
the region as the main unit of analysis. National (Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 1993, 
Edquist, 1997) and regional systems of innovation (Cooke, 2001, Braczyk et al., 1998, 
Asheim and Isaksen, 2002) are both part of this perspective. 
Before focusing in more detail in section 2.4.7 on the findings obtained by 
applying a systemic approach to the study of RE technologies (under several variants 
that include technological and national innovation systems), here some key aspects of 
the national innovation system (NIS) perspective are reviewed34. This is necessary for 
two main reasons. A number of NIS studies have been applied to developing countries 
and reviewing them should enable us to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of this 
perspective in explaining technological change in a developing country context. Second, 
China's historic evolution in the pre and post reform period presents quite distinctive 
features (see chapter 5) that will need to be properly understood to asses why 
technological change in PV in China occurs and why firms innovate. The NIS 
perspective could offer in this respect a useful analytical tool because it is concerned 
about the country-specific factors that influence the innovation process. 
Insights from wider national systems of innovation 
The concept of NIS was first introduced in the late 1980s on a study of the 
Japanese economy (Freeman, 1988) and enhanced in the early 1990s by two major 
studies, which provided more detailed theoretical and empirical analysis (Lundvall, 
1992, Nelson, 1993). The key idea behind the NIS concept is that the national context 
made up actors, institutions and its historical evolution matters in the development of 
innovation. In his study about the reasons behind differences in the rate of economic 
growth of several countries35 , Nelson found out that these reflected the different 
national institutional set-ups (Nelson, 1993) and concluded that there was need for an 
34  It is important to note that the theoretical underpinning of the NIS approach will be done in this 
chapter, while in Chapter 5 the approach will be used to present and discuss the evolution and the main 
features of the Chinese NIS. 
35  The countries included large high-income countries, like the USA, Japan and several countries 
in Western Europe, smaller high-income countries like Canada or Denmark, as well as lower income 
countries like South Korea, Taiwan or Brazil. 
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enhanced understanding of the national environments where technical change 
originates. 
Although there is no a single NIS definition in the literature (Niosi, 2002), this 
study adopts the following: 
"NSI is [ ...] a set of interrelated institutions; its core is made up of those 
institutions that produce, diffuse and adapt new technical knowledge, be they industrial 
firms, universities, or government agencies. The links between these institutions consist 
of flows: knowledge, financial, human (people being the bearers of tacit knowledge and 
know-how), regulatory, and commercial" (Niosi, 2002, p. 291). 
Similarly to the more general IS approach, the NIS concept rests upon two main 
building blocks: components and linkages. Understanding the linkages among the 
different system components (which include both organisations and institutions, as 
previously explained), especially how they relate to each other as elements of a national 
collective system of knowledge creation, diffusion and use, is a crucial instrument for 
the improvement of a country's innovative performance (OECD, 1997). 
In recognition of the fact that country-specific factors influence the innovation 
process and that the institutional set-up of nations matters, a number of aspects are 
expected to be important and analysed in NIS. These include: provision of R&D, 
competence building - e.g. provision of education and training -, financial institutions 
and networking through markets and other mechanism, including interactive learning 
between organizations (Edquist, 2005). 
Application of NIS to developing countries 
While the NIS concept has been widely applied to comprehend technological 
dynamism in mature economies (see among others Lundvall, 1985, Freeman, 1987), 
recently a number of authors have extended the concept to developing countries (Gu, 
1999, Arocena and Sutz, 2000, Cassiolato and Lastres, 2000, Hall and Sulaiman, 2002, 
Intarakumnerd et al., 2002, Mytelka, 2003, Johnson et al., 2003, Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2006, Kiggundu, 2006, Nassif, 2007). Their insights have contributed not only to a 
better understanding of how technological change occurs in industrialising nations, but 
also to the theoretical and empirical issues one encounters in applying the NIS concept 
to a context different from the mature economy it was originally developed for 
(Lundvall, 1992, Nelson, 1993, Edquist, 1997). 
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The appeal of the NIS approach in a developing country context lies in the 
emphasis it places on the complex relations between actors, competences, policies and 
`institutions'. In particular, a number of focal points of the NIS approach appear 
particularly relevant to understand technological change in developing countries. 
First, a lot of the ideas that are central to the NIS approach occupy a 
predominant position also in economic development theory. As an example, the NIS 
approach takes into account a wide range of national institutions including those 
engaged in education and training which are well known in the literature for being 
particularly relevant in the economic development of countries and especially of the 
less developed (Schultz, 1988, Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985). Second, the idea 
that institutions matter for the performance of the economy is central to the concept of 
NIS but is also widely recognised for economic development in industrialising nations. 
Third, the NIS concept, as more broadly the IS approach, allows for the inclusion not 
only of economic factors but also of organizational, social and political factors. It also 
encompasses the whole range of different innovations; minor as well as major technical 
and organizational (Johnson et al., 2003). This is in line with the understanding of 
innovation that is normally adopted in development economics studies and particularly 
in the technological capability literature that will be reviewed in Section 2.5. In the 
context of firms in developing countries innovation is understood as a continuous 
process to absorb or create technical knowledge (Lall, 1992). 
Finally the focus on innovation as a learning process puts the emphasis on 
endogenous variables that should be enhanced for technologies to emerge and diffuse. 
This is in line with the view that technological change in developing countries occurs 
not only via technology transfer of hardware but is the result of a cumulative 'softer' 
learning process at both the firm and the country level (Lall, 2000). 
Applying the NIS concept to developing countries can, however, be problematic. 
NIS is an ex-post concept elaborated after having observed a number of national 
innovation systems in industrialised countries and having derived similarities in their 
behaviour (Arocena and Sutz, 2000). In developing countries, innovation tends instead 
to be a process 'in the making', where specific elements of the system might be either 
missing or not-conducive for learning and innovation (Kiggundu, 2006). 
Fragmentation is a dominant feature of IS in developing countries (Intarakutnnerd et al., 
2002), where "very few patterns of the socio-economic behaviour regarding innovation 
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at national level can be viewed as working in a system-like manner" (Arocena and Sutz, 
2000, p. 58). This is not to say that technical change does not occur in developing 
countries36, but existing micro-innovative strengths remain isolated and many of the 
institutions or actors relevant to innovation do not exist (Arocena and Sutz, 2000, 
Kiggundu, 2006). 
Several authors have added further insights by studying NIS in specific 
developing countries or regions. 
In studying local productive clusters in Mercosur, Cassiolato and Lastres (2000) 
note that countries in Latin America are characterised by higher levels of diversity and 
institutional instability than advanced economies. They highlight how the instability or 
vulnerability of the macroeconomic, political, institutional and financial environments 
affects a firm's innovation behaviour more than explicit technology policies (Cassiolato 
and Lastres, 2000). They claim that, although the NIS approach contains the idea that 
differences in macroeconomic performance are related to differences in NIS, it deals 
little with this micro-macro relationship. 
In the case of Thailand, Intarakumnerd and colleagues (2002), make two 
interesting remarks. First they note that studies of NIS in countries that have been less 
successful37 in technological catching up (this is the case of Thailand, but also of other 
countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa): "[...] should focus not only on how 
innovation related activities start and improve over time but also, and more importantly, 
on factors that contributing to stagnancy and factors contributing to the long-running 
perpetuation of weak and fragmented NIS system" (Intarakumnerd et al., 2002, p. 
1455). They then suggest that paying attention to 'blocking mechanisms' (to use the 
terminology adopted by Bergek and reviewed above) could offer richer and more 
helpful insights into the analysis of NIS in developing countries. Second, they argue 
that policy making to stimulate intensive learning could be hindered by political 
interference from vested interest groups. Moreover government agencies in developing 
countries (as has been the case in Thailand) could have insufficient organisational and 
individual competencies to initiate policies and co-ordinate with other actors of NIS 
(Intarakumnerd et al., 2002). 
36 The specific understanding of innovation in a developing country context is discussed in detail 
in Section 2.5.2 
37 The study contrasts the Thai NIS development and performance with those more successful in 
newly industrialised countries (i.e. South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) 
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Gu (Gu, 1999) has specifically added to the existing knowledge about technical 
change in developing countries by studying the evolution over time of the Chinese 
innovation system. Using observations she made from the Chinese case she concludes 
that: NIS in a developing country is specifically related to the country's development 
level. Therefore, it is important to connect level of NIS development with level of 
economic structural and institutional development. Moreover, in noting that 
extraordinary 'intensive learning' has been crucial in the successful catching-up of 
countries like Korea and Taiwan, Gu argues that studies of NIS in developing countries 
should pay particular attention to purposeful strategic management for catching-up (i.e. 
to those adaptive strategies that are promoted at both the national and the firm level to 
achieve performances similar, or possibly higher, to the ones of industrialised 
countries). Finally, unlike mature economies, capital accumulation, rather than 
intangible assets, such as knowledge and learning, is the main contribution to technical 
progress in developing countries. This is because: "[...] capital investment is the 
necessary mean by which a late industrializer acquires technology embodied in capital 
goods from abroad" (Gu, 1999, p. 47). A NIS analysis should hence investigate how 
effectively a developing country moves from a learning path based on physical capital 
accumulation to one based on intangible human capital. 
To sum up, although the NIS approach is appealing even in a developing 
country context because of the emphasis it places on the complex relations between 
actors, competences, policies and 'institutions', it presents a number of analytical and, 
indeed, empirical difficulties (including the availability of data) that need to be kept in 
mind when approaching the study of technological change in these countries from a 
systemic perspective. 
2.4.7 The application of the innovation system approach to the study of RET 
The concept of IS was first applied to RE technologies in 2000 (Jacobsson and 
Johnson, 2000), further developed by the same authors in subsequent studies (Bergek 
and Jacobsson, 2003, Jacobsson et al., 2004, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004) and adopted 
by other scholars (Foxon et al., 2005, Negro et al., 2007, Hekkert et al., 2007a, Negro et 
al., 2008, Kamp et al., 2004, ICCEPT and E4Tech, 2003) to highlight the success or 
failure of emerging RE technologies in different countries. 
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The point of departure of this literature is that despite the increasing role RE 
sources are playing in the energy mix of many countries and despite the increasing 
recognition of the crucial role innovation should play in taking their development 
further (Stamboulis and Tsoutsos, 2002, Menanteau et al., 2003, Toman, 1998) there is 
still limited understanding of the innovation process involved in the emergence and 
diffusion of these energy sources38 (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, Jacobsson et al., 
2004, Foxon et al., 2005, Hekkert et al., 2007a). Since RET challenge existing energy 
systems based on fossil fuels (Hekkert et al., 2007a, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004), a 
full understanding of the systemic processes by which innovation in these technologies 
occur is essential to comprehend and inform the transition to more sustainable energy 
solutions. 
This has important implications for energy policy design. In fact, without an 
adequate understanding of how the transformation process towards a greater share of 
RET in electricity consumption occurs, it is difficult to adequately inform policy 
makers attempting to manage the process (Jacobsson et al., 2004, p. 4). 
In this context, where the real issue is not to prove the potential of RET but how 
this potential can be realised, an IS perspective can offer a broad and rich conceptual 
approach within which to study RET (Sagar and Holdren, 2002). 
Scholars who have taken up the challenge to analyze under what conditions 
emerging RET technologies could have a high chance of becoming successfully 
embedded in the existing system, have done so from a number of perspectives within 
the broader IS approach. Some have used a NIS point of view and have highlighted 
country-specific features of the IS for the domestic development of RET (ICCEPT and 
E4Tech, 2003, Foxon et al., 2005), others have instead adopted a technological 
innovation system (TIS) perspective (Jacobsson et al., 2004) or, more broadly, a 
`functions of innovation systems' approach (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003, Negro et al., 
2007, Hekkert et al., 2007a) to study how well the systemic functions discussed above 
are fulfilled in a system involving emerging RE technologies. 
In what follows these studies are reviewed not for their theoretical contribution, 
which is in line with the more general IS literature reviewed above, but for their 
empirical value to the study of RET. We will in particular focus on those inducing and 
38 There is for instance not a full understanding of how the different policy instruments (prices vs 
quantity-type of mechanisms) adopted to stimulate an increase in RES installed capacity affect the 
technological learning processes and the innovation process (Menanteau et al., 2003) 
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blocking mechanisms that have been identified as relevant for the emergence and the 
diffusion of RET, as well as on the policy implications for a better functioning of the IS 
that surrounds RET. 
Important factors in the emergence and diffusion of RET 
The effectiveness of innovation systems in successfully promoting innovation in 
RE technologies in Europe has been analysed by researchers from Chalmers University 
in a series of papers (Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001, 
Bergek, 2002, Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Jacobsson et 
al., 2004). Two are particularly relevant here: one where the emergence of the German 
technological system for solar cells is examined (Jacobsson et al., 2004) and another 
one where the authors analyse and compare the growth of the German, Dutch and 
Swedish wind turbine industries (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003). These authors argue 
that a number of factors have contributed to the success of these RET technologies in 
Europe39. 
First, the establishment of social legitimacy of wind and solar PV should be 
mentioned. These authors note (see particularly Jacobsson et al., 2004) that a number of 
German organisations, like the Green movement and other pressure groups, have 
played a key role in creating a positive momentum towards the new technologies. This 
has contributed in both legitimating wind and solar PV and in influencing the 
regulatory framework so that markets can be formed and firms have been encouraged 
to enter the emerging system. 
A study on the UK IS for RET further supports this point by emphasising that 
developing a shared vision between government, industry and the research community 
for each RE sector is important (Foxon et al., 2005). 
Second, it has been important to stimulating technological variety in the early 
phases of the system formation. The authors note that in the presence of great 
uncertainties over the potential performance and cost of the various competing designs, 
as has been the case with wind turbines (Jacobsson et al., 2004, Bergek and Jacobsson, 
2003), encouraging technological variety and experimentation in the early days of the 
system has created a learning space for research institutes and new firms to enter the 
wind and PV sectors. While several wind designs or application options have failed 
39 A recently published article by Stenzel and Frenzel (2008), which analyses RE firms strategic 
responses to subsidy policies promoted in the German, Spanish and UK electricity markets, offers further 
insights into the success of RET in Europe. 
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along the way, stimulating technological variety and entrepreneurial experimentations 
have led to a 'learning selection' (Douthwaite, 2002) and have created the conditions 
for emerging technologies to have a high chance of becoming successfully embedded 
in the existing energy systems. Foxon and colleagues further corroborate this point by 
highlighting that RET technologies that fail along the innovation chain provide 
valuable learning opportunities. Support should hence be given also at the 
demonstration and pre-commercial stages where several attempts might be necessary 
by technology developers before a successful path is found (Foxon et al., 2005). 
Two other important factors that have contributed to the successful development 
of solar and wind technologies in some European countries are the employment of 
advanced market creation policies in a later phase and the use of industrial policy to 
favour the domestic industry (Bergek and Jacobsson, 2003). This has encouraged the 
entry in the emerging system of local 'prime movers', i.e. actors who are technically, 
financially and/or politically so powerful that they can initiate or strongly contribute to 
the development and diffusion of a new technology. 
A last point pertains to the considerable length of the learning period 
(Jacobsson et al., 2004). This includes not only the time necessary to experiment and 
improve the different RET technologies that have been analysed (i.e. wind and solar PV 
cells), but also the time needed for new firms and actors to enter the system and for 
new networks to be formed to enhance the learning process. 
Three inducing factors have influenced the performance of the RET innovation 
systems in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004)4°: 
government policy, firm's entry and feedback loops from the formation of markets. In 
the case of Germany, government polices, initially in the form of R&D funding, have 
positively affected several functions by supporting the creation of new knowledge, 
supplying resources and guiding the search of various actors to the new technology 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). Similarly, the entrance of new firms has created 
knowledge and supplied resources but has also stimulated the creation of markets. A 
number of feedback loops from the formation of markets have resulted further affecting 
a number of functions. For instance, more sales have generated more resources, which 
have contributed in attracting new actors into the developing system. 
4° In this study the analysis, besides wind turbines, has been extended to solar cells and solar 
collectors. 
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Studies by Foxon and colleagues (ICCEPT and E4Tech, 2003, Foxon et al., 
2005) support the findings of the scholars from Chalmers University in terms of the 
role of policies and of the importance of encouraging technological variety (and indeed 
of supporting technologies in the various phase of technological and market 
development). They also provide some further insights based on the analysis and 
comparisons of the different IS surrounding RE technologies in the UK. They note that 
having a clear knowledge and expectations on future markets is crucial for the 
successful development of these technologies. This is because market conditions 
fundamentally influence these technologies in all the stages of the innovation process41. 
Moreover, developing the necessary skills in key areas has meant that the UK 
has a leading research community in avant-garde technologies like high efficiency PV 
cells under concentration and organic PV (Infield, 2007, Marigo et al., 2007, ICCEPT 
and E4Tech, 2003). 
In the case of cogeneration technology in the Netherlands, the key to success 
has been the fulfilment of all the functions that are known to be important for well-
performing innovation systems (Hekkert et al., 2007a). Hekkert and colleagues note 
that: "When only a few system functions were well taken care of, no take off was 
observed. When a few functions collapsed, also the diffusion of cogeneration stopped" 
(Hekkert et al., 2007a, p. 4686). Their findings support the view that innovation in low-
carbon technologies is not the result of a single magic ingredient but occurs thanks to 
the coexistence of many different elements and to the alignment of the government 
actions to the needs of the other parties in the innovation system. 
Factors that can obstruct the emergence and diffusion  of RET 
Scholars from the Chalmers School in Sweden have also identified a number of 
factors which may hinder the good functioning of selected RET innovation systems 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). They include: 
1. Uncertainty in technological, economic and market terms. 
2. Lack of legitimacy of the new technology in the eye of different actors 
3. Weak connectivity 
41 Foxon and colleagues specifically refer to hydrogen development, whose innovation path and 
technological viability depend on the expectation that there will eventually be a market, the timing of 
which is currently unclear (Foxon et al., 2005) 
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4. Ambiguous behaviour of established firms 
5. Government policy 
Obstacles created by the absence of a clear and consistent policy framework are 
further highlighted in a study about biomass gasification in the Netherlands (Negro et 
al., 2008). The authors of the study note that, despite the promises of high-energy 
conversion efficiency and the wide variety of applications (which could have act as 
inducing mechanisms), biomass has not been successfully developed and implemented 
in the Netherlands. According to their findings the absence of available public 
resources, guidance, and other forms of public support for biomass gasification have 
hampered the path of this low-carbon technology in the country (Negro et al., 2008). 
In the case of the UK, Foxon and colleagues emphasise specific problems 
encountered by RET technologies along their innovation path from the R&D stages to 
market diffusion, i.e. they identify specific challenges encountered when technologies 
need a 'gear change' and begin to move from technological infancy into a growth phase 
(Foxon et al., 2005). 
They note that the successful development and exploitation of RET (i.e. the 
`goodness' of an IS for RET) in the UK have been hindered by difficulties in moving 
technologies along the innovation chain and particularly from demonstration to pre-
commercial stages and from pre-commercial to supported commercialisation. This 
might be due to a number of factors that, in the case of the UK, have included: 
insufficient financing to enable scaling up to next stages; a mismatch between the skills 
needed for large-scale demonstration and early commercialisation; inappropriate policy 
support provided by generic mechanisms (like the Renewables Obligation42) that are 
unable to drive investors towards those technologies that are still in their infancy 
(Foxon et al., 2005); a high risk perceived by the investors and the entrepreneurs in 
moving technology from a pre-commercial stage to a large-scale deployment. 
2.4.8 Relevance and limits of the IS approach for this study 
The review of the IS literature (with insights into the 'functional approach' 
suggested by the TIS variant), including its NIS variant and its application to the study 
of RE technologies, suggests that it can provide useful theoretical insights for the 
42 For more details on the Renewable Obligation see Mitchell and Connor (2004). 
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understanding of innovation in Chinese PV firms. These insights are summarised in 
what follows. 
The idea that innovation is a dynamic and multi-agent process where firms do 
not innovate in isolation but are embedded in innovation systems, that both guide and 
constrain them, provides a broad analytical understanding of technological change. It 
follows that, although this study will specifically focus on innovation at the firm-level 
(i.e. what PV firms in China can do and how they can do it) it will also need to bear in 
mind the broader system. This will provide a richer understanding of how PV firms in 
China add-value and of what affects their innovative behaviour. 
Secondly, knowing how a system is structured and what processes (i.e. what 
`functions' as suggested by the TIS approach) could be expected to be important in 
most ISs provides valuable analytical tools to map the structure of the Chinese system 
for PV and to study its performance and its evolution over time43. 
Third, the identification of factors that have contributed to the relative success 
of different RE technologies (PV included) in a number of European countries (see 
discussion in Section 2.4.7), provides useful insights against which to analyse the 
performance of the Chinese innovation system for PV. 
Finally the IS approach will be useful in informing the policy suggestions that 
will be put forward towards the end of this thesis. These will emphasise how the 
dynamic and systemic nature of innovation should be taken into account together with 
the broader environment that surrounds it. 
However the IS review also suggests that several important issues are not well 
addressed in the existing literature. We shall deal with two of these that will play a 
central role in this thesis: 
1. A limited understanding of the nature of innovation and of how learning 
takes place within organisations like firms. 
2. The use of ex-post, normative concepts to study innovation in 
developing countries. 
43 How these concepts have been translated into practice is explained in Chapter 3. 
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A limited understanding of the nature of innovation and of how learning takes place 
within organisations like firms 
The IS approach greatly contributes to improving our understanding of 'how' 
innovation occurs at the system level. We know that technological change involves and 
emerges from a complex number of feedback loops that occur among the different 
agents that participate in the IS and who are both constrained and driven by framework 
conditions (where institutions play a key role). However the approach does not say 
much about the 'nature' of innovation and the extent to which technical change takes 
place within a country or a firm. In other words, by adopting an IS approach we do not 
know whether a firm is actually undertaking technological change and the extent to 
which this is happening. 
Moreover, learning processes are analysed not at the level of the single system 
component (for instance, the firm) but at the broad system level. What really matters in 
the IS approach is how the whole system learns and can generate and diffuse 
knowledge. Although the IS approach recognises the paramount importance of learning, 
it does not help in understanding how learning takes place within organizations. By 
adopting an IS approach we cannot say much about the process trough which 
technological change occurs in firms, how a firm's technological capacity changes over 
time and what path firms follow to accumulate knowledge. In short, we know how a 
system learns but we do not know how a firm, or a single organisation within the 
system, learns. 
Indeed Lundvall identifies this as one of the challenges the IS literature has to 
face: "While it is important to study national characteristics in terms of organisations 
that pursue R&D, it is equally important to understand national characteristics in terms 
of how firms interact with customers and to what degree different firms give employees 
access to competence building in connection with on-going economic activities" 
(Lundvall, 2007). 
If we want to understand the process through which RET emerge and diffuse in 
the society we need to understand what happens in firms: "The success or failure of 
nascent industries is inextricably linked to actors' technological and problem-solving 
capabilities, and how they incorporate such capabilities into strategies for exploiting 
business opportunities" (Christiansen and Buen, 2002, p. 236). A poor understanding of 
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how knowledge and learning occurs at the level of the firms is particularly critical for 
two main reasons: 
a. There is a lot of technological uncertainty surrounding PV (See chapter 
4), hence an improved understanding of what sort of technological 
capabilities firms in the sector are building and how they are building 
them is important to understand current and future technological 
trajectories. 
b. If the focus of the analysis is shifted from mature to developing 
economies, it is even more important to have a clear understanding on 
how a technology potentially relevant to establish a low-carbon 
economy is acquired and managed by firms. 
The use of ex-post, normative concepts to study innovation in developing countries 
The IS approach has been originally developed in mature economies. When 
attempts have been made to export the concept to developing countries (through the 
NIS perspective) useful insights into the role of institutions in unleashing technological 
change have been obtained but a number of analytical problems have also been 
highlighted. The fragmented nature of the IS in developing countries has been 
emphasised and discussed as a possible challenge to the IS analysis in these countries 
(i.e. if only few of the system components are present or seem to behave in a systemic 
way, is there still scope for an IS analysis?). 
When knowing that a system has a certain structure and that certain processes 
could be expected to take place for technical change to occur, one would be tempted to 
find in a developing country possible analogies between functions and inducing 
mechanisms that have been relevant for mature economies. However, it is not 
necessarily the case that: "shortcomings in actor's performance or resistance to policy 
objectives should be seen as something to overcome. It can instead be an indication that 
there might be an alternative system that is equally effective and efficient in 
introducing and diffusing technological and related organizational innovations but more 
appropriate for a particular context" (Liu and White, 2001, p. 1112). 
An example could be illustrative. The studies that we have reviewed with 
respect to the development of RET, stress the importance for a technology to gain 
legitimation and explain how this has occurred, in particular in the case of solar cells in 
Germany, through pressure groups like the Green Movement. While studying an 
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emerging IS in a developing country one can ask whether pressure groups are powerful 
enough or whether they exist at all. One can ask whether achieving legitimation is 
really a sine qua non condition for technological change to occur in these countries. 
Overall the IS approach offers a good way to have an overview of the 
functioning of the whole system but it lacks depth of analysis when it comes to 
understand the functioning of the single parts of the system, like, for instance, a firm's 
TC accumulation. Empirical review of the firm-level competencies and factors of 
influence are usually not included in innovation system analysis. For these reasons we 
need to adopt a complementary approach which is discussed in the following section. 
2.5 The technological capability literature 
In what follows the theoretical basis for understanding the technological 
capability (TC) approach used in this study is outlined. This builds on a considerable 
academic and policy literature, some of which is critically reviewed in this section. The 
origin of the technological capability concept is reviewed (Section 2.5.1) together with 
the main insights coming from this body of literature. These include: a discussion of the 
understanding of innovation in a developing country context (section 2.5.2); an 
explanation of why it is important to focus on technological change at the firm level 
and what kind of capabilities do firms in developing countries acquire (section 2.5.3); a 
review of how capabilities are built up in firms (i.e.: how firms learn) and what 
important factors facilitate the process (sections 2.5.4 and 2.5.5); an analysis of the 
stages that a firm goes through over time to master (usually imported) technologies and 
to catch up with firms in mature economies (section 2.5.6). The section ends with a 
discussion of the contribution and the limits of the TC approach for this study's 
purposes (section 2.5.7). 
2.5.1 The emergence of the technological capability concept 
Since the late 1970s, in the debate about industrial development in developing 
countries, technology was often identified with the hardware of production - the 
knowledge about machines and processes. Developing countries were thought to 
advance by importing and using technology from mature economies and there was little 
recognition of the need to develop local technological activities (Stewart, 1977). This 
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understanding limited the study of technological change in these countries to 
technology transfer and to the choice of the most suitable technology for the 
development needs at the minimum possible cost (Helleiner, 1975, Eckaus, 1977). 
Since then a number of authors have enhanced our understanding of 
technological change in developing countries (Dahlman and Westphal, 1982, Katz, 
1984, Bell, 1984, Lall, 1992, Bell and Pavitt, 1995, Romijn, 1999, Figueiredo, 1999, 
Dutrenit, 2000, Mani and Romijn, 2004, Hobday, 1995, Kim, 1997, Kim, 1998) and 
have showed empirically that mere technology acquisition does not imply the capacity 
to master it. 
This is so for two important reasons (Evenson and Westphal, 1995): technology 
has a strong tacit component and contains environment-specific elements. Techniques 
of production are often not fully embodied in manuals or blueprints but involve a tacit 
knowledge that can only be acquired through first-hand experience. Similarly, local 
conditions, shaped for instance by social, cultural or climatic factors, often determine 
the nature of the technology that, when used in a different context, requires adaptation. 
As a consequence countries and firms need to develop capabilities to 
continually assimilate, reproduce, adapt and improve new imported technologies. 
Capabilities should then be understood as the ability by the firms to do things and 
technological capabilities reflect the ability to generate and master technological 
activities (Dutrenit, 2007, Rush et al., 2007). 
Technological capabilities are the result of a constant and prolonged effort, that 
is: a purposive investment in time and resources (both physical and human) that leads 
to technological learning (Dahlman and Westphal, 1981). It is this learning effort that 
allows the accumulation over time of the knowledge necessary to engage in innovative 
activities. 
These ideas constitute the theoretical core of the technological capability 
literature and are reviewed in more details in what follows. 
2.5.2 Understanding innovation in a developing country context 
A first important contribution of the TC literature (Katz, 1987, Lall, 1987, Lall, 
1992, Hobday, 1995, Kim, 1997) is to have enhanced our understanding of what we 
mean with 'innovation' in a developing country context. When technical change is 
equated to major, new to the world innovation, there seems at present to be possibly 
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relatively little room for a contribution originated in developing countries. These 
countries usually lack the technical, financial and human resources to perform 
groundbreaking innovation and are, by definition, behind the technology frontier 
(Forbes and Wield, 2002). However, when technological change is understood as a 
continuous process to absorb or create technical knowledge, then the role for 
developing countries in innovation becomes different (Lail, 1992). This leads to a 
broad definition of innovation which covers all types of search and improvement 
efforts. An innovation in a firm in a developing country may not be new to the world 
but consist of a "[...] continuous search and learning process in which the generation of 
entirely new technology is only the most complex activity on a continuum of a much 
larger set of technological activities, including search for alternatives, assimilation [of 
technology imported from abroad], and minor and major adaptation and improvement 
of chosen technologies, products and organisational principles" (Romijn, 1999). 
Innovation and technology management do take place outside mature 
economies or large, globally famous, high-tech corporations, though those activities 
should be perceived in a broader sense (Forbes and Wield, 2000). Although not 
necessarily new to the world, innovation in a developing country context can be a 
novelty for the firm or for the local milieu (van Dijk and Sandee, 2002). 
This broad understanding of innovation does not deny that there is a difference, 
in terms of specific strategies, risks to be taken and resources to be invested between (a) 
the effort to advance the technology frontier44 and (b) the efforts to catch up or crawl 
along at some considerable distance (Romijn, 2002). Indeed, these two notions of 
innovation imply different technological capabilities and skills required for (b) are 
generally less demanding then those required for (a) (Romijn, 2002). 
However, a narrow focus on 'new to the world innovation' would leave aside a 
crucial part of our understanding of how technical change occurs in developing 
countries and indeed of the effort and dynamics that are behind it. There is a lot that 
firms in developing countries can do in terms of technological change and to: "[...] go 
beyond the boundaries assigned to them by their national environments and by the 
world's leading technology-driven firms" (Forbes and Wield, 2006, p. 2). Forbes and 
Wield (2002) argue that the innovation task in developing countries, and more 
specifically, in their firms, is indeed different from that of mature economies and that it 
should focus around five key areas: 
44  For a definition of technology frontier in the specific context of PV see Section 1.4. 
82 
1. Incremental innovation. Innovation could be classified according to how 
radical it is compared to current technology (Freeman and Soete, 1997). 
From this perspective, continuous improvements to the current technology 
could be defined as 'incremental' as opposed to 'radical' innovation which 
involves a big leap into a 'new technological paradigm' (like for instance, 
the introduction of a totally new type of machine — Forbes and Wield, 
2002). If we assume that firms in developing countries are, in general, not 
concerned with: "[...] the generation of new technology [because] the 
technology frontier is defined by the technology-leader [in mature 
economies]" (Forbes and Wield, 2002, p. 15), then incremental innovation 
becomes key not only to keep up with continuous improvement to the 
technology made by technology leaders, but also to catch up at a faster pace 
than the improvements made by the leaders. 
2. Process innovation. Forbes and Wield (2002) note that in the early stages of 
the catch up process, firms in developing countries begin with process rather 
than product innovation, as it is the case in leading technological 
countries45. They argue that: "[...] when an industry matures, the innovation 
drivers change from technical performance to cost competition" (Forbes and 
Wield, 2000, p. 1099). To achieve cost-saving wage competitiveness and 
(incremental) process innovation (i.e. making things better) are important46. 
3. Shop-floor innovation. Key for process innovation is the need to focus on 
the shop floor. This is the way in which manufacturing improvements and 
cost-saving could be achieved in day-to-day operations (even by simply 
absorbing slacks and working harder). This could help promoting the 
competitiveness of the firms in developing countries especially in cost-
sensitive markets. 
4. Development of an innovation-conducive environment encompassing 
organisational, cultural and managerial aspects. For any innovation to be 
successful and sustainable, it has to be widespread and continuous. This is 
why it is necessary to develop an innovation culture and to enhance 
organisational and managerial aspects to make things happen. This could be 
45 Section 2.5.6 in this chapter explores more in details the different stages developing countries 
tend to go through in their catching up process with industrialised countries. 
46 Odagiri and Goto (1993) note how incremental process innovation has been crucial in Japan's 
catching up process with industrialised countries and rapid economic growth since the 1960s. 
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done by embedding, for instance, in firms' routines also 'soft' elements like 
the development of systematic ways of capturing creativity across the 
organisation47. 
5. 
	
	R&D effort with a specific focus. Firms in developing countries need to 
perform their own R&D but its role, it is argued (Forbes and Wield, 2000), 
is different from that of firms in mature economies. This aspect is discussed 
in more detail in Section 2.5.4 
In sum, innovation does take place in firms in industrialising countries but 
needs to be understood in a way that is rather different from innovation in the case of 
technology leaders. Instead of a narrow focus on 'new to the world', innovation should 
be appreciated as the continuous process to absorb or create technical knowledge, 
where incremental process innovation (with the shop floor as source of competitiveness 
and a R&D focused on those activities that can force firms up the value-chain) and an 
effective innovation culture all play a key role. 
2.5.3 Firms as the locus of knowledge accumulation and different types of TC 
The technological capability literature adopts the firm as the main unit of 
analysis and studies it to understand the extent to which and how it develops the skills 
necessary to acquire, assimilate, utilise, adapt, change and create technology (Juma and 
Clark, 2002). 
Given the specific, cumulative and partly tacit nature of technology, the most 
important components of technological accumulation are localized in firms (Bell and 
Pavitt, 1993). This is so because they are associated with learning from specific 
experiences in developing and operating production systems and because they need to 
build the necessary capabilities to maintain their competitiveness, especially in the 
global economy (van Dijk and Sandee, 2002). It follows that a full range of 
mechanisms necessary to accumulate technological capabilities (see, for example, 
learning by doing, reverse engineering, in-house R&D, personnel training, inter-firm 
linkages and networks. etc.) could be observed in firms, making them a particularly 
suitable place to study innovation in the making (Bell, 1984). 
47 Open communication systems that encourage ideas or rewards systems that encourage 
creativity and do not discourage getting it wrong are important factors associated with creative 
organisations (Rickards, 1985). 
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The recognition that firms could make a key contribution to industrial growth 
has made them a central element in those government policies aimed at increasing 
national industrial competitiveness (see among others Lall and United Nations 
Conference on Trade and, 2004). As a consequence an understanding of technological 
capabilities accumulation dynamics in firms is necessary if we want to inform the 
policy process. 
Different types of technological capabilities 
Different types of technological capabilities, that cover the main technological 
activities a firm performs, are identified in the literature (Lall, 1992, Bell and Pavitt, 
1995, Kim, 1999, Westphal et al., 1985). Drawing on Lall (1992) and Bell and Pavitt 
(1995), Romijn (2002) provides a useful synthesis: 
Investment capabilities. They refer to the firm's ability needed to choose 
new technology and to establish (or expand) new production facilities. 
They include activities related to both decision-making as well as 
preparation and implementation of projects. 
(Routine) Production capabilities. Consist of the skills and knowledge 
needed to reproduce existing technologies as well as to operate and 
maintain production facilities. 
— Innovation capabilities. Are the skills and knowledge required to make 
independent adaptations and improvements to existing technologies, and 
ultimately to create entirely new technologies. 
The identification of different types of capabilities 48 is analytically useful 
because it helps in focusing the attention on a full range of capabilities that have to be 
internalised by the firm to ensure successful commercial operation and to move 
technologically forward (Lall, 1992). 
The distinction between 'routine' production capabilities and innovative 
capabilities is particularly important because it is based on the distinction between: "the 
kinds of knowledge and skill required to operate given production systems and the 
48 Two other types of 'supportive' capabilities are also identified: developing linkages and 
interaction with firms and institutions (Lall, 1992; Bell and Pavitt, 1995) and producing capital goods 
(Bell and Pavitt, 1995). 
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kinds of knowledge required to change them" (Bell and Pavitt, 1993, p. 165). In other 
words, it is the distinction between technology-using and technology-changing skills. 
For analytical purposes and given the difference in the effort required to push 
forward the technology frontier and to catch up, Romijn suggests that a broader 
understanding of technological capabilities, where all the three types of capabilities 
identified above are included, should be preferred to a narrow one on 'innovation 
capabilities'. 
2.5.4 Technological learning as the main means to build up technological 
capabilities in firms 
The concept of learning is central to the TC literature and is regarded as the way 
in which organisations such as firms accumulate skills and knowledge (Malerba, 1992). 
Firms are defined as 'learning organisations' (Lundvall et al., 2002) because 
they need a purposive effort to assimilate, adapt and modify existing technologies 
and/or to develop new ones49 . Firms are "[...] skilled at creating, acquiring and 
transferring knowledge, and at modifying their behaviour to reflect new knowledge and 
insights" (Garvin, 1993, p. 80). 
Firms learn at different rates and learning experiences are firm specific. 
Learning is a path-dependent and cumulative process and, as such, a major source of 
incremental technical change. 
Possibly the mode of learning that is more closely associated with capability 
enhancement and innovation in firms is internal R&D. 
Forbes and Wield (2002) argue that R&D in firms in developing countries is 
important and that its role is different from that it plays in mature economies. What, it 
is argued, matters for the success of industrial innovation in firms in industrialising 
countries is not 'how much' they spend in R&D but rather the 'focus' of their R&D. 
The key role of R&D in these countries could be summarised in the need to "[...] build 
absorptive (learning) capacity so that the firm can effectively access work done 
elsewhere" (Forbes and Wield, 2002, p. 18). More specifically the R&D task in 
developing countries' firms is suggested to be: 
1. 
	
	To follow the technology frontier determined by firms in mature economies 
efficiently, i.e. to support the firm's quest for long-run competitiveness in 
49 The literature on firm-level learning is abundant. Some representative authors are: Arrow, 1962, 
Rosenberg, 1982, Dosi et al., 1988, Lundvall, 1988, Malerba, 1992, Bell, 1984. 
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manufacturing. This involves, for instance, solving problems that arise in 
manufacturing which cannot be solved on the shop-floor and need the specific 
skills embodied in an R&D department. 
2. 	To achieve effective design leadership, i.e. to deliver an independent product 
development capacity to the firm. This calls for the development of 'design 
capabilities' as distinct from 'technological capabilities'. The role of R&D in 
developing countries, as Forbes and Wield (2002) suggest, is to push the design 
frontier ahead while following the technology-frontier determined by firms in 
mature economies. 
Despite the importance of in-house R&D, a substantial part of the firm's 
internal learning may not take the form of a formalised technological effort (Romijn 
and Albaladejo, 2002). 
The tacit, specific and non-codifiable nature of many elements of the 
technology (Polanyi, 1967) and the potential to appropriate some of their benefits 
favour other informal and incremental problem solving strategies5°. 
Forbes and Wield (2002), drawing on an abundant literature on the topic (Arrow, 
1962, Rosenberg, 1982, Bell, 1984, Lundvall, 1988, Lundvall, 1992, Malerba, 1992), 
distinguish between the following modes of learning: 
1. Learning by doing 
2. Learning by investment. 
Learning by doing takes place at the manufacturing stage when informal, 
incremental problem solving and experimentation take place on the firms' shop-floor 
and allows firms to get acquainted with productive processes. In other words: "learning 
by doing is the passive, automatic and costless by-product of production" (Forbes and 
Wield, 2002, p. 14). 
Learning by investment involves the firm's conscious and purposive effort to 
enhance capabilities. This mode of learning could be further divided in three main 
categories (Forbes and Wield, 2002): (a) learning by analysing, which may include 
activities like reverse engineering (b) learning by explicit action, which includes 
personnel training both within and outside the firm as well as the hiring of specialists 
50 As specified at the beginning of this chapter informal ways of learning are particularly relevant 
for firms in developing countries, which tend to lack the necessary resources for formal and extensive 
R&D programmes. 
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(often foreign) from whom the local personnel can learn from (c) formalised R&D 
activities. 
2.5.5 Factors that affect learning in firms 
A variety of factors internal and external to the firm may contribute to 
technological learning and result in enhanced capabilities (Romijn and Albaladejo, 
2002 provide a comprehensive overview). 
Internal sources of technological capabilities 
The knowledge and skills brought into the firm by the entrepreneur and the 
workforce significantly contribute to the firm's learning process (OECD, 2001, Romijn 
and Albaladejo, 2002). This knowledge is the result of both the educational background 
and the previous working experience. "Firms require an adequate stock of technically 
qualified manpower to absorb new technologies, modify them, create and transfer new 
technological information, particularly scientists and engineers" (Romijn and 
Albaladejo, 2002, p. 1054). Highly qualified workers add great value to any firm and 
the inability to recruit them can be a serious constraint on subsequent growth, 
especially when innovation is viewed as a cumulative process, critically dependent on 
tacit knowledge (Hoffman et al., 1998, Galende and de la Fuente, 2003). 
Also the firm's size, age and ownership could play an important role in 
capabilities enhancements and learning. A large firm's size, for instance, could be 
positively associated with innovative behaviour in firms because it can allow achieving 
greater economies of scale, superior access to finance and the ability to spread risk in 
diverse portfolios (Galende and de la Fuente, 2003)51. Similarly, there seems to be a 
direct link between a firm's age and its ability to undertake innovative activities 
(Kumar and Saqib, 1996, Molero and Buesa, 1996). The age of a firm represents the 
experience and knowledge accumulated throughout its history and is related in the 
literature to: "a better management of communication and of necessary creativity to 
innovate, and to a more effective capacity for absorption" (Galende and de la Fuente, 
2003, p. 718). 
51  It should be noted that the relationship between firm size and innovation is most controversial 
and arguments exist both supporting a large size and a small size. In this latter case, firms' innovative 
results would be favoured by greater flexibility, better communication, greater specialisation 
possibilities, informal and strategic controls. Galende and de la Fuente (2003) offer a thorough review of 
the controversies surrounding the link between firm size and innovation as well as of other internal 
determinants of innovation in firms. 
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As for ownership, we discussed at the beginning of this Chapter (Section 2.2.3) 
how Chinese competitive industries and China's high-tech exports are overwhelmingly 
produced by foreign-managed and foreign-owned firms (Rosen, 2003). In the case of 
China the literature seems hence to suggest that non-Chinese ownership has a positive 
effect on the likelihood of innovation (see among others: Steinfeld, 2004, Lemoine and 
Unal-Kesenci, 2004). 
One further aspect that is suggested to be important for innovation but that will 
not be taken into account by this study because it is far beyond our scope, is culture, 
understood as 'the way things get done' (Forbes and Wield, 2002). 
External sources of technological capabilities 
Among the firm's external sources of technological capabilities the access and 
the adoption of the technology developed by other industries by means of license 
agreements or as embodied in capital equipment and intermediate inputs (Pavitt, 1984) 
could play an important role. This could be particularly the case of firms in developing 
countries where technological capability accumulation generally begins with the import 
of technology from an industrialised country (Forbes and Wield, 2002). 
Interactions with suppliers, customers, industry associations, research institutes 
and the alike also provide important external inputs to the learning and the 
technological accumulation processes. Romijn and Albaladejo (2002, p. 1055) note that 
"interaction may take place for the purpose of gathering information about technologies 
and markets, and also for obtaining various other inputs to complement the internal 
learning process, such as external staff training, parts and components, consulting 
services, and R&D grants". The type of learning that occurs as a result of the links and 
relations with external sources is called 'learning by interacting' (Lundvall, 1988). 
Several authors (see among others: Camagni, 1991, Oerlemans et al., 1998) 
have suggested that interactive learning would also be boosted by the geographical 
proximity of the firms with the network of suppliers, customers and other organisations 
with whom they interact. This, it has been suggested52, would happen for a number of 
reasons: the tacitness of new knowledge, which makes its transfer difficult across large 
distances (Cooke et al., 1997); the lower costs involved and face-to-face contact that 
52  See Romijn and Albaladejo (2002) for a synthesis of the main arguments about the link 
between geographical proximity and innovation. 
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would enhance the quality of the interaction (Saxenian, 1994); the importance of local 
knowledge spillovers, including inter-firm movement of skilled labour (Caniels, 2000). 
2.5.6 Stages in technological capability accumulation 
A part of the TC literature focuses on the pathway that has been followed by 
developing countries in catching up53 with industrialised countries (Kim, 1980, Kim, 
1997, Lee et al., 1988, Lee and Lim, 2001, Hobday, 1995, Hobday, 2000). Kim (1980, 
1997) argues that the process of innovation in catching up countries (focusing 
particularly on South Korea) is fundamentally different from that of mature economies. 
It has been suggested (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975, Utterback, 1994) that 
innovation in mature economies develops along a technology trajectory that starts from 
a high rate of radical product innovation, where several product designs coexist and 
compete in the market place (emergence stage); it proceeds with the emergence of a 
dominant product design and the focus on a specific process technology (consolidation 
stage) and it ends with incremental process improvements as product design matures 
(maturity stage). When the industry reaches this stage, firms become increasingly 
vulnerable in their competitive position and are less likely to undertake R&D aimed at 
radical innovation54. 
By contrast (see Kim, 1980 and 1999) developing countries are suggested to go 
from acquisition of foreign technology, assimilation, where process development and 
product design technologies are acquired, adaptation, small modifications and 
eventually to autonomous innovation. 
In this 'three-stages model' (i.e. acquisition, assimilation and improvement) 
typical of innovation in developing countries, Kim (1999) notes that the sequence of 
innovation is 'reversed' with developing countries (and more in particular South 
Korean firms upon which Kim's observations are derived) moving from mature to early 
stages of the innovation process, i.e. starting with process rather than product 
innovation as in the case of leading technological firms. 
53  'Catch up' here refers to the processes industrialising countries could follow to accelerate their 
development and reduce the gap between themselves and the technologically and economically advanced 
countries. 
54  It should be noted that, although this trajectory mode elaborated by Utterback and Abernathy 
(1975) is not universally applicable (this is because differences across firms, industries and countries 
could determine a wide variation in the rate of accumulation — see Bell and Pavitt, 1995), it is however 
still useful in analysing TC building in developing countries. 
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Kim (1999) also notes how countries and Korea more in particular, catch up not 
only in mature technologies but also during the consolidation and emergence stages as 
they progress in their capabilities. 
Figure 5 graphically represents the innovation model in mature and developing 
countries as it has been conceptualised by Kim (1997) drawing on previous work on 
technological trajectories (Lee et al., 1988, Utterback, 1994). 
Figure 5 Innovation process in mature and catching up countries 
♦ - Tame 
Source: Kim, 1999 
A similar reverse innovation model has been observed also by Hobday in the 
specific context of electronics in Taiwan and Korea (Hobday, 1994). He notices that 
firms begin their catching up process by manufacturing to the specifications of 
multinational companies (i.e. they start as original equipment manufacturers — OEM); 
they then move to their own design (i.e. they become original design manufacturers — 
ODM), while the multinational companies continue to carry out the marketing and 
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distribution under their own brand name. The catching up process is complete when the 
domestic firm become OBM (own brand manufacturer). In this final stage: "the firm 
carries out all of the stages of production and innovation, including manufacturing, new 
product design, and sometimes R&D for new materials and products" (Hobday and de 
Barros Perini, 2005, p. 19). 
In line with Kim's findings, Forbes and Wield argue that, although in 
developing countries usually process innovation gives way to product innovation, unity 
between them is often crucial to move up the value-chain (Forbes and Wield, 2006). 
Moreover, they highlight that to develop distinctive capabilities in either or both 
process or product innovation another dimension is needed: proprietary capability. 
"Proprietary capability comes from knowledge that is distinctive to the firm. In some 
cases, this proprietary capability takes the form of intellectual property formally owned 
by the firm: patents, trade-marks, designs, copyright. In other cases, the intellectual 
property may not be formally protected through intellectual property rights (IPR) [...] 
but is the sum of tacit knowledge spread among the firm's employees and routines. [...] 
Proprietary knowledge can also take the form of management capabilities, or 
widespread and distinctive knowledge in the heads of a large sales force. Proprietary 
knowledge works when it permits the firm to stay ahead of competitors" (Forbes and 
Wield, 2006, p. 10). 
To illustrate this point they develop what they define as the 'process-product-
proprietary grids' (see Figure 6), which allow them to position firms in their catching 
up process but also to trace their progresses and path towards 'technological leadership' 
and competitiveness. At the beginning of their catching up process and when they start 
competing internationally, firms are in the process/non-proprietary quadrant of the grid 
(bottom left) where they compete on wages. Within this first quadrant firms can start 
improving their process capabilities by innovating at the shop-floor (by for instance 
absorbing slack, as explained in Section 2.5.2). Although these improvements require 
considerable effort and commitment on the side of the firm and cannot therefore be 
considered as minor, "moving up the value chain means capturing innovation rents via 
product innovation, or by building proprietary capabilities, or both. Crossing the 
quadrant boundaries requires that firms build new assets and capabilities" (Forbes and 
Wield, 2006, p. 14). This could happen in a variety of ways. Firms can, for instance, 
move from process/non-proprietary to product/non-proprietary or going proprietary by 
moving to the right side of the grid. 
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The merit of the process-product-proprietary grids is, rather than indicating one 
best practice, to suggest that for many firms, there are a series of possible moves to 
become innovative. 
Figure 6 The process-product-proprietary grid to analyse firm-level innovation in developing 
countries 
Product Product — Non proprietary quadrant Product — proprietary quadrant 
Process Process —non — 
proprietary quadrant 
Process — proprietary quadrant 
Non-Proprietary Proprietary 
Source: Forbes and Wield, 2006 
2.5.7 Relevance and limits of the TC approach for this study 
The technological capabilities approach as it has been reviewed in the previous 
pages, offers analytical insights that are particularly useful to address some of the key 
issues of this study. 
First the approach has been specifically developed to study and explain firm-
level technical change in developing countries. It follows that, by using this approach, 
this study will not encounter the problems, identified instead for the IS approach, of 
adapting to a developing context ideas generated by observing behaviours in mature 
economies. 
Second, the TC approach provides a practical analytical too155 that allows to 
study what kind of capabilities firms in developing countries acquire (i.e. what is the 
nature of their innovative effort) and what are the learning processes through which 
they are accumulated - all aspects that are at the core of this thesis' objectives. 
Moreover, a wealth of empirical evidence upon which to compare and contrast the 
results obtained by this study is available (Romijn, 1999, Figueiredo, 1999, Ariffin and 
Figueiredo, 2004, Albaladejo and Romijn, 2000, Ariffin, 2000). 
55 This will be explained in more detail in the first part of Chapter 3. 
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These are all important aspects, even more so, when the other approach adopted 
by this study, the IS perspective, has been questioned in the literature for not being 
practical enough and for being too conceptually heterogeneous (Klein Woolthuis et al., 
2005). 
However, although the TC literature has substantially contributed to our 
understanding of technological dynamics in firms in developing countries and on the 
learning processes that underpin efforts to increase value-added, it suffers from some 
important limitations. We shall deal below with two of these for the importance they 
play in this study: 
1. The limited attention to the study of new emerging knowledge intensive 
technologies 
2. The lack of systemic understanding 
Limited attention to the study of new emerging knowledge intensive technologies 
The process of technological capability building and the underlying learning 
processes have been well studied by the TC literature in industries such as, for instance, 
farm equipment (Mishra, 1985, Romijn, 1999), metalworking (see Katz, 1987 and 
Figueiredo, 2002 for specific insights into the Brazilian steel industry), rice milling 
(Mingsarn, 1986) and briquetting (Clancy, 2001). These are all traditional 
manufacturing and engineering-based industries that have been at the core of industrial 
development in the 20th century. Catching up strategies in these machine-based 
manufacturing processes were possible from a low skill base and by pursuing the 
previously illustrated incremental path of foreign technology acquisition, assimilation, 
modification and adaptation to local needs (Mytelka, 2004). 
The new century is seeing instead the increasing importance of a different type 
of technologies. Biotechnologies, pharmaceutical, nano-technologies, fuel cells and 
indeed solar technologies for the production of electricity are rapidly acquiring 
importance. These technologies, defined by Mytelka as 'new wave technologies' 
(Mytelka, 2003, Mytelka, 2004) are characterised by: intense knowledge base, systemic 
embeddedness and patent intensity. Mytelka (2004) emphasises how processes of 
catching up and capability building in these technologies are bound to be different from 
earlier mechanically based industrial technologies upon which our understanding is 
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currently based. Incremental innovation strategies (i.e. from imitation, to adaptation 
and innovation) are bound to be not longer adequate for firms willing to take part in 
new wave technologies because they: "[...] have raised the barriers to entry and 
narrowed opportunities for incremental catching up from a low skill base" (Mytelka, 
2004, p. 389). 
Moreover, the technology frontier in these new wave technologies is moving 
quickly ahead. This is particularly relevant in the case of solar PV where, as will be 
explained in Chapter 4, different technological families, at different levels of 
technological and commercial maturity, are rapidly moving forward and are competing 
to dominate the solar electricity markets of the next decades. This rapid rate of 
technological change (in PV but also in other emerging technologies like for instance 
stem cell biology or nanotechnologies) casts a further doubt on whether the incremental 
innovation process described in the TC literature is still an adequate strategy to 
participate in the global markets and production. The rate of change forces firms to 
compete not only on prices but also on the basis of their ability to innovate. 
This is why a deeper understanding of TC building in new knowledge-intensive 
technologies like PV is needed and should be carefully studied, both to see whether 
accumulation paths are indeed different from traditional technologies upon which the 
large majority of the TC literature is based and whether firms are taking steps to keep 
pace with the rapidly shifting technology frontier. 
Moreover, a lack of knowledge of the extent to which, and how, firms in 
developing countries are building up TC in knowledge intensive technologies does not 
allow to shed light on the contribution these countries could give to further developing 
and diffusing these technologies. If: "From the firm's point of view there is little 
difference [...] between efforts to improve technology mastery, to adapt technology to 
new conditions, to improve it slightly or to improve it very significantly" (Lail, 1992, p. 
166), from the technology's point of view it makes a considerable difference. This is 
particularly relevant for those technologies, like solar PV, that have not yet reached 
maturity and need innovation to develop further. Whether China is developing only the 
TC necessary to become a good imitator or whether it is taking steps to reach the 
technology frontier and possibly moving it forward could have profound implications 
for the future of PV diffusion. 
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Lack of systemic understanding 
Although in identifying the factors that are relevant for technological learning, 
some authors (see for instance Romijn and Albaladejo, 2002) take into account also 
factors external to the firm and particularly those that imply interactions with customers 
or suppliers, they fail to study and understand the interplay between the firm and its 
external environment. Since firms are part of a larger system (see the discussion in the 
initial part of this chapter): "[.. 1 it is simply not enough for innovation studies, in 
developing countries, to focus on firm-level factors without considering the relations 
between these and the broader institutional and organizational set-up within which 
firms are embedded. The dynamic capabilities for absorption and innovation are 
influenced by firm-level factors and competencies as well as the character and conduct 
of institutions and organizations defining the system" (Kiggundu, 2006, p. 33). 
2.5.8 Concluding remarks on the usefulness of the IS and TC approaches for this 
study 
Both IS and TC approaches have strengths and limitations which arise from 
their bounded focus. Therefore they can only yield partial insights on this study's 
purpose to understand more about innovation in PV firms in China. 
The TC literature is interested in the determinants of firms' TC accumulation 
and particularly in the learning mechanisms that are behind this accumulation process. 
Although this is certainly crucial in firms in developing countries (even more so if we 
understand innovation in the broad sense so that also incremental innovation can be 
taken into account) the big picture remains in the background. Firms are part of a broad 
system that fosters and constrains innovation and capability building at the same time. 
It is how the different elements of the system work together that matters and determines 
the outcome of innovation. 
On the other side, the IS literature has the merit of focusing specifically on the 
interplay of the different elements of the system. However, it fails to shed light on the 
specific knowledge accumulation processes that are so important for technological 
improvements in firms and even more relevant in firms in developing countries, where 
it is assumed that specific effort should be devoted to acquire and assimilate a 
technology developed elsewhere. 
• 
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It is suggested here that new insights into the driving forces of firm-level 
competence building, competitiveness and growth in developing countries could 
emerge by combining the two approaches. 
2.6 Conclusions 
The focus of this thesis is upon the ability of the PV firms in China to innovate 
and on what drives them to do so. We began this Chapter by discussing a commonly 
used approach to understand and measure innovation in firms (or countries): the use of 
quantitative indicators like R&D expenditure or patents. We adopted this approach to 
sketch a picture of China's innovativeness and concluded that, despite being useful, 
quantitative indicators by no means could give a complete picture of the health or 
otherwise of a firm's or a country's innovativeness. Not only do they present 
considerable challenges when applied in a developing country context56 but also, and 
more specifically, when used to understand more about innovation in China, they 
cannot reflect the rapid changes a country the size of China is undergoing and the time 
and effort needed for technological change to occur. Moreover the use of quantitative 
indicators cannot provide accurate insights into the many technological complexities 
and specificities that characterise the different industrial sectors. The nature of global 
innovation is changing, and we need to update our frameworks and models to take 
account of this. 
For this reason we devoted the second part of the Chapter to review critically 
two strands of literature - the TC and the IS literatures - that we believed could provide 
a better understanding of firm-level innovation dynamics. We emphasised, however, 
how studies that adopt an IS perspective rarely include an empirical review of firm-
level technological competences and factors of influence. At the same time, a common 
weakness of the TC studies is that they adopt a static view of what determines learning 
in firms and do not take into account the workings of the innovation system as a whole. 
We propose to use in this study both the approaches to see whether their joint adoption 
could deliver a better understanding of the innovation process underway in China in 
solar PV. 
56  As explained in the initial part of this chapter formal R&D, for instance, only captures a limited 
part of the innovation effort undertaken by firms in developing countries. 
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Our task in the next chapter is to describe the analytical framework that results 
from combining these two literatures and to set out and discuss the methodology of the 
study. 
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3 DEVELOPING 	THE 	ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK AND THE METHODOLOGY OF 
THE STUDY 
Picture 4 Searching for a method: how do I eat this? 
Note: the answer to the question in the caption above is provided at the end of the Chapter• 
Source: Picture taken by the author during fieldwork in China (May-July 2005) in a Shanghai 
restaurant serving southern Yunnan cuisine 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 discussed how technology is developed largely in firms and 
suggested that they need to build the necessary capabilities to grow value-added and to 
maintain their competitiveness both in domestic and international markets. The 
capability building process requires effort57 at the level of the individual firm but also 
the active involvement of other elements (i.e. organisations, institutions and networks) 
of the system in which firms are embedded. While each of these elements is important, 
57 As discussed in the previous Chapter, the 'effort' is essentially the continuous learning that a 
firm needs to add value to its products and processes. Learning (which includes not only the formal in-
house R&D expenditure but also other, less quantifiable, mechanisms like learning-by doing or learning 
by investment, see Section 2.5.4) is known from the literature (see Section 2.5.5) to be affected by 
previous education and working experience of both the entrepreneur and the workforce, culture, some 
firm-specific factors (i.e. size, age, ownership), geographic proximity with firms in similar lines of 
business and interaction with customers and suppliers. Since firms do not go through the same innovative 
process, the extent to which these factors play a role in their learning and technological capability 
accumulation process varies and needs to be explored. 
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the interplay between them and the way in which a system performs are particularly 
important for the emergence and the diffusion of innovation. 
In this chapter we propose to design a strategy to operationalise and empirically 
test these concepts. The chapter has therefore two main purposes: 
1. To develop an analytical framework to translate some of the theoretic 
concepts reviewed in Chapter 2 into observable and empirically testable 
variables. 
2. To design a suitable method to collect the data necessary to answer the 
research questions (Section 1.3). 
The first part of the Chapter presents the analytical framework and starts with an 
overview of the issues that a framework developed for this study should help in 
addressing (Section 3.2.1). Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 discuss these issues more in detail 
and explain how this study 'measures': how advanced is what PV firms in China can do 
(Research question 1 on the nature of innovation in the PV firms in China) and how 
knowledge has been accumulated and what has played a part in this accumulation 
process and ultimately supports or inhibits innovation in the firms under analysis 
(Research question 2 on the determinants of innovation). 
The second part of the Chapter (Section 3.3) explains the method used to 
address the specific theoretical, analytical and empirical requirements of the thesis. 
Particular attention is devoted to the empirical part of the research and to the methods 
used to collect the evidence necessary to understand the innovation behaviour of the PV 
firms in China. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 contain information on the empirical 
instrument used (i.e. questionnaire and semi-structured interviews); on the type of data 
that have been collected and on the fieldwork done in China. 
3.2 Analytical framework 
Before going into the details of the analytical framework, two introductory 
notes are important. 
The analytical framework developed for this study combines two approaches —
one with a TC and intra-firm learning focus and the other with a wider systemic focus, 
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coming from the IS literature58. The framework developed considerably over time and 
the version presented below is the result of an iterative process, in which additional 
pieces of information have been added as the empirical analysis has proceeded. This 
particularly refers to the part aimed at enhancing understanding of the systemic 
dynamics and of what influences innovation in PV firms. A number of factors made it 
difficult and possibly undesirable to tighten up too much the analytical framework 
before undertaking the empirical analysis: the speed of change of the Chinese PV sector 
since the early 2000s (see second part of Chapter 5); the fact that this sector in China 
had not been studied before from an innovation point of view; the rapid economic 
growth of the country since the early 1980s and the profound changes occurred in the 
Chinese innovation system over time (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2). 
Furthermore, while one of the key purposes of the analytical framework is to 
guide the data collection, another important aspect is to explore the complementary 
nature of the two different approaches adopted (i.e. the TC and the IS). As a 
consequence it did not make sense to have a too structured framework to work with 
before the beginning of the data collection. 
Information obtained in China has been used to further structure the analytical 
framework and to see how compatible the two approaches are. These issues will be 
discussed in more details in Chapter 7. 
The second remark is that two other Chapters should be considered as an 
integral part of this analytical framework: Chapter 4 and 5 where the PV technology 
and the development of the Chinese innovation system over time are respectively 
discussed. As explained in Chapter 1 (Section 1.6) and further detailed in section 3.2.1 
of this chapter, the reviews of these two issues are crucial not only to inform the 
analytical framework but also to understand the empirical results presented in Chapter 
6 and discussed in Chapter 7. For reasons of simplicity we have preferred not to include 
the coverage of these two technology and country specific issues in this chapter but to 
locate them in two separate chapters that precede the presentation of the results 
(Chapter 6). 
58  Figure 7 provides an overview of the approaches used to elaborate the framework and the 
concepts it operationalises. 
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3.2.1 What an analytical framework designed for this study should help in 
understanding 
The analytical framework developed for this study should help in understanding 
the nature and the determinants of the technological effort underway in the PV firms in 
China. More in particular, building on the theoretical basis reviewed in Chapter 2, it 
should operationalise the two research questions and a number of key concepts they 
contain: 
1. How advanced is what the PV firms in China can do (research question 1). 
In this respect we need analytical tools to assess: the type of capabilities that 
the Chinese PV firms possess and how advanced they are (i.e. only the 
capabilities to assemble standard PV modules or also the ability of 
customising products or indeed developing fundamentally new products? 
Are firms developing proprietary solutions that are hard to duplicate and can 
guarantee a long term competitive advantage?); with respect to what and to 
whom should we assess how advanced these capabilities are (i.e. are the 
Chinese PV firms accumulating capabilities only in the PV technology 
family that is closer to technological and market maturity or are they 
entering also other emerging PV technologies? How do the Chinese PV 
firms perform with respect to competitors?) 
2. What factors affect the knowledge accumulation process, how they changed 
over time and can drive further the firms' innovation effort (research 
question 2). 
To operationalise this research question we need to focus both on firm-level 
and wider systemic aspects. We need hence tools to: identify different types 
and sources of learning in PV firms (for instance: what is the role played by 
in-house R&D? How important is the educational/professional background 
of the entrepreneur in the firm's learning and innovative behaviour?59), but 
we also need to map the structure of the Chinese PV innovation system 
(what types of actors are there? How do they relate to each other?) and to 
identify what processes (i.e. 'functions') are important to the firms' ability 
to generate technological change and what induces and blocks them. 
59 For the theoretical underpinning of these issues see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.5. 
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We will also need to identify different points in time in the firms' history in 
order to understand the role played by the different 'accumulation factors' 
over time (i.e. how do the different structure and dynamics of the innovation 
system over time affect the innovation behaviour of the Chinese PV firms?). 
As anticipated, two different approaches suggested by the literatures critically 
reviewed in Chapter 2 have been used to operationalise these key concepts. The TC 
literature, which is more suitable to explain firm-level dynamics60, has been exclusively 
adopted to frame point 1 above. Both the TC and IS literatures have instead been 
adopted for point 2 on the determinants. As pointed out in Chapter 2, we believe that 
each body of literature, when taken separately, can yield only partial insights into the 
factors that affect knowledge accumulation in firms, how they changed over time and 
what can drive their innovation effort further. In other words: why firms accumulate 
knowledge and innovate. To operationalise this specific aspect, we hence propose to 
construct this part of the analytical framework by adopting separately the two 
approaches to see what results they are capable of delivering. The complementarity of 
the two approaches and the extent to which they could be integrated will be discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
Figure 7 summarises the two conceptual blocks that the analytical framework 
should address (i.e. the nature of the firms' technological effort and its determinants), 
the specific concepts that it operationalises and the main theoretical approaches used. 
Because the analytical framework addresses a number of distinct issues (see the 
discussion above) it is possibly more appropriate to refer to several sub-frameworks (or 
`analytical tools' as they have been called above) that have been specifically designed 
to address each analytical issue of interest for the study (e.g. with respect to what and 
whom the TC of firms should be 'measured'? How the innovation system components 
can be mapped and its performance be studied over time? etc.). Taken all together these 
sub-frameworks constitute the analytical framework of this study. 
60 See the discussion about the strengths and limits of the two literatures in Chapter 2 
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Key concepts to 
operationalise 
Nature of innovation 
Approach 	 TC literature 
How adanced is what 
firms can do 
Priority research  	China technological 
area 	 innovation for PV production 
Determinants of innovation 
What affects the knowledge 
accumulation process 
	 .,' 	  
Static 	Systemic 
determinants 	analysis 
I 
TC literature 	IS literature 
Figure 7 Overview of the concepts operationalised by the analytical framework 
Source: Author's elaboration 
3.2.2 Assessing how advanced is what the PV firms in China can do (on the 
nature of the technological effort) 
In addressing the nature of the technological effort of the PV firms in China (see 
the first building block in Figure 7), we need first of all to establish with respect to 
`what' and to 'whom' we want to assess how advanced is what the firms can do. We 
argue that this should be understood not only in a narrow sense by focusing on a firm's 
ability to increase the value added of its products and processes, but also with respect to 
the firm's positioning in the PV value chain and in a broader PV technological and 
competitive context. 
This represents an improvement to conventional approaches interested in TC in 
firms (Lall, 1992, Figueiredo, 2002, Romijn, 1999, Ariffin, 2000), where the degree of 
technological maturity firms have achieved has been assessed only with respect to the 
technological activities they perform (i.e. investment, product and process activities as 
well as developing linkages with firms and institutions)6I. 
Figure 8 schematically presents the key dimensions against which the maturity 
of the technological capabilities accumulated by the Chinese PV firms will be assessed 
in this study. 
61  These aspects have already been introduced in Section 2.5.3 and will be further discussed in the 
following pages of this section. 
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TC complexity in PV firms 
To be assessed with respect to 
PV 
technology 
families 
PV value chain Firms' technological 
activities (products 
and processes) 
Competitors 
Producing 
commercial state 
of the art products 
Taking steps to 
push technology 
frontier 
Figure 8 Analytical framework for the assessment of the complexity of TC in PV firms 
TC in absolute terms TC in relative terms 
Source: Author's elaboration 
In what follows we explain why we believe a broader focus is needed to assess 
technological capabilities in PV and how we intend to make these assessments 
operative. 
A. 	Assessing TC with respect to the PV technological families 
The generic term 'solar PV' refers to a group of technology families at different 
levels of technological and commercial maturity (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3). Not 
necessarily the technology that today dominates the market and that has nearly reached 
technological maturity (this is the case of c-Si) will be the one with the largest market 
share also in the years to come. Since one of the PV innovation goals is to reduce the 
cost of production and PV technology families that are currently in their infancy have 
proved they can better suit this goal, it is quite likely that c-Si will be substituted in the 
future by other more cost-effective and better performing technologies62. 
In assessing TC in the PV firms in China, it is hence important to position the 
firms within this broad technological context to understand whether they operate in a 
technology family with a limited innovation potential (like the case of c-Si) or whether 
they manifest a long term view by accumulating capabilities in technologies that are not 
yet commercially available (or that are approaching market diffusion) but that are likely 
to constitute the future PV innovation frontier. The choices made by the firms with 
62 All these aspects are discussed at length in Chapter 4. 
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respect to the different PV technology families will be taken by this study as a first 
indication of their innovation behaviour. 
B. 	Assessing TC with respect to the PV value chain 
As pointed out above, since the currently dominant PV technology is c-Si, it 
makes sense to give a closer look to its value chain assuming that a certain number of 
firms in China will be operating in this technology63. 
As Chapter 4 (Section 4.3) explains, not all the manufacturing links along the c-
Si value chain have the same knowledge intensity and innovation potential towards the 
goal of reducing productive costs. Since the high cost of this technology family 
depends on the main material employed, i.e. Silicon, it follows that the manufacturing 
links where Silicon is employed more extensively (i.e. ingot, wafer and cell 
manufacturing) are the ones where more cost reduction is possible and where more 
innovation effort is required. Moreover these are also the links that are more knowledge 
intensive and where more advanced TC are required to manage the production process 
(see Chapter 4 for more details). 
It follows that undertaking production in one manufacturing link or another 
along the c-Si value chain may give additional indications on the maturity of the 
technological capabilities of the firms under analysis. Should evidence collected for 
this study highlight that PV firms in China are mainly assembling modules, this result 
will suggest that firms are possibly doing light transformation of high-tech goods (i.e. 
cells and wafers) whose value is created elsewhere, possibly in mature economies. 
C'. 	Assessing TC with respect to the firm's technological activities: products and 
processes 
Based on the idea that technological capabilities are the mastery of 
technological activities (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5.1), it is possible to identify those 
activities that are important in a firm's operations and to study the level of maturity that 
firms have achieved in their mastery (Lall, 1992). Lall (1992) has explored these issues 
and identified six different technological activities (which he calls 'technical 
63  As it will be explained in detail in the second part of this Chapter, before leaving for fieldwork, 
a preliminary search was undertaken to identify the main PV industrial, academic and policy players. It 
appeared immediately clear that the large majority of the firms that were manufacturing PV components 
in China in 2005, were doing so in the c-Si technology 
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functions'): (i) pre-investment decisions (ii) project executions (iii) process engineering 
(iv) product engineering (v) industrial engineering (vi) linkages within the economy 64. 
The idea behind Lall's sub-division in technical functions is that a firm is 
unlikely to ensure successful commercial operations unless it has acquired a basic core 
of competence necessary for instance to decide by itself on its investment plans, to 
reach minimum levels of operating efficiency, to deliver products with minimum 
quality requirements or to establish effective linkages with reliable suppliers. 
This study takes into account only two of the technical functions identified by 
Lall: product and process engineering. We want to establish the extent to which the PV 
firms in China can undertake a) changes in the products they offer (product innovation) 
b) changes in the ways in which these products are created (process innovation). This 
choice rests upon the fact that these are the aspects that are more significant to foster 
innovation in PV where, as anticipated here and explained in detail in Chapter 4, one of 
the main goals is to reduce production costs via improved or new production processes 
or via new applications65. 
Once the technical functions have been conceptualised, it is also possible to 
identify different degrees of maturity of the technological capabilities accumulated by 
firms in the different technical functions. Lall (1992) refers to three maturity stages: 
basic, intermediate and advanced (Lail, 1992)66. 
When referred to process or product engineering, the category basic capabilities 
indicates that simple routine activities, such as assimilation of standard process 
technology or easy maintenance to ensure product's minimum quality requirements, 
can be undertaken by the firm. These capabilities are the result of the experience gained 
by the firm in constantly repeating certain activities and do not require any significant 
action to foster the process of technological upgrading (i.e. they are essentially the 
result of learning by doing and of processes like reverse engineering). 
64 Functions (i) and (ii) refer to the investment decisions, in terms of technology, equipment and 
construction sites, necessary before undertaking production. Function (v) refers to activities like 
inventory control, monitoring productivity, etc. 
65 Using high-efficiency 3rd-generation solar cells for building-integrated PV could be an 
example of a new possible application (Bullhorn et al., 2006) 
66  Hobday (1996, 1999) has adopted a slightly different classification framework for the 
technological positioning of firms. In studying technological activities in the global electronics firms, he 
distinguishes between: a) Changes to existing old stock through technological support and engineering 
services b) capability to install the latest vintage equipment c) minor adaptation and short-term (six 
months to a year) development of products and processes d) medium-term development and research e) 
`blue sky' basic research. 
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Intermediate capabilities imply a certain degree of autonomous effort to adapt, 
for instance, the productive process to different local conditions or to undertake product 
quality improvements. 
Advanced capabilities refer instead to the ability of substantially change or 
create new products or processes. 
We believe the framework developed by Lall can be useful for this study 
because it provides a hands-on tool to study the firms' ability to increase the value 
added of their products and processes. The approach suggested by La11, and its 
derivations (Hobday, 1996, Bell and Pavitt, 1995), has been widely adopted (and 
enriched) in the literature (Figueiredo, 1999, Romijn, 1999, Ariffin, 2000), so its use in 
this study can add to the body of evidence underpinning technological capability 
studies. 
The following part of this Section presents in detail how this study 'measures' 
the different levels of complexity of the technological capabilities possessed by the 
Chinese PV firms in processes and products. The different degrees of complexity (i.e. 
basic, intermediate and advanced) have been specifically developed to study the PV 
industry. c-Si technology has been taken as the manufacturing value chain of reference, 
assuming that the majority of the PV firms to be interviewed in China operate in this 
technology family67. 
As explained in the methodological part of this chapter (see Sections 3.3.1 and 
3.3.2) the 'complexity indicators' have been elaborated on the basis of the insights 
obtained from both the available literature on technological capability in firms (where 
the work of Romijn has been particularly useful — Romijn, 1999, Romijn, 2002, Romijn 
and Albaladejo, 2002) and the information collected during the in-depth interviews 
with the key PV experts (see Section 3.3.2). 
Basic capabilities for process: 
The study considers the following indicators as evidence of basic capabilities in 
the production processes of c-Si wafers, cells or modules: 
67 As previously pointed out, this initial assumption was indeed confirmed after a preliminary 
search undertaken to identify the firms to be interviewed (see further details provided in section 3.3.3). 
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- Conducting routine operations on a PV turnkey production line for the 
manufacturing of 'off the shelf' c-Si wafers, cells or modules. Using a 
turnkey production line only in the standard way suggested by the supplier 
to undertake production at the minimum efficiency level required, is 
considered by this study as a possible indicator of the inability of the firm to 
undertake an autonomous effort to modify the production process to adapt it, 
for instance, to specific local circumstances or market needs. 
- Undertaking only the limited maintenance necessary to keep basic quality 
standards. 
Basic capabilities for products 
Basic capabilities for products are understood by the study as the firm's ability 
of manufacturing only standard c-Si modules or other standard PV products. A 
standard PV product is understood by this study as one that can be obtained `off-the-
shelf' and for which bespoke solutions are not necessary. In other words, being able to 
deliver only standard PV products is used by the study as evidence of the lack of more 
advanced capabilities that would enable the firm to customise its products. 
Intermediate capabilities for processes 
The study considers as 'intermediate capability for process' the following firm's 
abilities: 
— Intervening in the standard way in which the production line (for wafer, cell 
or module production) should be installed The user of the production line 
might need to modify the standard installation requirements (as for the 
supplier's instructions) to respond to cost savings or specific production 
requirements. Since these changes requires the firm to be in control of the 
manufacturing process and to be able to face any possible problem that can 
arise in the production as a consequence of a non-standard installation of the 
production line, they are taken by the study as evidence of intermediate 
capabilities for process. 
- Undertaking small modifications of the standard equipment used in the 
production line. An example can illustrate this point. If the standard 
equipment includes a six-wafer holder, the user might prefer (to satisfy their 
specific production needs) to have only 4 larger wafers for which a non- 
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standard four-wafer holder is needed. A firm's ability to undertake such a 
small modification to otherwise standard equipment is used by this study as 
evidence of intermediate process capabilities. Moreover this ability shows 
the firm's technical confidence in addressing further possible issues that 
might arise from a non-standard use of the equipment (which will as a 
consequence be no longer covered by the supplier's warranty). 
Self-constructing small parts of the equipment, such as spare parts, tools, 
etc. 
These are all important indicators because they testify the ability of making a 
non-standard use (i.e. different from that suggested by the main supplier) of the 
production equipment. Moreover, the ability of constructing small equipment or tools 
to be used to satisfy the firm's specific production needs highlights the firm's problem 
solving capacity. 
A univocal definition of what 'small modification' means is difficult to provide. 
In several cases in fact even making small spare parts or some of the tools to be used on 
the production line's equipment (for its maintenance or more efficient use) may take 
the firm quite a lot of effort and time. 
What is important to emphasise here is that although these modifications require 
the firm to have a good understanding of the productive process and the necessary 
technical skills (i.e. they require the firm not only to replicate the same productive 
process that was possibly taught by somebody else, but to add own and conscious effort 
to add value), they do not require the specific knowledge, the technical background and 
the search for specific technological solutions needed to modify production processes 
or even to develop new ones. Putting it differently: these small modifications and small 
pieces of equipment could be easily accessed outside the firm or replicated by others. If 
the firms decide to develop them in-house is usually because it costs less than buying 
them from their suppliers. This is why small modifications and the self-construction of 
pieces of equipment are considered by this study as intermediate capabilities. 
Intermediate capabilities for products 
The following firm's abilities are included by this study in this level of 
technological complexity: 
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- Producing non-standard PV products and being able to customise them. Taking 
PV modules as an example, this might refer to ad hoc changes to module size, 
coating and encapsulation68. 
- Undertaking home designed/modified electric circuits. For instance, designing 
protection circuits that can enable the PV module to function even if one or 
more cells are out of order. This could be particularly relevant for certain 
module sizes and installation set ups. 
— Ensuring high quality standards and procedures. Firms' accreditation status 
with respect to international quality standard69 is used in this study as an 
indicator of the more than basic knowledge necessary to guarantee 
manufacturing and quality procedures conforming to internationally approved 
standards. 
Advanced process capabilities  
They include the following capabilities: 
- Undertaking major modifications to the productive process and/or 
manufacturing entirely new equipment to be used in the production line. With 
difference from the small modifications that have been taken as evidence of 
intermediate capabilities, 'major modifications' are understood by this study as 
those that require specific advanced technological knowledge to improve an 
existing production process or to develop new ones. In other words, it is not just 
about 'doing the same as competitors' in-house to save money on the equipment 
(as is the case for intermediate process capabilities), but it is about finding 
specific technological solutions to technological problems aimed at greatly 
improving or changing the technology. 
- Using (or thinking of and being able to use) alternative and advanced c-Si 
production technologies. An illustrative example could be the ability of the 
firms to grow ribbons of multicristalline Silicon70 . 
— Adopting (also in the form of R&D or acquisitions of assets) alternative 
production processes belonging to emerging PV technology families (i.e. not c-
Si). 
68 For details on the c-Si manufacturing process see Chapter 4, Section 4.3. 
69 For instance: IEC, for the performance of the components in PV modules, TUV, to ascertain the 
safety of the modules, CE, to declare conformity to the relevant EU directives. 
70 See the discussion on PV innovation avenues done in Section 4.4. 
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Advanced product capabilities 
They include: 
- The production of greatly modified (existing) products. 
- The use of new materials (organics, III-V semiconductors, carbon nanotubes, 
etc.) to produce PV modules. 
- The adoption of alternative module designs (like, for instance, cells embedded 
in glass, concentrators, etc) to accomplish multiple functions71 .  
— Having patents or licensing own technology to third parties 
Table 2 summarises the complexity indicators we have presented above to 
understand how advanced is what the PV firms can do in terms of processes and 
products. The columns set out the main technological capabilities by the two technical 
functions suggested by Lall (1992) and of interest for this study (i.e. process and 
products), while the rows set out the main technological capabilities by degree of 
complexity as measured by the activities from which the technological capability arises. 
7!  A transparent module developed by Sharp to be used both for electricity generation and as an 
architectonic element for building integrated PV, could be taken as an example of a innovative PV 
product designed to meet more than one function. Developing modules for the cogeneration for both hot 
water and electricity production, could be another example. 
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Table 2 'Complexity indicators' for the study of firms' TC in PV manufacturing processes and products 
TECHNICAL FUNCTIONS 
Product Process 
T
C
 C
O
M
PL
E
X
IT
Y
  
Basic Production of standard 'off the shelf modules/cells/wafers (i.e. inability to 
provide bespoke solutions) 
Routine operation (as for the supplier's instructions) of a turnkey 
production line 
Only limited maintenance necessary to keep basic quality standards. 
Intermediate 
Production of non-standard PV products and customisation 
Home designed/modified electric circuits 
International level of quality standards and procedures 
Non-standard installation of the production equipment  
Small modifications on the production standard equipment 
Self-construction of small parts of equipment (i.e. tools, spare parts, 
etc.) 
Advanced 
Greatly modified products 
Use of new Materials (organics, III-V semiconductors, carbon nanotubes, 
etc.) 
Alternative designs (i.e. cells embedded in glass, concentrators, etc.) to 
accomplish multiple functions 
Patents or licensing own technology 
Undertaking major modifications to the productive process and/or 
manufacturing entirely new equipment to be used in the production 
line 
Alternative c-Si production technologies (i.e. growing ribbons of 
multi crystalline Si) 
Novel manufacturing methods based on emerging PV technology 
families (i.e. non c-Si) 
Source: Adapted from Lall (19921 and made PV-snecifie on the hack of the in-tionth interviews with the PV pvnprtc 
Improvement of technological capabilities over time 
Borrowing from the available literature (Romijn, 1999, Romijn, 2002) and from 
the insights obtained during the in-depth interviews with the key PV experts, this study 
also adopts four other indicators to understand if the PV firms in China have improved 
their technological capabilities over time. The purpose here is not to rank capabilities 
according to the level of complexity (as was done previously following Lall's approach) 
but to assess whether firms have progressed over time. Two points in time are used: 
what a firm was able to do when it started producing and what it could do when the 
survey was undertaken in mid 2005. 
The four indicators that have been developed are: 
1. Degree of product diversification 
The ability of a firm to manufacture an increasing range of products by entering 
more complex manufacturing steps along the PV supply chain over time, indicates that 
the firm in question must have acquired, and be able to master, more advanced 
technological capabilities. If, as an example, a firm started its activity by assembling 
solar modules and at the time of the survey is able to produce also solar cells, this will 
be considered an indicator of increased technological capability over time. 
The ability to diversify product range over time has been widely used in the TC 
literature (Romijn, 1999, Mingsarn, 1986) as an indicator of enhanced technological 
capabilities in firms. This is an important indicator that goes beyond the understanding 
of TC per se. It allows in fact also getting insights into the ability to master different 
productive processes as well as to undertake more complex production planning and 
organisation. 
2. Increase product technological complexity 
Being able to upgrade the firm's product in a technological sense can also be 
used as an indicator of capability increase and technological deepening. For example, 
producing more efficient solar cells or thinner wafers over time can be considered 
evidence of capability increase because it is assumed that the firm must have acquired 
more complex skills in order to deliver more complex products. 
3. Improvements in quality and technical performance 
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Similarly to the previous two indicators, improvements in quality and technical 
performance (for instance, an extended service life) suggest technological deepening 
over time. While, for example, we have already suggested using international quality 
certifications as an indicator of intermediate process capabilities, the ability of a firm of 
delivering better quality products over time is used by the study as an indication of 
technological progress and of the acquisition of more advance technological 
capabilities through time. 
4. 	Increasing production capacity 
Although this is not an indicator of improved technological capabilities per se, it 
is an important variable because it measures the ability of a firm to attract and mange 
the necessary resources (i.e. funds, personnel, equipment) to fulfil its strategic 
productive goals. Limited production capacity, not only greatly restrict the range of 
possible PV applications that the firm can satisfy72 but can also impinge a firm's ability 
to secure feedstock and other production materials (for instance: glass, ethylene-vinyl 
acetate —EVA— sheets for encapsulation of solar cells, etc.) at discounted prices and 
hence endanger production. 
Moreover, production capacity is closely linked to PV cost reduction, which is 
one of the innovation goals the PV industry should aim at. A study by NREL EIA/US 
(http://www.nrel.gov/pv/pv_manufacturing/cost_capacity.html) based on 14 firms with 
active module manufacturing lines in 2005, shows that for every doubling of 
production capacity an average 17% drop in direct costs of manufacturing can be 
achieved. Having hence a limited production capacity limits the firm's possibility of 
reducing production costs. 
D. 	Assessing TC with respect to competitors 
So far the construction of the analytical framework has involved analytical tools 
for the assessment of a firm's ability to add value in absolute terms, i.e. with respect to 
the firm itself as an isolated unit. 
However, this study also understands innovation as a relative concept that 
should be studied with respect to international competitors: "Since other firms and 
nations do not stand still, competitiveness can only be maintained and increased 
72  Certain applications, like for instance utility scale installations that are in the typical order of 
about 1 MW, requires fairly large production capacity. 
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through continuous improvement and innovation to continuously increase value-added" 
(Forbes and Wield, 2002, p. 11). 
The complexity of the TC in firms in relative terms (i.e. with respect to 
competitors) is assessed by this study for two distinct types of effort: 
a) Manufacturing products that are commercial state of the art 
b) Taking steps to push the technology frontier. 
Since, as will be explained in detail in Chapter 6 (see in particular Table 16), the 
firms in the sample tend to have more than one product line, the assessment of the TC 
in relative terms will be done only with respect to the main product line, which is, for 7 
out of the 8 firms that are in the sample, c-Si module. As specified in Chapter 6, only 
one firm in the sample has c-Si wafers as its main business. Since it was not possible to 
collect some of the necessary data relative to this firm's performance, the complexity of 
this firm's TC with respect to the international wafer producers is not assessed by the 
study. 
i. 	Producing commercial state of the art products  
According to the definition provided at the beginning of this thesis (see Section 
1.4), this study has developed four indicators, to understand whether and to what extent 
commercial state of the art module production is achieved by the Chinese PV firms in 
the sample. The four indicators are: 
1. Capability to deliver same technical standard as competitors 
2. Capability to satisfy the largest possible range of customers' demand. 
3. Capability to meet demand for utility scale installation. 
4. Capability to deliver same qualitative standard as competitors 
The ability to produce modules with technical standards similar to the ones of 
the best competitors is measured in this study by the conversion efficiency73 of the 
solar module. 
The number of products in range is instead used as the measure of a firm's 
capability of satisfying the largest possible range of customer's demand. 
73  For more information of the relevance of conversion efficiency for PV module and cell 
performance see Chapter 4. 
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The capability of a firm to satisfy not only small residential demand but also 
utility scale installation, is measure by the firm's production capacity. This refers to the 
amount of product (measured in MW) that can be produced from the firm's processing 
facilities. Since, as briefly mentioned before, a typical utility scale installation is of the 
order of about 1 MW, a firm with a production capacity of only a few MW, would be 
quite unlikely to be able to satisfy a large demand and to provide for utility scale 
installations. 
The capability to deliver products with qualitative requirements similar to the 
ones of the competitors is measured by the number of the international certification for 
safety and quality needed to gain product acceptance and market share in the European 
and American markets. 
The four indicators, and the quantitative data necessary to make them 
measurable, will be collected for the PV firms under analysis and compared with the 
`best practice model' defined by the international competitor that was the market leader 
for c-Si modules in 2005. As discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.5.3 and in particular 
Table 13) the market leader in 2005 was Sharp. 
Once the indicators and their respective measurements have been defined, it is 
necessary to assign a 'score' against the PV firms in the sample for each of the four 
indicators of 'commercial state of the art' that we have identified. We suggest using a 1 
to 4 scale, where 4 is the 'best practice model' (so, a firm that is assigned a 4 for a 
certain indicator will be producing commercial state of the art for that specific indicator) 
and where 1 means 'very far from the production of commercial state of the art'. An 
example will further clarify the point. A firm that manufactures PV modules with 
conversion efficiency 50% lower that of Sharp (i.e. the top module producer in 2005) 
can be given 1 as a score. This means that for that specific indicator (i.e. technical 
performance) the firm is quite far from delivering commercial state of the art products 
as those manufactured by the best practice model. 
Table 3 summarises the indicators proposed by the study to assess how close the 
PV firms in China are to produce commercial state of the art products, how these 
indicators are measured and the criteria used for each indicator to assess the scores. 
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Table 3 Indicators to study how close the PV firms in China are to producing commercial state of 
the art products 
Indicator 
Capability to deliver same 
technical standard as 
competitors 
Capability to satisfy the largest 
possible range of customers' 
demand 
Capability to deliver same 
qualitative standard as 
competitors 
Capability to meet demand for 
utility scale installation. 
Source: Author's elaboration 
Measurement 
Module efficiency (%) 
No. of products in range 
No. of international certification 
for safety and quality standards 
(i.e. IEC, TUV, CE, UL, etc) 
Production capacity (MW) 
Score 
<50% of the efficiency of the 'best 
practice model' = 1 
50%<x<60% = 2 
60%<x<75% = 3 
>75% = 4 
<5 products = 1 
<5<x<15 products = 2 
<15<x<30 products = 3 
>30 products = 4 
No certification = 1 
1 certification = 2 
1 certification<x<5 certifications = 3 
>5 certifications = 4 
<100kW = 1 
<100kW<x<10MW = 2 
<10MW = 3 
>10MW = 4 
ii. Taking steps to push forward the technology frontier 
In order to understand whether firms under analysis are starting to take steps to 
push the technology frontier, the following indicators are suggested by the study: 
1. The commitment towards continuous improvement as measured by the 
in-house R&D expenditure on the firm's total yearly turnover. 
2. The ability to produce new products, as measured by the number of new 
products a firm can produce in one year. 
3. The ability to patent own product or process innovation or to develop 
other proprietary assets that are unique to the firms and that are not easy 
to replicate. 
4. The ability to take risks and undertake strategic technological or 
commercial decisions: 
- Ability to move towards those links of the c-Si value chain that 
have strategic importance in boosting technological innovation 
and in greatly reducing production costs — e.g. feedstock/wafer 
production. 
- Investing in additional marketing and distribution channels in 
mature economies or where the demand is booming. 
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Measurement 
No. of new products during one 
year preceding the survey or 
intention to do so in the year 
following the survey 
No. of proprietary assets 
Score 
None = 1 
<1% = 2 
1-10% = 3 
>10% = 4 
None = 1 
In preparation = 2 
Few = 3 
Many = 4 
None = 1 
in preparation = 2 
1 = 3 
>1 =4 
In- house R&D expenditure (% of 
total firm turnover) 
— Acquiring 'new assets' — for example, moving towards thin-film 
or any other acquisition of wafer/Silicon feedstock firms. 
As in the case of 'commercial state of the art', the PV firms in the sample will 
be assessed against the best practice model provided by Sharp, which was the market 
leader in 2005. Table 4 summarises the indicators proposed by the study to assess 
whether the PV firms in China are taking steps to push the technology frontier, how 
these indicators are measured and the criteria used for each indicator to assess the 
scores. 
Table 4 Indicators to study whether the PV firms in China are taking steps to push the 
technology frontier 
Indicator 
Commitment towards continuous 
improvement 
Ability to produce new products 
Proprietary assets (e.g. patents or 
other assets that are unique to the 
firm) 
Ability to take risks and undertake 
strategic technological or 
commercial decisions 
Source: Author's elaboration 
Moves towards those steps of the c-
Si value chain that have strategic 
importance in boosting 
technological innovation - i.e.: 
feedstock/wafer production 
Investing in additional marketing 
and distribution channels in mature 
economies or where the demand is 
booming 
Acquiring 'new assets' - i.e.: move 
towards other PV technology 
families, i.e.: thin-film, etc. 
None = 1 
in preparation = 2 
1 = 3 
>1 =4 
None = 1 
Marginal = 2 
Significant = 3 
Major = 4 
None = 1 
Marginal = 2 
Significant = 3 
Major = 4 
3.2.3 Assessing what influences innovation in the Chinese PV firms (on the 
determinants of the technological effort) 
As explained in the initial part of this chapter (see also Figure 7), to better 
understand what affects the knowledge accumulation process in the PV firms in China, 
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we combine two approaches that are suggested by the TC and the IS literatures 
respectively. 
Both approaches contribute to a deeper understanding of innovation but 
emphasise different aspects of the innovation accumulation process74. While the TC 
uses a microeconomic perspective with a strong focus on firm's internal learning (and 
its determinants), the IS approach is more concerned about the macroeconomic and 
systemic perspective. We hence think it is useful to apply them separately in 
developing the analytical framework and presenting our empirical findings (Chapter 6). 
In this way we will be possibly able to gain deeper insights into the innovation 
behaviour of the PV firms under analysis and to explore the extent to which the two 
approaches can complement each other (these issues will be discussed in details in 
Chapter 7). 
A. 	Using the TC approach to asses what affects the knowledge accumulation 
process in firms 
Drawing on the TC literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the study explores six main 
sources of technological capability building in firms. They include both the different 
learning mechanisms, as they have been reviewed in Section 2.5.4, and what is 
suggested by the literature to have an effect on learning and on the TC accumulation 
process. In what follows we briefly recall what the sources of technological capability 
are75 and how this study makes them operative and empirically testable. 
Learning 
Among the potentially important sources of TC, learning plays a crucial role. As 
explained in Chapter 2, learning in firms is represented not only by formal in-house 
R&D, but also by informal and incremental problem solving and experimentation that 
takes place on the shop-floor (like reverse engineering), or by sending staff to training 
courses or importing/hiring foreign specialists for local workers to learn from. 
To explore these issues this thesis will collect information about firms' R&D 
investment as a percentage of the firm's total turnover, importance of R&D staff 
relative to total employment and training courses. Moreover, the existence of 
74 See Chapter 2 for the theoretical underpinning and Figure 7 for an overview of the different 
approaches that have been adopted to operationalise the key concepts of this thesis. 
75 For more theoretical background see Section 2.5.5. 
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shopfloor-type of experimentation and informal on-the-job training will also be 
explored. 
This information will help in assessing the relevance of the different types of 
learning in unleashing the technological capabilities of the firms under analysis. 
Technology access 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, the access and the adoption of technologies 
developed by other (often foreign) industries could play an important role in enhancing 
technological capabilities in firms. The thesis will collect information on the source 
(whether they originate from imports or whether they are sourced domestically) of the 
production equipment used by the PV firms in China and on whether the firms under 
study have signed any license agreements. 
Endowment 
In Chapter 2 we explained how the entrepreneur and the workforce can 
contribute to the firm's technological capabilities by bringing a certain stock of 
knowledge and skills into the firm, which they obtained through earlier education and 
working experience (Romijn & Albaladejo 2002). Proxies used in the literature, and 
adopted by this study, to evaluate skills and their relevance to the firm's technological 
capabilities include the numbers of technicians, scientists, engineers and designers 
present in the firms and the number of years they have possibly worked in the PV or in 
a closely related sector (for instance, the semiconductor industry). Similarly, the study 
also assesses the relevance for the enhancement of the firm's technological capabilities 
of the education gained by the entrepreneur and his previous working experience. 
Other firms' internal factors 
We already discussed (see chapter 2) the relevance as well as the controversies 
pertaining to a number of firm's internal factors that showed some relevance to enhance 
technological capabilities. They are: firm's age, size and ownership. This latter aspect 
seem to play a particularly important role in the Chinese context where a positive 
correlation has been reported in several studies (Gaulier et al., 2007, Lemoine and 
Unal-Kesenci, 2004, Rosen, 2003, Gilboy, 2004) between the foreign ownership (also 
as joint ventures) of domestic firms and their ability to innovate (see the argument put 
forward in Chapter 2 — Section 2.2.3 - about the Chinese high-tech production as being 
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`not very Chinese'). These three factors, as measured by the length of the firm's 
commercial activity, the production capacity in MWp and indeed the firm's ownership, 
will be explored in the firms in the sample and their possible influence on the firm's 
innovation assessed. 
Linkages 
Chapter 2 (section 2.5.5) explained as interactions with suppliers, customers, 
industry associations, research institutes and institutions could provide important 
external inputs to the learning and the technological accumulation processes of the 
firms. The study will assess the relevance of these linkages by exploring with how 
many agents a firm tends to link and which of them seem to be more relevant in the 
firm's learning process. Moreover the study will also explore what kind of knowledge 
is shared within these linkages (i.e. general knowledge form basic research, specialised 
knowledge to address specific problems encountered in the production, new techniques, 
etc.), but also what are the most important methods of sharing knowledge (for example, 
hiring scientists and engineers, attending specialised conferences/sectoral exhibitions, 
informal personal contacts, etc.) 
Geographic proximity 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the geographical proximity of the firms with the 
network of suppliers, customers and other organisations with which they interact could 
have a positive impact on the firms' learning and innovative performance. In exploring 
the relevance of the different linkages in the firms' innovative behaviour the study will 
also ask the firms to indicate, whether or not a proximity advantage is attached to the 
interaction in each network link. 
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Figure 9 Sources of technological capabilities in firms 
Sources of TC 
Effort/Learning 
Learning by doing 
Learning by investment 
Technology 
access Endowment 
Educational& 
professional 
background of 
entrepreneur 
Skill of 
workforce 
Other firm's 
internal 
sources 
Size 
Age 
Ownership— 
     
     
Linkages 
  
Geographical 
proximity 
 
    
Firms-R&D 
organisations 
    
     
Firm-suppliers — 
Firm-customers 	 
Firm-institutions 	
Source: Author's elaboration 
Figure 9 provides a synthetic view of the sources of technological capabilities as 
they are described in the literature and as they will be studied in the firms in the sample. 
B. 	Using the IS approach to asses what affects the knowledge accumulation 
process in firms and how the different influences have changed over time and 
can drive further the firms' innovation effort 
The assessment that this study makes of the factors that influence technological 
capabilities accumulation and innovation in firms draws also on the IS literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2 and, more precisely, on the insights coming from the application 
of a systemic perspective to the study of RET (ICCEPT and E4Tech, 2003, Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2004, Jacobsson et al., 2004, Foxon et al., 2005)76. 
This part of the assessment should help in: 
1. Identifying the key actors involved in PV development and diffusion in 
China and their interactions (i.e. the system's structure). 
2. Understanding how the PV system performs and what processes (i.e. 
functions) are more relevant for innovation in firms 
76 See the critical discussion made in Section 2.4.7. 
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3. Understanding what induces or blocks these processes77. 
Researchers from Imperial College London have developed a generic 
framework for analysing IS for RE technologies, where they identify key typologies of 
actors and interactions (Foxon et al., 2005). They group actors in four main categories: 
innovators, demand, policy support and facilitators. 'Innovators' include those actors 
involved in creating or sharing knowledge like technology developers (i.e. firms) or 
academic researchers. 'Demand' includes actors involved in disseminating and using 
knowledge, like project developers or end-users. 'Policy support' encompasses actors 
that set the framework conditions like government departments and regulators. Finally 
`facilitators' refers to actors like financial investors, consultants or those who can 
provide administrative or industrial support (for instance, industry associations and the 
alike). 
In terms of the interactions between the actors, Foxon and colleagues (2005) 
identify four primary 'flows' between the actors relating to their roles and activities: 
flows of funding, knowledge, resources and influence. The latter may include, for 
instance, long term national targets set by the government to encourage a larger 
deployment of RET on the side of the domestic utilities and consumers. 
This conceptualisation allows Foxon and colleagues (2005) to draw generic 
innovation systems maps where the system's main components and primary flows 
could be visually represented. 
77 For the theoretical underpinning of these three points see Section 2.4.2 
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Figure 10 Generic map to study the structure of the Chinese PV innovation system 
Source: Adapted from Foxon et al., 2005 
Figure 10 draws on Foxon and colleagues' contribution and provides the generic 
innovation system map that will be used by this study to explore who are the key actors 
involved in PV development and diffusion in China and what are the interactions 
among them. The map has been slightly modified with respect to the original template 
provided by Foxon and colleagues. This was done to take into account some actors, like 
the local governments or the international organisations involved in promoting RET in 
China, who resulted potentially relevant during a preliminary search conducted before 
the fieldwork in China. The generic system map presented in Figure 10 is not meant to 
be comprehensive, but only a schematic illustration of how such diagrams could be 
presented. 
It is important to say that this map will only be used as a general guideline 
during data collection. This is so because we are aware that certain actors may simply 
be missing in the Chinese context, while others (not encompassed by the map) could be 
present and their role within the system could be different from the one suggested. 
However, we believe that the approach of using maps suggested by Foxon and 
colleagues, when compared to other innovation system studies (see for instance 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004), provides a more practical, yet broad, specification of the 
types of actors and interactions that are likely to be relevant in RET, PV included. 
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The usefulness of this map for this study became apparent during the 
preliminary phases of the research when it was necessary to identify people with whom 
to conduct the semi-structure interviews and indeed the firm-level survey (see Sections 
3.3.3 and 3.3.4 for more details). Guided by the framework provided by the innovation 
system map, industry associations, research organizations and international 
organisations present in China to foster the development of RET were contacted not 
only to secure the necessary information but also to identify further actors in the system. 
Once the main elements of the system surrounding PV in China have been 
identified together with the main interactions that link them together we need to assess 
how the wider system affects innovation in the PV firms in China. This is because we 
want to assess the 'system' aspect of innovation and move beyond the description of 
specific categories of actors and the interactions among them. 
From insights coming from the IS literature reviewed in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.4.2), we know that a number of activities/functions could be expected to be important 
in most technological ISs for innovation to emerge and develop. So whether, and the 
extent to which, these functions affect the innovation behaviour of the PV firms in 
China should be understood. 
The seven functions, as they have been presented in Chapter 2 drawing on 
Bergek et al. (2008) are: 
1. Knowledge development 
2. Influence in the direction of search 
3. Supply of resources 
4. Creation of positive externalities 
5. Facilitation of market formation. 
6. Stimulus of entrepreneurial experimentation 
7. The legitimation of nascent technologies or industries 
The study will assess the system's performance, according to the seven 
functions, and structure over time. This is done to enhance understanding of how the 
system has evolved and how influences on firm's innovation have changed over time. 
Three phases of PV development in China will be taken into account: PV under 
central planning (1960s-1978); PV in the economic reform period (1978-late 1990s), 
rapid take off of the domestic PV industry (late 1990s-2005). 
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3.2.4 Summing up the analytical framework 
The analytical framework developed for this study aims at providing guidance 
for a better understanding of three key areas: how advanced is what PV firms in China 
can do, how firms have accumulated knowledge and what factors affect the 
accumulation process. Two approaches have been adopted to develop the analytical 
framework: those suggested by the TC and the IS literatures. By combining insights 
coming from the TC literature and interviews with key PV experts 78 , we have 
introduced a number of indicators that will be used to study the maturity of the firms' 
technological capabilities not only with respect to the technical activities, like process 
and products, but also in a broader PV industrial, technological and competitive 
context. In this way the analytical framework extends existing models of technological 
capability maturity where particular attention has been paid to asses TC in firms with 
respect to technological activities. 
To understand 'how' and 'why' the current level of knowledge achieved by the 
firms has been achieved, we adopt both the TC and the IS approach, which are applied 
separately to see what results they can deliver. In Chapter 7 we will explore the 
complementarity of the two approaches and whether they could be integrated. We use 
the TC approach to explore the contribution of technological learning in determining 
the firms' ability to add value. We adopt instead the IS approach to see how the broader 
innovation system affects the firms' innovative behaviour and their ability to move 
forward. We have used the insights coming from the IS literature to draw generic 
innovation maps through which a system structure and performance can be studied. 
3.3 The methodology 
Four distinct methodologies were used to properly address the different 
theoretical, analytical and empirical requirements of the study: 
1. Desk-based literature review 
2. In-depth interviews with key PV experts (mainly based in the UK). 
3. Firm-level questionnaire survey executed during fieldwork in China. 
4. Semi-structured interviews with key representatives of the Chinese PV 
research community, policy-makers, international organisations and one 
78 See details in section 3.3.2. 
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NGO (i.e. the WWF), fostering PV development and diffusion in China 
(all executed during fieldwork in China). 
Table 5 provides an overview of the different methods adopted, why they were 
adopted (i.e. to retrieve what sort of information) and for the preparation of which 
chapter they were mainly used. 
As illustrated by the Table (third column), the literature review and the in-depth 
interviews with key PV experts were the main methods adopted to establish the 
theoretical underpinning (Chapter 2) and the analytical framework of the thesis (first 
part of Chapter 3), as well as to enhance understanding of PV technology and of the 
evolution of the Chinese NIS over time (Chapters 4 and 5). 
The firm-level questionnaire survey and the semi-structured interviews were 
used for the empirical analysis (Chapter 6). Since the study is interested in 
understanding if, how and why the Chinese PV firms innovate, a firm-level survey was 
chosen as the key method to collect the necessary evidence. However, in recognition of 
the fact that firms innovate as part of a broader innovation system79 and in order to 
better understand what drives or hinders their ability to innovate, semi-structured 
interviews undertaken at the Chinese national level were also necessary to map the 
different system's constituents, to understand their interactions, to appreciate what 
affects innovation in firms and how the system evolved over time. 
79 See Chapter 2 for the theoretical motivation of why this is the case and Section 3.2.3 to 
understand how the system's structure and performance are operationalised in the thesis. 
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Table 5 Overview of the research methods 
Chapter where the 
method was 
mostly used 
Method 
Desk-based literature 
review 
In-depth interviews 
with PV experts 
(mainly UK-based) 
Questionnaire survey 
with PV firms in China 
Semi-structured 
interviews with other 
PV stakeholders at the 
national Chinese level 
Why the method was used 
Understand broad context of the research 
Establish most suitable theoretical underpinning 
Develop analytical framework (i.e. how to 'measure' TC 
in firms, map an IS and identify system components + 
performance) 
Take decisions on the type of empirical instrument + 
types of questions to ask 
Acquire broad understanding of PV technology, 
production and market 
Understand evolution of NIS in China 
Deepen understanding of PV technological and 
production issues (i.e. main PV technological innovation 
avenues; contribution of industrial production to PV 
innovation, etc. ) + obtain an 'insider' point of view on 
key technological and industrial drivers 
Collect empirical data on TC in firms, accumulation 
effort and innovation drivers 
Identify key actors in the national PV IS in China 
Understanding of system dynamics + blocking and 
inducing mechanisms 
Ch. 1, 2, 3 4 and 5 
Ch. 3 (to inform the 
analytical 
framework) and 4 
Ch. 5 (for the part 
about PV in China), 
6 and 7 (for the 
discussion) 
Ch. 6 and 7 (for the 
discussion) 
The empirical part of the research combined hence two distinct methodologies 
(i.e. survey and semi-structured interviews) targeting respectively firms and other 
relevant stakeholders at the national level. 
As illustrated by Figure 11, the empirical part of the research, from initial 
design, to implementation and final analysis, involved several steps (all discussed in the 
following part of the chapter) that elapsed through a considerable number of months. 
Allowing enough time for these different activities was important to ensure that the 
empirical analysis could deliver the most accurate and comprehensive information 
necessary to answer the research questions. As an example, allowing six months to 
acquire a Chinese language terminology specific for PV and to improve overall 
linguistic fluency was crucial to acquire first-hand information (not mediated through 
the use of an interpreter) and trust among the Chinese firms and the other stakeholders 
that were interviewed. 
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Figure 11 Timeline for the empirical part of the research 
Refine RQs 
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The remaining part of this Chapter describes in detail the four different 
methodologies. Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 present the desk-based literature review and 
the interviews with the key PV experts (and motivate why they have been adopted and 
useful). Section 3.3.3 presents the design and the implementation, via fieldwork, of the 
survey. The reasons for choosing a certain survey design versus other possible options 
are discussed, together with how the target population, the sample and the data 
requirement of the questionnaire have been decided. The measures taken to get access 
to the firms, the fieldwork and some practical issues encountered while administering 
the questionnaire to the firms are also described in this Section. Section 3.3.4 elaborates 
on the semi-structured interviews. 
3.3.1 Desk based literature review 
Extensive literature review was adopted to establish the theoretical 
underpinning of the thesis (i.e. which literary traditions seemed more appropriate to 
study innovation for RE technologies in firms in developing countries?) as well as its 
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analytical framework (for instance, how concepts such as the 'measurement' of 
technological capabilities in firms were operationalised in the literature). 
Referring back to the existent studies was also important to develop a broad 
understanding of PV technology and market and to appreciate what was already known 
about the evolution of the Chinese innovation system over time. 
The development of the questionnaire also required a search of the literature to 
check whether data and information useful for this study were available from other 
sources and what sort of questions and questionnaire formats had been used by other 
people interested in understanding innovation in firms (for example, how long the 
questionnaire should have been or what questions would have been most suitable to ask 
and how?). 
Additional literature review (mainly via web search) was also used to integrate 
data and information obtained during the fieldwork in China. 
3.3.2 In-depth interviews with PV experts 
Considering the specific technological focus of this study, four in-depth 
interviews with key experts in the solar PV industry and research realms were 
conducted in the early phases of the study to deepen understanding of the technology. 
During the interviews, conducted mainly in the UK, experts were asked open-ended 
questions about their views and insights into key issues like PV R&D trends, future 
market development, industrial strategies for value-added and competitiveness. The 
information they provided helped in identifying broad categories of players that had a 
role in the PV sector (for example, PV cell and module manufacturers; equipment 
suppliers, etc.) and important aspects to include in the questionnaire, like quality issues, 
capacity of customising products, etc. 
The analytical framework8° was made PV specific thanks to these interviews, 
which also informed Chapter 4. 
80 The analytical framework is hence the result of both literature review (see Section 3.3.1) and 
the interviews with the PV experts. 
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Table 6 List of PV key experts interviewed 
Area of PV 
expertise Name 	 Organisation Type of input provided 
R&D 	Dr. M. Mazzer 
Imperial College London, 
Department of Physics 
(experimental solid state 
physics) 
Former Vice President and 
Chief Financial Officer of 
MIGA-WB (Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee 
Agency) 
Insights into current and future PV 
R&D trends 
Industry's perspective on future PV 
market development, drivers and 
issues pertaining to the downstream of 
the PV value chain (i.e. PV system 
development and installation) 
Insights into contribution of PV to 
future electricity-generating capacity 
worldwide and issues pertaining to the 
upstream of the PV industry (i.e. Si 
feedstock and wafer production) 
Insights into renewable energy (PV in 
particular) support programmes in 
developing countries 
Industry 	Dr. J. Leggett 
	
Solar Century Ltd (UK) 
Market and Michael Rogol PHOTON Consulting industry 
Table 6 provides a list of the people that were interviewed, the organisation they 
belong to and the type of information they provided. Face to face interviews were 
conducted with the UK based experts between 2004 and 2005 before leaving for the 
fieldwork in China. Only one interview with an overseas expert occurred over the 
phone. 
3.3.3 The firm-level questionnaire survey 
Why a survey and which survey design is more appropriate for this study? 
Several studies on TC and learning mechanisms in firms tend to adopt a case 
study strategy (Dutrenit, 2000, Figueiredo, 1999, Gao, 2003). This is an ideal 
methodology when a holistic, in-depth investigation of few selected cases (usually two 
or three) is needed (Feagin et al., 1991). As an example, Dutrenit (2000) studied the 
Mexican Vitro Group because she was interested in exploring the specific challenges 
that firms confront when moving from a minimum essential knowledge base to 
building strategic capabilities and leadership. It follows that, for her purposes, it was 
necessary to identify a firm (and indeed to interview more than one person within that 
firm) that was in that specific stage of development and to thoroughly investigate its 
behaviour during the transition process. A case study methodology was the best option 
to fulfil this aim. 
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In the case of this study, the attention is instead on how complex is what the 
Chinese firms involved in the PV-specific sector can do and on what factors affect their 
innovative behaviour. Selecting only one or two cases would have provided only partial 
insights into our research core problem, in fact: how could we know that the knowledge 
accumulated by that specific and hypothetically selected firm would have been 
representative of the entire Chinese PV population of firms 81? 
A survey based on a semi-structured questionnaire was then chosen as the most 
appropriate method to address the research questions specific of this study. In contrast 
to case studies, surveys are applicable to the entire population (or to a sample) and can 
allow the identification of comparison groups (Arundel, 2007). Moreover, a semi-
structured survey, when compared to a structured one, has the merit of allowing for 
insights from the respondents and to explore 'why' and 'how' certain activities are 
performed (Salant and Dittman, 1994, Saunders et al., 2003). Both issues are important 
for this thesis because they help in understanding the extent to which and how PV firms 
in China innovate. 
Identifying the target population 
A careful identification of the target population is important because it 
determines the interpretation of the results (Arundel, 2007): how far it is possible to 
generalize from the findings? What are the policy implications that can be derived from 
them? 
A first important ground clearing issue in the selection of the target population 
was to understand which PV technology families were actually manufactured in China 
at the time of fieldwork82 (i.e. only c-Si that has the largest market share in global PV 
production or also other technology families, like thin-film?). 
A preliminary search on the web and in the literature available in late 2004-
early 2005 suggested that the majority of the PV firms in China were involved in c-Si 
technology. For this reason the target population, the analytical framework and the 
method to collect the data were structured around this technology. However, since this 
81  For reasons that are detailed below, it has been impossible to interview all the firms that work 
in the PV sector in China. However all the care has been taken to select a sample that is representative of 
the knowledge level that the national industry has accumulated so far, of what has determined it and 
indeed of what can drive it forward. 
82 The existence of more than one PV technology family at different level of technological and 
commercial maturity has been introduced in the initial part of this chapter and will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4. 
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study seeks to assess firms' TC in the broader PV technological context (see Section 
3.2.2), specific questions were included in both the firm-level questionnaire and in the 
semi-structure interviews with other PV stakeholders at the national level to explore 
whether other technology families with better innovation prospects were also taken into 
account by the firms (via, for instance, in-house R&D) or by national research institutes 
or indeed policy makers (via the promotion, for instance, of research programmes 
specifically aimed at stimulating technological variety). 
The target population of the study comprised hence all the Chinese firms 
involved in the core manufacturing links of the c-Si value chain. More in particular, as 
it is illustrated by Figure 12, it included: Silicon feedstock (also called solar grade 
Silicon), ingot and wafer, as well as cell and module producers83. 
Figure 12 The target population of the study 
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Note: Suppliers include: suppliers of materials (for example, glass, EVA sheets, etc.), production 
equipment suppliers (for example, suppliers of laminators used by the PV module producers) and 
suppliers of BoS (balance of system) components 
Source: Author's elaboration 
PV system developers and PV product producers were not included in the target 
population despite being part of the c-Si value chain. This is not to say that the 
83 For a discussion of the crystalline Silicon manufacturing process and of the different links in 
the value chain see Section 4.3. 
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activities performed in these downstream links of the manufacturing chain cannot 
involve innovative aspects, but considering this study's budget and time constraint, it 
was decided to focus the analysis on those manufacturing links where the innovation 
potential and the overall impact on the industry's future development could expected to 
be greater. As it is discussed at length in Chapter 4 these links are: feedstock, wafer, 
cell and, to a lesser extent, module production (Kazmerski, 1997). 
However, given that this study adopts an innovation system perspective, the 
roles of other actors along the c-Si value chain (i.e. equipment suppliers, PV system 
installers and PV product producers) were also explored by both the questionnaire and 
the semi-structured interviews at the national level. This was done to better 
comprehend the innovation system dynamics and performance. 
Sample 
After having determined the target population it was necessary to establish its 
size. This was a critical issue upon which the decision to perform a census (i.e. to 
survey the entire target group) or to survey only a part of the target group (via sampling) 
depended. Although secondary information collected before fieldwork from reports 
(Dai and Shi, 1999) and academic journals (Yang et al., 2003, Zhu, 2004) seemed to 
suggest that only 10 firms were producing c-Si feedstock, wafers, cells and modules in 
China (i.e. suggesting hence a census was possibly feasible), the situation at the 
beginning of 2005 (immediately before undertaking fieldwork) appeared to be more 
complex for the following reasons: 
— The secondary data available in 2004 were out of date because they described 
the situation of the domestic PV industry and market in the late 1990s early 
2000s. 
— Preliminary conversation had in 2004 and early 2005 with Chinese scholars 
involved in PV R&D unveiled that the domestic industry was on a fast growth 
track and that several new firms were about to start production while others 
(among the 10 identified in the literature) were ceasing their activity. This 
aspect made the lack of up-to-date information (see previous point) even more 
crucial. 
— Some firms had recently changed their names to reflect changes in ownership 
and management. This caused confusion in understanding whether 'new' firms 
were really new (i.e. newly established) or 'old' but with a new name. 
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— From a preliminary search done on the web looking for firms involved in Si 
feedstock, wafer, cell and module production in China it emerged that possibly 
many more than 10 firms were operative. However, it was extremely difficult to 
establish the exact business line of each of them. Although some firms were 
clearly involved, for instance, in cell production, for others it was impossible to 
establish, from the little information available on the web, whether they were 
producing PV modules, PV products or whether they were only installing PV 
systems. 
All these aspects made particularly difficult to have a clear picture of the 
sampling frame and of the number of firms working in the c-Si industry84 in China. 
The number of module producers was particularly difficult to estimate because 
firms are highly dispersed across the territory and might easily have a production 
capacity smaller than 4 MW making their exact counting difficult even for Chinese PV 
experts85. 
Given the uncertainties explained above, the time available for fieldwork (two 
months) and the size of the country, it was decided not to perform a census but to take a 
sample of the population selected on the basis of the information obtained from: 
a) Mr Wang Sicheng, general manager of Beijing Jike Energy New Tech. 
Development Co., who was interviewed at the beginning of the 
fieldwork (Wang, S., 2005, personal communication, 25 May 2005) and 
who was (and indeed still is) regarded, with more than twenty years of 
experience in the sector, as one of the main PV experts in China. 
b) An up-to-date report published in Chinese by the NDRC/GEF/World 
Bank's Renewable Energy Development Program (REDP, 2004), short 
before undertaking fieldwork. 
Both sources of information were the most comprehensive and reliable when the 
fieldwork took place in May-July 2005. Both the REDP report and Mr. Wang Sicheng 
believed 26 different companies were active in c-Si wafer, cell and module production 
84  It should be pointed out that although the PV industry has grown rapidly since the late 1990s 
(see Chapter 4) both in China and in the world, it remains a small industry with a limited number of 
firms worldwide. This particularly pertains to the upstream of the c-Si value chain where only 7 Si 
feedstock producers, 10-15 wafer manufacturers and 40-50 cell producers participated in the global c-Si 
market in 2005 (see Figure 21). 
85 This was confirmed to the author of this study several times during fieldwork. 
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at the time of the fieldwork. Having access to these two authoritative sources made also 
clear right from the beginning of the fieldwork that China's production capacity for 
solar grade Si feedstock was extremely limited in early 200586. For this reason, and also 
because it was not possible to secure access to these firms, no c-Si feedstock producer 
have been included in the sample. 
A sample of 8 firms, out of the 26 mentioned, was selected for the survey. The 
senior managers or the chief engineers were interviewed and their plants visited during 
the fieldwork. As suggested by conversations had in China (in particular with Mr Wang 
Sicheng) these companies were highly representative of Si wafer, cell and module 
production in China in early 200587. Furthermore these firms, despite being quite far 
apart (sometime even some thousand kilometres) are all located along the eastern coast 
of China allowing to make the most of the time and the budget available for the 
fieldwork. A profile of the firms, their location and activities is provided in Chapter 6. 
The questionnaire's design 
In designing the questionnaire the first step taken was to ascertain whether the 
necessary data88 were available from other sources and to what extent questionnaire's 
formats adopted by other innovation and technological capabilities studies could be 
useful for this study. A research report published in 1999 on technological innovation 
in PV in China (Dai and Shi, 1999) contained some information relevant for this study 
(for instance, the industrial organisation and structure; the government's role in 
supporting the industry; the in-house R&D; the manufacturing costs, etc.) but they were 
out of date and could only be used as an historic reference. 
As for the format and for the questions to include in the questionnaire, the most 
consolidated survey to collect firm-level data on innovation activities is the previously 
(see Section 2.2.1) mentioned Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 89 (OECD and 
86 See more details in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.3) 
87 Their significance with respect to the total production capacity available in China in 2005 in 
each manufacturing links together with the proportion they represent on the total of the firms operating in 
China in the same productive process in 2005, is discussed in Chapter 6 and illustrated in Table 17. 
88 The type of data that have been collected during the survey are discussed in the following 
section. 
89 CIS is a survey conducted by EU member states that allows the monitoring of Europe's 
progress in the area of innovation. The survey was originally conducted every four years, but since 2005 
has been conducted every two. See the web-site of the Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform for the UK Innovation Survey (http://www.berr.gov.uk/dius/innovation/innovation-
statistics/cis/page10957.html)  
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Eurostat, 1997). Unfortunately this was only of limited help for this thesis' purposes for 
the following reasons: 
a) The CIS questionnaire focuses on 'innovation activities' but not on 
innovation 'per se'. Its main purpose is not to study the nature of 
innovation and of the technological capabilities (i.e. how advanced is 
what a firm can do) but the activities undertaken by innovative firms (i.e. 
innovation outputs - in-house R&D expenditure - and inputs; aims of, 
and constraints to, innovation; collaborative agreements, information 
sources on, and public support for, innovation). The CIS survey adopts a 
subjective way to ascertain whether firms innovate by asking them 
whether they think they innovate with reference to an innovation 
definition provided at the beginning of the questionnaire90 . 
b) The CIS survey, and the OECD's Oslo Manual upon which the data 
collection method adopted by the survey is based (OECD and Eurostat, 
1997), has been designed to understand innovation in firms in mature 
economies, not in developing ones. This implies that a wide range of 
innovation-related activities (like reverse engineering, adaptation, etc.) 
suggested by the literature to be common in developing countries91 are 
not explored by the CIS questionnaire. Although the most recent version 
of the Oslo manual (OECD, 2005) contains an appendix on how to 
perform innovation surveys in developing countries, the version 
available at the time of this study's survey did not contain any specific 
feature for developing countries, making the CIS format and contents of 
limited use for this study. 
c) This study addresses a number of issues pertaining to technological 
capabilities, learning effort and innovation's drivers specific for solar 
PV. These specificities are not accounted for by the CIS surveys. 
A questionnaire was then developed specifically for this study by adopting 
insights coming from the literature review done in Chapter 2 and insights provided by 
the PV experts interviewed (see Section 3.3.2). 
9° See the CIS3 questionnaire provided at: http://www.berr.gov.ulddius/innovation/innovation- 
statistics/cis/page10957.html 
91 See discussion in Section 2.2. 
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Concept to be 	Unit of 
measured measurement 
Production capacity 
Cell/module conversion 
efficiency 
Wafer/Cell/Module size 
MW 
Inches or 
millimetres 
Product's lifetime 	Years 
Product's guarantee 	Years 
Manufacturing costs 	RMB/Wp 
Best wholesale price of RMB/ Wp products 
In house R&D 
expenditure % of sales 
The type of data and information that were collected, the questionnaire's 
structure and how it was administered to firms during a fieldwork in China are all 
detailed in the following pages. 
Identification of data requirements 
As broadly suggested by the analytical framework it was decided to collect both 
quantitative and qualitative information to better understand if and how PV firms in 
China innovate. 
Table 7 Quantitative information collected by the questionnaire 
Definition 
Amount of product that can be produced from the 
firm's processing facilities92. 
Quantity of radiated light that is converted into useable 
electric power by a solar cell/module 
Typical width, height, or sometimes area of a solar 
wafer, cell or module 
The period during which a cell or a module is capable 
of operating above a minimum specified capacity or 
efficiency performance level. 
The period during which the quality and specifications 
of a cell or a module are guaranteed 
Cost of making a product, inclusive of direct costs (e.g. 
labour, materials) and indirect costs (e.g. overheads). 
Price charged to customers who buy large quantities of 
PV wafers/cells/modules for resale in smaller quantities 
to others 
Amount spent in R&D activities (e.g. experimental, 
theoretical or other work aimed at the discovery of new 
knowledge or the advancement of existing knowledge; 
searching for applications of that knowledge)93  
Quantitative data are particularly useful to assess how technologically 
advanced/innovative Chinese PV firms are in both absolute terms and with respect to 
the competitors as well as to assess firms' technological improvements over time94. 
Quantitative data that have been collected during the survey include product's 
specification (cell/module size, efficiency, lifetime and guarantee), plant's production 
92 For example if a company has an end of the year cell capacity of 100MWp, and receives 
100MWp of wafer supply together with all the other necessary material supplies, then it could actually 
produce 100MWp of cells in 12 months. 
93 http://www.hwca.com/publications/tax_treatment_of  rd_expenditure.pdf 
94 See Section 3.2.2 
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capacity (both current, past and expected), manufacturing costs95 and amount of R&D 
expenditure. 
Table 7 provides a summary of the quantitative data collected by the 
questionnaire, how they were defined and how they were measured. 
A number of qualitative information were also collected to deepen 
understanding of both the nature of the technological effort underway in firms and of 
what drives firms to add value96. They included: 
- General information about the company: year of establishment, ownership, 
location, core business (now and at the start of the firm's activity) and plans for 
future business expansion. 
— Entrepreneurial history: prior working experience of the firms' 
manager/director, number of years spent in the PV sector, educational 
background and where it was acquired. 
— Production processes: adoption of turnkey production lines; maintenance of the 
equipment; modification undertaken on the way in which the production line is 
installed; modifications on the production line's standard equipment; ability to 
design/manufacture entirely new equipment; existence of collaboration 
agreements to undertake modifications or develop new processes. 
— Product manufacturing: main line of product (current, past and planned); 
product quality (i.e. products certified by different standard setting bodies); 
minor adaptations to products to meet market and customers needs; ability to 
produce entirely new products and/or engaging in products using new materials; 
patents and/or licences. 
— R&D: purpose of the R&D activity and existence of protected or licensed 
intellectual property. 
- Manpower skills: employees' education and qualification (i.e. existence, and 
number, of technicians, engineers, scientists or university-trained personnel), 
training activities undertaken. 
- Export: role played (if any) by exports on total firm's sales. 
95 Although all possible effort was made to retrieve information about manufacturing costs and 
product prices, the firms interviewed did not want to disclose these types of information. 
96 For the theoretical and analytical reasons why it was decided to collect these qualitative 
information see the theoretical underpinning in Chapter 2 and the initial part of this chapter (sections 
3.2.2 and 3.2.3). 
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- Competition: role played by competition now (i.e. when plant visits and 
interviews took place in May-July 2005) and at the beginning of the firm's 
activity and key factors that make most significant rivals more competitive 
against the firm's main products. 
— External inputs to technological development: relationships with other members 
of the production and national innovation system (i.e. customers, suppliers and 
research institutes). 
- Government support: support received (if any) from the government or other 
public or private organisations for innovation and RET related activities. 
- Obstacles and view for the future: impediments and drivers for growth in the 
firm's main market and product segment during the last twelve months (since 
interviews took place in mid 2005); most relevant impediments foreseen to 
firm's growth in the next 12 to 24 months (until mid 2007); expected rate of 
growth in the firm's main market region over the next 12 months (until mid 
2006). 
The questionnaire structure 
The questionnaire was organised into eleven sections. Each of them explored 
one of the issues put forward in the qualitative data requirement presented above. 
While the complete version of the questionnaire, as it was administered to firms during 
the interviews, is provided in the Appendix 1, its broad structure and the headings of 
these different sections are illustrated in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 	Questionnaire structure 
General Info about the company Obstacles and 
view for future development 
••• ..... • 
...... •• ......... 
• 
Entrepreneurial history 
Government support 
Inputs to technological development 
Process 
Relations with suppliers 
Relations with customers 
Product manufacturing Relations with universities (Cooperative R&D) 
R&D Competition 
• 
Manpower skill prices Export and 
Source: Author's elaboration 
The questionnaire consisted of both open ended and closed questions with 
nominal (i.e. 'yes' or 'no') and ordinal scales. This was done to limit subjectivity in the 
answers but also to create opportunity to explore issues of particular relevance for the 
study. Figure 14 below presents an example taken from the questionnaire of a nominal 
question followed by an open one. 
Figure 14 Example of one of the questions included in the questionnaire 
Can you make minor modifications to your products to address specific requests 
from customers? (For example: can you provide modules for very humid 
weather conditions? Or for very extreme temperatures?) 
Yes ❑ 
	
No ❑  
a. If yes, please specify 
b. If yes, when did you start to customise your products? 
The questionnaire was prepared both in English and in Chinese to make sure 
that all the questions could be fully understood by all the survey respondents. 
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The questionnaire was piloted to make sure questions were not ambiguous, 
instructions were clear as well as to eliminate questions that did possibly not yield 
usable data. 
The implementation of the empirical analysis: the. fieldwork 
The survey and the semi-structured interviews (described in section 3.3.4) were 
undertaken during a fieldwork in China, which took place from May to July 2005. 
Figure 15 illustrates the places that were visited during the fieldwork. 
Figure 15 Places visited during fieldwork 
The questionnaire-based survey was administered in face-to-face interviews 
with CEOs, senior R&D managers or chief engineers of the firms in the sample97. 
Interviews were conducted in the firm's sites in China and typically lasted for 90 to 120 
minutes. Five firms gave also permission to visit their manufacturing facilities and 
shop-floors. An interview usually began with a brief introduction of the research and of 
its main objectives. It was also stated at the beginning of the interview that the 
97  Additional information on the interviewees could be find in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.1) 
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information provided would have been considered confidential and the names of the 
firms would not have been disclosed in association with the information provided. 
During the interviews the researcher asked the questions appearing in the 
questionnaire and wrote down the answers and any possible comment made by the 
respondents. 
The fieldwork was preceded by nine-months of intense and careful preparation 
aimed at designing the survey (see previous discussion), preparing the semi-structured 
interviews (see section 3.3.4 of this chapter) and securing access to the necessary 
information (see Figure 11 for a complete timeline of the empirical part of the research). 
In what follows some of the measures taken to ensure an effective and fruitful data 
collection are discussed together with some first hand experience of undertaking 
fieldwork in China. 
• Securing access to the source of the information 
Obtaining a satisfactory data set depends crucially on getting access to the 
source of the information, i.e. to the firms that will participate in the survey and to the 
respondents to the semi-structured interviews. This aspect is even more critical in the 
case of a country with a vast territory and a distinctive cultural and business 
environment like China. 
Considerable effort and time (see Figure 11) was spent before leaving for 
fieldwork to create a suitable network upon which to rely once in China. Chinese RE 
associations and scholars who had recently published about (a) China's PV technology 
and industry (b) China's technological capabilities and innovation on both international 
and Chinese journals were identified and contacted. International organisations98 with 
strong and far-reaching links with domestic PV firms and local business organisations 
were also contacted and engaged in the research project. The full list of the institutions 
contacted before the fieldwork is provided in the Appendix 3. 
This pre-fieldwork activity turned out to be crucial to identify respondents to the 
semi-structured interviews (see Section 3.3.4) and to secure access to the firms in the 
sample. With difference to survey's implementation adopted in Western countries, 
where respondents are often approached by letter or by phone directly by the researcher 
98 Such as the UNDP and the GEF, who together launched the Capacity Building for the Rapid 
Commercialization of Renewable Energy in China (CCRE); or the World Bank (WB), who launched 
with the GEF and the Chinese Government the Renewable Energy Development Programme (REDP) 
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in charge of the study (Arundel, 2007), in China being introduced by someone familiar 
to the firm is crucial to obtain the interview and to establish an informal and 
cooperative setting for the discussion. 
Because the Chinese culture attaches a great importance to interpersonal 
relationships (called guanxi in Chinese) (Xin and Pearce, 1996, Park and Luo, 2001), 
being introduced by Chinese nationals turned out to be, in the majority of cases, more 
effective (and successful) than being introduced by foreigners working in China for 
bilateral or international organisations involved in RET and PV development. This is an 
important point to emphasise because researchers undertaking fieldwork in a foreign 
country and who do not speak the local language tend to liaise with people of the same 
nationality or with other foreigners (usually English speaking) working in the country 
to obtain access to the information of interest. 
• Strengthening linguistic knowledge 
An important asset in building up an effective network is the ability to speak the 
local language and to be familiar with the local culture. Although the author of this 
thesis is a fluent Mandarin speaker, the PV-specific technological knowledge required 
by the study presented a significant linguistic challenge. For this reason not only daily 
classes of Mandarin were taken for six months before departing for China to increase 
fluency but also a Chinese/English glossary with the main terms used in PV technology 
and manufacturing processes was prepared by the author. 
• Creating an atmosphere conducive to fruitful discussion 
It was decided not to tape record the interviews. Although this implied an 
intensive notes taking activity, it had the merit of putting the interviewee at ease and 
establishing an informal and effective setting for the discussion. 
Showing interest towards the interviewee's work and the firm's activities were 
also important aspects to engage with the respondents. 
Time spent in strengthening the links established with the firms after the 
completion of the fieldwork was also appreciated. For example, sending greetings to 
celebrate the Chinese New Year or paying a visit to the firm's booths during 
international exhibitions were effective ways to show commitment and continuing 
interest in the firm's activities. 
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3.3.4 The semi-structured interviews with other Chinese PV stakeholders 
The aim of undertaking semi-structured interviews was to collect information 
pertaining to the broader Chinese PV innovation system, to understand its dynamics 
and evolution, as well as to appreciate closely related issues such as market prospects, 
PV policy measures and nation-wide R&D trends. In particular, with the help of semi-
structured interviews that targeted key representatives of the PV R&D, policy and co-
operation realms, it was possible to investigate the following issues: 
a) Who are the main actors in the Chinese PV innovation system 
b) What are the systemic interactions between these actors and how these 
give rise to and drive innovation 
c) What has been the evolution of the system over time 
d) What is (and indeed was) the performance of the system in terms of the 
seven functions suggested by the literature and adopted by the analytical 
framework of this study (i.e. knowledge development, resource 
mobilisation, etc. See discussion in Section 3.2.3) 
e) How the system's performance affected and affects innovation in the PV 
firms. 
Another important purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to obtain a 
point of view different from the one given by firms, on a number of issues. For 
example, while it was important to ask firms during the survey what their view was on 
the market prospects, it was equally relevant to hear the view of the policymakers on 
the same issue to appreciate (1) if and to what extent their view differed from the one of 
the firms (2) how the policymakers' position towards the creation of the market could 
affect the functioning of the system and the firms along their innovation path. 
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Area of competence 
Innovation and 
management 
Solar energy technology 
and economics 
c-Si technology 
PV market and 
development 
PV system installation and 
market applications 
Capability building and 
bilateral commercial 
opportunities 
Type of 
institution 
Academic 
NGO 
Industry 
International 
cooperation 
Environmental protection 
and energy management99 
Bridge between regulatory 
Policy/business authorities, research 
institutes and industry 
professionals 
Table 8 List of organisations within which semi-structure interviews were conducted 
Name of institution contacted 
Research Centre for Innovation and Development, 
Zhejiang University (Hangzhou) 
Beijing Solar Energy Research Institute (Beijing) 
Solar Energy Institute of Shanghai Jiaotong University 
(Shanghai) 
Department of Physics, Zhejiang University 
(Hangzhou) 
WWF China 
Beijing Jike Energy New Tech. Development Co. 
Bejing Corona Science & Technology Co. Ltd 
REDP - Renewable Energy Development Program 
(promoted by GEF/WB/NDRC) 
CCRE - Capacity Building for the Rapid 
Commercialisation of Renewable Energy in China 
(promoted by UNDP/GEF/ China National 
Development and Reform Commission 
GTZ — German Development Cooperation (Beijing) 
CREIA 
As anticipated above, people with whom to conduct the semi-structured 
interviews were selected from the contact list (see the Appendix 3) put together before 
leaving for fieldwork in May 2005. Once in China these early contacts gave further 
indications on other suitable people to interview. Table 8 provides the full list of the 
organisations within which the semi-structured interviews were conducted. As 
illustrated in the table, key stakeholders were chosen because they had an expertise on a 
number of innovation and PV related issues in China. 
Each interview was conducted face-to-face and the answers transcribed by the 
interviewer. Questions were not e-mailed in advance to the interviewee because 
appointments to conduct the interviews were often given with a short notice. The 
questions that were used as a basis for the semi-structured interviews are provided in 
the Appendix 4. 
99  Other fields of operation of GTZ (which is an international cooperation enterprise for 
sustainable development) encompass: Economic Reform and Development of the Market System, 
Natural Resources Protection and Poverty Alleviation. 
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3.3.5 Summing up the methods 
A combination of four different methods was adopted for this study: desk-based 
literature review, open-ended interviews with PV experts (mainly) in Europe, a 
questionnaire survey with PV firms in China and semi-structured interviews at the 
national Chinese level with key stakeholders involved in PV R&D, market and policy 
promotion. This was necessary to satisfy the different theoretical, analytical and 
empirical requirements of the research. 
The empirical data of the study was obtained via a questionnaire survey 
administered to a selected sample of 8 c-Si wafer, cell and module producers in China. 
These data were complemented with the semi-structured interviews, which contributed 
in enhancing understanding of the dynamics and evolution of the PV innovation system 
in China. 
3.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced both the analytical framework used by this study to 
understand the nature and the determinants of the technological effort underway in the 
PV firms in China and the method used to collect the necessary data. We have 
explained that the analytical framework was developed by using a combination of 
approaches. It adopts the insights coming from the TC literature to develop indicators 
of the complexity of firm-level capabilities with respect to the processes and products 
firms undertake as well as to the broader technological, industrial and competitive 
environment. 
The framework adopts instead two separate approaches in order to better 
understand how the technological capability process occurs and what determines it. The 
insights coming from the TC literature have been used to explore the learning 
mechanisms that are at the basis of the technological accumulation in firms and their 
determinants. The IS literature has been used to develop a generic model of the 
innovation system through which to explore the system's structure, performance and 
the way in which it affects innovation in firms. 
In terms of the empirical methods, the study adopts four distinct methodologies 
to address the different theoretical, analytical and empirical requirement of the study. A 
firm-level survey based on a questionnaire that has been administered to a selected 
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sample of PV firms during fieldwork in China, has been adopted as the main method to 
collect the necessary data. Semi-structured interviews undertaken at the national level 
with other stakeholders of the PV sector in China have provided further results 
necessary to understand firms' innovative behaviour also from an innovation system 
point of view. 
The two Chapters that follow (4 and 5) integrate what has been discussed in this 
Chapter by presenting specific aspects of PV technology and market (Chapter 4), as 
well as issues pertaining to the evolution of the Chinese innovation system over time. 
NOTE: for those readers interested in knowing how you eat the dish pictured at the 
beginning of this chapter (Picture 4), the dish is called guoqiao mixian (crossing the bridge 
rice noodles) and is a speciality of Kunming (Yunnan province). Diners are first given a plate 
(like the one in the picture) of thinly sliced raw chicken, pork, fish, bean sprouts, chives, egg 
and bean curd. The waiter will then serve a piping hot bowl of chicken broth and rice noodles. 
Put the raw meat in the broth first, then the vegetables, the fish, the remaining ingredients and 
lastly the noodles. Keep stirring the soup until the meat changes colour and is cooked. Your 
bowl of delicious noodles is now ready! 
As it is often the case in the long Chinese culinary tradition, there is a legend behind 
this popular Yunnan dish. "Guoqiao mixian came about when a young scholar shut himself 
away to prepare for the imperial examination. His loving wife had to travel and cross a bridge 
to bring him his daily meal. Frequently, his meal went cold by the time it reached him. One day, 
quite by chance, his wife discovered a bowl of chicken soup could be kept warm by putting a 
layer of oil on top. From then on, she would serve the noodles and meat slices with the oil-
layered soup and the young scholar could enjoy a warm meal every day. When the scholar did 
well in the examination, he credited his success to his wife's noodles and the noodle dish 
gained 	in 	popularity". 	By 	Tan 	Xiaomi 	at: 
http://paper.sznews.com/szdaily/20070321/ca2615183  .htm 
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4 PV TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT 
Picture 5 A demonstrative PV installation 
Source: Picture taken by the author at the 21st European Photovoltaic Solar Energy Conference 
and Exhibition, Dresden (Germany), September 2006 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter, together with the following China-specific chapter, complements 
the analytical framework discussed in Chapter 3 and is required to interpret the results 
presented in Chapter 6. 
The term `PV' groups several technology families that have reached different 
levels of technological maturity and market penetration and consequently different 
scales of potential innovation. Any assessment of the innovation behaviour of the firms 
involved in the solar PV industry has to be based on a thorough understanding of the 
technology and of what innovation means in this specific technological context. 
The first part of the Chapter (Section 4.2) explains how sunlight can be turned 
into electricity and introduces the available PV technology families (Sections 4.2.1 to 
4.2.3). Section 4.3 is devoted to the manufacturing process of crystalline Silicon (c-Si) 
technology, the most common PV technology family. Although several PV reviews can 
be found in the literature (Boyle, 1996, Archer, 2001, Luque and Hegedus, 2003, 
Bubenzer and Luther, 2003), the purpose here is to highlight only those aspects that are 
relevant for this study. It will be explained, for instance, how different links along the 
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c-Si value chain present different degrees of technological complexity and the 
implications of this for our understanding of the firms' ability to add value and 
innovate. 
Section 4.4 explains what 'innovating' means in the context of PV and explores 
the possible innovation options. Section 4.5 examines PV market developments, i.e. 
trends in installed capacity and applications, together with production capacity and 
main industrial players. Section 4.6 considers the policies that have been promoted in 
different countries to support PV and Section 4.7 summarises the main points discussed 
in this chapter. 
Before proceeding with the discussion, it is important to emphasise that the 
information contained in this chapter, which synthesises insights coming from the 
literature and the interviews with the PV experts (see Section 3.3.2), dates back to 2005. 
This is done to provide an overview of the state of the PV technology and market at the 
time when the Chinese PV firms were interviewed (mid 2005). Significant progress has 
been made since 2005, both in terms of PV installed capacity, industry development 
and indeed technological advancement 100 . Despite their significance for the future 
growth of PV, these developments are not discussed in this chapter, which only aims at 
providing information useful to understand and assess the innovativeness of the 
Chinese PV industry in 2005. 
4.2 PV technology 
4.2.1 How does a solar cell work? 
The term 'photovoltaic' is composed of the word 'photo', meaning light, and 
`volt', meaning electricity (Boyle, 1996). It refers to a family of technologies that 
convert sunlight directly into electricity. 
Solar cells, which are the basic element of a PV system, consist of at least two 
layers of a semiconducting material 101 that have been intentionally contaminated 
(`doped') with chemical elements to create a surplus of either positive charge carriers 
loo Some types of thin film PV modules like CIS and CdTe, that were in a pre-commercial phase 
in 2005, are now rapidly gaining market shares. 
101 Semiconductors are materials whose electrical properties lie between those of conductors (such 
as copper and aluminium) and insulators (such as glass and rubber). A semiconductor substance can 
conduct electricity under some conditions but not others, making it a good medium for the control of 
electrical current. 
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(p-conducting layer) or negative charge carriers (n-conducting layer) from the 
semiconductor material (Boyle, 1996). When sunlight is absorbed by the 
semiconductor, the electric field across the junction between these two layers causes 
electricity to flow, generating a current. The greater the intensity of the light, the 
greater the flow of electricity. Figure 16 illustrates the basic functioning of a solar cell. 
Figure 16 Basic solar cell functioning 
Source: State Energy Conservation Office (SECO), 2005 
The quantity of the radiated light that is converted into useable electric power 
by a solar cell is called the cell's efficiency. Power conversion efficiency is the single 
most important indicator of a cell's performance. As discussed in Section 4.4, one of 
the key innovation goals of the PV industry is to improve solar cell efficiencies while 
holding down the production cost per cell. 
4.2.2 From the cell to the PV system 
Figure 17 below illustrates the main components in the typical PV system where 
the material preparation (dominated by two main technologies, as explained in section 
4.2.3) is followed by the cell fabrication. 
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Figure 17 The PV system 
Source: Adapted and integrated by the author from SECO, 2005 
The cell is the basic building block of a PV system. Since the power of a single 
cell is small (usually 1 or 2 watts), large numbers of cells need to be electrically 
connected to form a single unit called a module. Modules can be further connected to 
form an array. The number of modules needed in an array depends on the amount of 
output needed. The module (or the array) is then completed with a number of 
components that enable the PV-generated electricity to be properly applied to the load. 
Taken together these components are called the balance of system (BoS). They may, for 
instance, include a battery, which is necessary to store and use electricity in cloudy 
weather conditions or at night, as well as charge controllers, used for small loads 
(usually in off-grid applications) to protect the battery from overcharging and also 
excessive discharging. 
Electron control devices like maximum power point (MPP) trackers and 
inverters are also components of the BoS and are used to extract maximum power from 
the module and to convert DC power (produced by the PV module) to AC (that is used 
in the electric grid). 
4.23 PV technology families 
Solar cells are made of different semiconductor materials and are usually 
grouped in two big technology families according to the way in which the material is 
prepared (see Figure 18). It is possible to distinguish between: 
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1. Wafer-based solar cells 
2. Thin-film solar cells 
Figure 18 Different types of solar cells 
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The main difference between the two technology families is the substrate on 
which the solar cell is deposited and/or fabricated. Wafer-based solar cells are based on 
wafers of crystalline material cut from an ingot or from grown ribbons, while thin-film 
cells are deposited in thin layers directly onto cheap substrates like glass, plastic or 
steel. As explained below, the second technique allows consistent cost reductions in 
terms of material use 
Wafer-based solar cells 
Silicon (Si) is the most widely used semiconductor material in wafer-based solar 
cells. 93% of the solar cells that were sold on the market in 2005 were based on c-Si 
wafers (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006). There are two main reasons behind the 
popularity of the use of this semiconductor material. First, Si is a widely available 
material I 02 with a well-balanced set of electronic, physical and chemical properties 
(Green, 2000). Second, Si solar cells use the same well established knowledge base that 
has been developed for the semiconductor industry. 
There are two types of c-Si cells: single crystal Silicon (sc-Si) and 
multicrystalline Silicon (mc-Si). While sc-Si cells are fabricated by slicing wafers from 
102  Silicon is most commonly found in quartz and sand and it is the second most abundant element 
in the earth's crust. 
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a single crystal ingot, mc-Si cells derive from solidifying molten Si in a container 
(Green, 2000) 103 . Although sc-Si cells are the most efficient cell type currently 
available, mc-Si cells allow a better use of the expensive Si because they can reduce 
waste. 
Maximum efficiencies between 20.3% and 24.7% have been recorded in 
laboratory for cells made with mc- and sc-Si respectively (Green et al., 2006). However, 
commercial modules have lower efficiencies, which range between 12% and 16% for 
mc-Si 	and 	between 	16% 	and 	18% 	for 	sc-Si 
(http://photovoltaics.sandia.gov/docs/Database.htm). Table 9 compares the efficiencies 
of laboratory c-Si cells and commercial modules with other competing cell 
technologies (all presented in the following part of this section). 
Table 9 Best conversion efficiency of various solar cells developed in laboratory and typical 
commercial module efficiency 
PV technology 
family 
Wafer based 
Thin film 
Cell type 
sc-Si 
me-Si 
a-Si 
CdTe 
CIGS 
Typical commercial 
module efficiency (%) 
16-18 
12-16 
5-7 
6-7 
9-10* 
Maximum recorded 
laboratory efficiency (%) 
24.7 ± 0.5 
20.3 ± 0.5 
9.5 ± 0.3 
16.5± 0.5 
18.4 ± 0.5 
Area (cm2) 
4.00 
1.002 
1.070 
1.032 
1.04 
Source: for commercial module efficiency (http://photovoltaics.sandia.gov/docs/Database.htm); for 
laboratory efficiency: Green et al., 2006 
* (http://www.semiconductor-today.com/news_items/2008/MAY/HELIOVOLT_140508.htm)  
While the main technological advantage of c-Si cells is certainly the high 
efficiency that they permit, the main disadvantage is the high cost of the material which 
has to be used in large quantities to obtain the wafer104. As will be explained in Section 
4.4, the cost of the wafer is a substantial part of the total cost of this solar cell 
technology family and it constrains its further development. Moreover the process of 
refining Si to very high purity is particularly expensive. 
103 The manufacturing process from the transformation of the Si raw material to the final module 
is explained in Section 4.3. 
104 Silicon is a poor light absorber compared to other semiconductor materials such as GaAs, 
CIGS or CdTe. A 50 to 100pm wafer thickness is needed to absorb a significant fraction of the incident 
light, while only 2 or 31.im of GaAs or CIGS would be sufficient. 
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Thin-film solar cells 
As briefly explained above, the main distinctive feature of thin-film technology 
is the substrate on which the cells are grown. This is no longer a Si wafer but can rely 
on much cheaper materials such as glass, plastic or certain types of ceramic. The 
substrates are then coated and patterned with thin layers of semiconductor materials, 
such as Si (that can be used in much smaller quantities compared to the wafer-based 
technique), amorphous Silicon (a-Si) or elements of group II-VI of the periodic table 
such as copper-indium-gallium-diselenide (CIGS) and Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) (see 
Figure 18). 
Solar cells belonging to this generation are highly efficient in material 
utilisation, and hence potentially cheaper to produce than wafer-based cells, but enjoy 
lower efficiencies (in the range of 5-10% when commercial modules are considered. 
See Table 9). Moreover their manufacturability could be constrained by the availability 
of some of the semiconductor materials such as indium (Green, 2000). 
The market share of thin film technology was 7% in 2005, but is expected to 
increase in the future (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006). Among the three thin-film cells 
currently available on the market (CIGS, CdTe and a-Si), a-Si are the most widespread 
in terms of production capacity and installation (4% of the total market in 2005 as 
summarised by Table 10) (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006). 
Other cell-types 
There are also other types of cells that are currently at the pre-commercial stage 
or in their R&D infancy. 
a) Sunlight concentrators. The solar cells used in this technology are wafer-
based (using III-V elements of the periodic table, mainly GaAs) and are designed to 
operate with concentrated sunlight. These cells focus light from a large area onto a 
small area of PV material using an optical concentrator, such as a Fresnel lens (Boyle, 
1996). The main idea is to use very little of the expensive semiconductor PV material 
(1/300 to 1/500 of the module area) while collecting as much sunlight as possible. III-V 
elements of the periodic table can allow achieving high efficiencies exceeding 30%. 
Solar cells under concentration have two main drawbacks: they cannot make use 
of diffuse sunlight and must always be directed towards the sun with a tracking system. 
This technology is at a pre-commercial stage (Barnham et al., 2006), but shows 
promising development prospects especially in large size utility applications. 
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b) Flexible cells based on organic materials. Flexible solar cells are still at a 
R&D stage and can be created adopting a similar production process to thin-film, by 
depositing carbon-based (organic) material in nanometre-thick layers. The advantages 
of this technique are flexibility and light weight. This opens the range of possible 
applications, making flexible solar cells particularly appropriate for building integration 
(roof tiles) or for niche applications, such as battery chargers for laptops and digital 
cameras (ScienceDaily, 2007). 
One of the main disadvantages of this technology is that the cells produced have 
limited efficiency, which is currently only about 20% of that of c-Si. 
Table 10 provides a summary of the main PV technology families and of the 
advantages and drawbacks they present. 
Table 10 Overview of main PV technology families 
Solar cell 
	
Technology 
main tech. 	market 	Technological Pros 	 Technological Cons 
families share 
Stable solar cells and good 
module efficiencies (12-18%). 	High costs of the semiconductor (c- 
Process technology developed Si wafers make up 40-50% of the 
from the knowledge base of the cost of a finished module) 
microelectronics industry 
Technological complexity. 
materials, such as amorphous 
Use of relatively cheap 
(gallium) diselenide. 
Silicon (a-Si) or copper indium range from 5 to 10%). degradation of performance over 
time and stabilised efficiencies can 
Low efficiency (production modules 
Some thin film materials have shown 
be 20-30% lower than initial values. 
Limited use of the expensive Modules cannot make use of diffuse 
semiconducting material while sunlight. 
collecting as much sunlight as Need to use a sun tracking system 
possible 
Flexibility and light weight 
Particularly 	appropriate 	in Low efficiencies 
building integrated applications 
Source: Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006; SolarBuzz, 2008 
Maturity and market penetration of available PV technology families 
As mentioned before, the various PV technologies differ greatly in terms of 
technological maturity and market diffusion. While several technologies are at the 
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R&D or pre-commercial stage, others are sold on the market1°5. Figure 19 employs a 
modified version of the so-called S-shaped curve of technology development and 
diffusion (Tidd et al., 2005) to illustrate the different degrees of PV technological and 
commercial maturity. A typical diffusion curve plots the market penetration of a new 
product over time. Initially the rate of adoption is low; it follows a rapid take off and 
diffusion phase followed by a gradual slow down as the market reaches saturation. 
Here, following the approach adopted by scholars at the Imperial College Centre for 
Energy Policy and Technology (ICCEPT and E4Tech, 2003), market penetration is 
plotted against technological maturity. For the different PV technology families 
presented above market penetration increases as they become more technologically 
mature. For this reason c-Si technologies are plotted towards the end of the S-curve 
because they are approaching both commercial and technological maturity l°6. 
Figure 19 The technological maturity of different PV technology families relative to market 
penetration 
Market penetration 
(indicative) 
R&D 	Demonstration Pre-commercial Supported Fully commercial 
commercial 
Technology maturity by "stage" 
Source: Adapted from ICCEPT and E4Tech, 2003. 
105 The division of technological maturity in stages has been theoretically introduced in Chapter 2 
(section 2.4.1) and further discussed in Chapter 3. 
106 The Figure is only illustrative on both axis and do not intend to provide quantitative 
information on the future rate of adoption of technologies that are now in their infancy 
158 
Although c-Si solar cells currently dominate the market there is no guarantee 
that they will continue to do so. On the contrary, it is expected that they will eventually 
give way to other technologies that are currently in their infancy (and are plotted at the 
beginning of the S-curve in Figure 19) and can offer larger prospective cost reductions 
(Green, 2000). While these aspects, which pertain to innovation, will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 4.4, it is important here to emphasise that the future PV 
technological scenario is uncertain. This has implications for both the firms that operate 
in the PV industry and for the policies that are promoted by different governments to 
support a larger diffusion of PV. 
Firms currently involved in c-Si production may well be effective in advancing 
the frontier of this now dominant PV technology family, but they operate in a 
technology that has nearly reached technological maturity and will eventually be 
replaced by more cost effective options. 
Moreover, since the recent PV development crucially depends upon policies 
promoted by different governments to support installed capacity, further policy 
measures should ideally take into account the existence of competing PV technology 
families and provide incentives to both the options that are now in the early stages of 
development as well as to those that are approaching full commercial maturity and can 
provide immediate solutions. 
4.3 Manufacturing process for crystalline Silicon 
technology 
This section presents an overview of the c-Si production process. This is useful 
to appreciate the extent to which the firms selected for the study add value and enhance 
their technological capabilities107 . Moreover the section is important to show how the 
different productive links along the c-Si value chain present different technological 
challenges and have different potentials towards cost reduction, which is the ultimate 
goal of the PV innovation effort (see Section 4.4). 
C-Si is processed in separate steps, leading to different industries, each 
dependent on each other. Some firms specialise in individual links of the value chain 
107 For a presentation of the results see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 for their discussion. 
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(like wafer production) while others operate in more than one link (for instance, cell 
and module production). 
Figure 20 shows the different links of the c-Si value chain, which is 
characterised by: 
1. Production of solar grade Silicon. 
This consists of the extraction of quartz sand (i.e. Silicon) from natural deposits. 
This raw material (often referred to as 'Si feedstock') is then purified in a 
metallurgical process, where the sand is melted and contamination is removed. 
2. Production of Silicon ingot / wafer. 
This step involves placing a Si seed crystal (refined from the solar grade Si 
obtained in step 1) into a molten sand bath and growing it into a Si ingot (called 
Tzochralski's method'). The ingot is then cut into wafers of around 260-
300iim thick. 
3. Production of cells 
In this link of the value chain, wafers are doped to create an electric field and 
metal contacts are added to the cell to tap the electric charge. Moreover an anti-
reflection coating is applied to the cell's surface to increase the amount of light 
reaching the active region of the cell. 
4. Module assembly. 
The individual cells are assembled into strings. They are then laminated 
between a piece of tempered glass and a polymeric backing sheet (like ethylene 
vinyl acetate - EVA)I08. Frames are then added 
5. System integration and installation. 
In this step the different components of the BoS are added, according to the type 
of final application, and the completed system is installed. 
108 Solar module lamination is done for protection purposes (from mechanical damages) as well as 
to provide mechanical rigidity to support the brittle cells and their flexible interconnections (Luther et al., 
2003). 
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Figure 20 The manufacturing processes along the c-Si value chain 
Process steps 
	 Description 
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Solar grade silicon production • Raw material extraction and refining • Processing to solar grade material 
Ingot and wafer production 
• Moulding of me-Si and sc-Si ingots 
• Ingot cutting into wafers 
Cell production • Doping of wafers • Surface processing 
• Application of contacts and anti-reflex layers 
Module assembly • Connection of solar cells into strings • Module lamination and framing 
PV system installation 
• Application of BoS components 
• Installation of the completed PV system 
Source: Adapted from Groner, 2007 
The c-Si value chain can be represented as a pyramid (see Figure 21) with only 
a limited number of solar grade Si suppliers at the top and a very large number of 
module assemblers and system installers at the bottom (Kluftinger et al., 2005). 
Figure 21 Knowledge intensity of the different links of the c-Si value chain and barriers of entry 
No. of market 	Capital 	Tech. 
	Production 
participants 	expenditure/MW Know how scale 
Note: data on the number of market participants and capital expenditure are for 2004 
Source: adapted from Kluftinger et al., 2005 
Segments in the upper part of the pyramid (in particular Si feedstock and 
ingot/wafer production) are capital and knowledge intensive and require large 
production volumes to be competitive. These factors constitute high barriers of entry 
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into the industry and explain why few firms in the world can transform quartz into solar 
grade Si or undertake ingot and wafer production. 
In moving down the value chain (i.e. towards module production and PV system 
installation) barriers of entry become lower because the capital and the technological 
know how required are less demanding. Putting it differently: module assembly is 
technologically less complex than solar wafer or cell manufacturing and production 
capacity can be expanded in a relatively short time due to the limited capital intensity 
of the process. 
These are all important aspects to bear in mind in assessing if and how the 
Chinese firms are able to innovate in this industry. Perspectives emerging from the 
literature (see among others Rosen, 2003, Steinfeld, 2004) would suggest that the 
Chinese firms are concentrated in those productive segments that require less know 
how and capital (i.e. module assembly and PV system installation)109 . Moreover, 
segments in the lower part of the value chain tend to be more locally focused (i.e. 
usually PV system installers tend to serve the local market) and this seems to be more 
compatible with the prevailing view of a domestic industry that adapt imported foreign 
technology to specific national circumstances and requirements. Should the Chinese 
firms be involved also in the upstream segments of the value chain this would be a first 
broad indication that they might well have the necessary know how to handle processes 
more complex than module assembly or system installation. Moreover, trying to add 
value in wafer manufacturing has different implications for the technology's further 
development than adding value in module assembly. Since the bulk of the c-Si 
technology cost is due to the cell's material (see Table 11 in the following section) and 
the industrial effort should be directed towards reducing the production cost, a module 
manufacturer can contribute little to PV innovation because the most critical 
component of the system in terms of cost efficiency ratio is the cell. 
4.4 PV innovation avenues 
PV is an emerging industry and, in pursuit of profits its goal should be to 
become cost competitive with other technologies for electricity generation as quickly as 
possible and without the many governmental schemes that currently sustain its market 
109 See also the discussion in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.3) about how China innovativeness is 
commonly perceived in the literature. 
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growth (see section 4.6). Therefore innovating in PV essentially means reducing 
production costs while maintaining or enhancing useful cell efficiencies (Green, 2000, 
Anderson et al., 2006). 
The main bottleneck for cost reduction is the cost of the material of which the 
solar cells are made and that constitute a substantial part of the total production cost, 
particularly in the case of c-Si (Green, 2001). This is illustrated in Table 11 that 
presents the cost structure along the different manufacturing links of the c-Si value 
chain. As illustrated by the table, the component that uses the material intensively 
represents the bulk of the cost for each productive link. 
Table 11 	Cost split along the PV value chain for Si wafer-based technology 
Wafer Cells Modules System installer 
>95% Silicon 60-70% wafer 60-70% cells 80-90% module 
<5% other 10-20% pastes 10-15% EVA 5-10% inverter 
<5% chemicals 10-15% glass 5-10% mount 
5% other 10-15% frame <5% cables 
<5% cable, other 
Source: Kluftinger et al., 2005 
Material cost reduction could be achieved in two main ways (Green, 2001): 
1. Within the dominant c-Si technology family by finding ways of using less of the 
expensive Si. 
2. By adopting other PV technology families, like thin film, sunlight concentrators, 
etc., that are more efficient in material utilisation or use other cheaper 
semiconductor materials. 
These two options are discussed below in more detail. 
4.4.1 Innovation avenues within the crystalline Silicon technology family 
Cost reduction in wafer-based Si cells can be achieved via: 
a) Increases in cell efficiencies. 
b) Reduction of the Si used in the manufacturing process. 
Increases in cell efficiencies 
The selling price of solar modules is determined by the price per unit of peak 
power delivered by the module (€ /Wp). Since cell's efficiency enhancements translate 
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into a higher output per area, they help in reducing the specific material consumption 
(Goetzberger et al., 2002). 
Commercial me-Si cell efficiencies have increased since the early 2000s from 10-
11% to14-16% (see Table 9). 
Although there is a theoretical maximum efficiency that c-Si cells could achieve 
(this is approximately 28%)110, improvements can still be expected at least to fill the 
gap between record efficiencies achieved in laboratories (24.7% for sc-Si cells, see 
Table 9) and those, lower, currently sold on the market. 
The structuring of the cell's surface to reduce reflection lossl 1 1 is an example of 
innovative steps to increase efficiency. This can contribute to about 1 % cell efficiency 
increase (Rohatgi et al., 2003) 
Reductions in the use of Silicon 
While nearly two thirds of the PV costs are directly related to Si material, as 
highlighted before, there is no overwhelming single cost reduction factor (Schott, 2003). 
There are hence several ways to reduce costs all along the PV value chain: 
(a) Develop a dedicated 'solar-grade' Si process independent of the electronic industry.  
The semiconductor and the PV industry use the same feedstock: high grade Si. 
Traditionally and while the global solar electricity demand was small, the solar 
industry used the rejected and out-of-specification Si from the semiconductor 
industry. This is indeed still the main source of supply for the manufacture of solar 
cells. However with the recent rapid increase in PV demand this conventional route 
of supply is becoming tighter112 and with total Si demand greater than supply in 
2004, this shortage could prevent the sector from achieving its plans for expansion. 
Since the quality and purity requirements needed for solar wafer and cell 
production are slightly lower than those for the semiconductor industry (Sarti and 
Einhaus, 2002), there are several initiatives for developing an independent and 
110 PV cells that are constituted by only one type of semiconductor can all reach a theoretical 
maximum efficiency of about 30%. This is because the more one seeks to increase the voltage that a cell 
can generate the more the cell's capacity to absorb the sun's radiation and hence to generate electric 
current, is reduced. Vice versa, the more light is absorbed the less voltage is obtained. Since what counts 
for the final use is the peak power that is generated (the result of the voltage times the current), the best 
one can aim for is to chose a material for which the result of voltage times current is the highest possible 
under the sunlight spectrum. This maximum peak power corresponds to a maximum cell efficiency of 
about 30%. To do better, researchers and manufacturers stack materials with different bandgaps in so-
called `multijunction cells' (Mazzer, M., 2006, personal communication, 23 April). 
111  For example, the cell surface can be constructed in a pyramid structure, so that incoming light 
hits the surface several times. 
112 Indeed solar demand now accounts for —45% of total Si usage (Rogol, 2005) 
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dedicated energy efficient Si feedstock supply chain that can secure low cost Si to 
the PV industry (Sarti and Einhaus, 2002, Woditsch and Koch, 2002)113. 
(b) Adopt different lower cost Si manufacturing processes.  
As shown in Table 9, while sc-Si solar cells are more efficient than me-Si cells114, 
they are more expensive to produce115. Several different processes can be used to 
grow both sc- and me-Si cells. Some of these processes are more cost effective then 
others. For instance, in sc-Si development, the production process known as 'ribbon 
growth' is less costly than other techniques because it produces Si directly into thin 
wafers instead of thick ingots that need to be cut into wafers, causing a consistent Si 
waste (Surek, 2005). This alternative production process can reduce the waste of 
the Si material of as much as 20% (Boyle, 1996). Another emerging technology for 
improving me-Si production techniques, involves a casting process that originates 
square ingots: this allows cells to be cut into squares that can fit more compactly 
into a PV module, permitting savings in the original material 
(Energy Information Administration, 2005). 
(c) Produce thinner wafers and reduce the sawing material loss. 
Most Si wafers are currently 250-300um thick (Chopra et al., 2004) to compensate 
for the fact that Si is a poor absorber of light. However, wafer thickness of about 
50µm - 100µm would be sufficient to absorb most of the incident light (Kluftinger 
et al., 2005)116. The innovative challenge aims at reducing the wafer thickness 
without increasing wafer breakage. 
Further reductions in costs can be achieved by moving to thinner saws used to cut 
wafers from ingots. This has the merit of reducing the sawing material loss. At 
present about 150-180µm are lost per slice - this could be reduced to 100um or less 
(Kluftinger et al., 2005). 
(d) Manufacture larger cells 
113 The overall advantage in terms of cost is difficult to assess because it depends on the different 
routes taken for Si production to be used by the PV industry. However a cost target below 20E, 
maximum 25E per kg (20cent Wp) is referred to in the literature as feasible (Woditsch and Koch, 2002). 
Note that the Si produced for the semiconductor industry and used by PV producers, is currently sold at a 
price of around 50E/kg, while the Silicon offcuts for the PV industry is now sold at around 30-34E/kg. 
114 This is because the single crystal allows a better and more efficient transfer of the electrons 
through the material 
115 In general they involve a 25-30% higher wafer price in comparison with me-Si (Nijs et al., 
1999). 
116 Moving from a 300gm to a 200gm wafer (with unchanged cutting losses of about 180gm) 
would save 26% of material per MW output, reducing the final system price by 2% (Kluftinger et al., 
2005). 
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An increase in cell size has a similar effect to that of thinner wafers. Although 
larger amounts of Si need to be used, the output per MW increases linearly with the 
increase in the cell area. This makes production faster and more efficient. 
Technological advances have already succeeded in increasing the cell area from 
4x4inch, to the current industry standard of 6x6 inch (Swanson, 2006). Although, 
like in the case of wafer thickness, there is a limit to how large a single cell can be 
built due to the physical properties of these cells, the manufacturing industry claims 
that they have recorded limited early success with 8x8inch cells (Kluftinger et al., 
2005). 
Table 12 summarises the main innovation options available along the different 
links of the c-Si value chain. 
Table 12 Innovation targets along the crystalline Silicon value chain 
Si feedstock Wafers Cells 	Modules System installation 
Innovation 
focus 
Dedicated 
`solar-grade' Si 
process 
independent 
from electronic 
industry 
Larger wafers; 
Thinner 
wafers; 
Improved wire 
saw processes 
Larger cells; 
Alternative cell 
production 
techniques (i.e. 
Si ribbon cells) 
Less material 
usage; 
Higher 
automation 
Standardisation; 
Increase system 
integration; 
Faster 
installations 
Source: Kluftinger et al., 2005 
4.4.2 Innovation avenues via other PV technology families 
The innovation avenues described in the previous section to achieve cost 
reduction and to make PV competitive with existing electricity options have inherent 
limits. Eventually material costs will dominate further cost reduction potentials because, 
for instance, a minimum wafer thickness is required to absorb most of the incident light 
or cell efficiency could not be higher than 28% due to the physical proprieties of Si 
(Green, 2001, Goetzberger et al., 2002). 
Although there will be further improvements in the c-Si technology, which is 
expected to dominate the market demand for another decade and probably longer 
(Kluftinger et al., 2005), alternative technologies requiring less raw material and 
offering further potential for cost reduction, while guaranteeing good efficiencies and 
performance, will become critical in the mid-, long-term (Green, 2001). This is 
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illustrated in Figure 22, which is the PV technology roadmap elaborated by RWE, Shott, 
one of the biggest world PV industrial players. 
Although, lower cost technology families such as thin films or dye cells based 
on organic materials are still in their commercial or indeed technological infancy, they 
will require the innovative effort of both the PV industry and the research community 
to drive further down the technology cost and the price of the PV module. 
Figure 22 An illustrative PV technology road map 
Source: Hoffmann, 204 
4.5 The world market for PV 
4.5.1 PV installed capacity growth and contribution to global electricity 
generation 
The solar PV market has been booming since the mid 1990s and is forecast to 
confirm this trend in the coming years (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006). Global solar 
electricity demand has grown consistently by 20-25% per annum over the past 15 years 
(Solarbuzz, 2005) and reached 4.2 GW in 2005 (IEA-PVPS, 2005) (see Figure 23). 
This rapid increase made solar PV the fastest growing technological sector in the world 
(Martinot, 2006). 
Although the bulk of the PV capacity installed since the 1990s occurred in the 
OECD countries (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006), PV is becoming a mainstream power 
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option also in developing countries, where off-grid PV electricity is becoming 
integrated into rural electrification planning (Martinot et al., 2001). 
Among the OECD countries, leaders in terms of installed capacity are Germany 
with 1.9 GW at the end of 2005, Japan with 1.4 GW and the USA with 479 MW. 
Together these three countries accounted for more than three quarters of the total 
installed capacity in 2005 (see Figure 23). 
Figure 23 Cumulative installed PV power in IEA countries 
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Source: Based on data from 1EA-PVPS, 2005 
As will be explained in more detail in Section 4.6, PV market deployment is to a 
large extent dependent on the support schemes implemented by several countries. 
Germany, Japan and more recently also the US with the California Solar Initiative 
(Barros and Segerstrom, 2007), have been particularly active in this respect. However, 
despite these support programmes and the rapid growth in PV installed capacity that 
has followed, the present contribution of solar PV to global electricity production is 
still limited. To put recent developments in context in terms of scale it is sufficient to 
think that 4 GW of PV (roughly the total PV cumulative capacity installed in 2005) are 
equivalent to eight 500MW gas turbines used for peaking power (at 20% capacity 
factor117). 
"7 Since the capacity factor depends on the location, the comparison provided here should be 
taken as only indicative. 
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4.5.2 Main applications 
PV system applications basically fall into one of three main categories 
(Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006): 
1. Consumer goods and services 
2. Grid-connected systems 
3. Off-grid electricity generation (also referred to in the literature as 'stand 
alone applications'). 
Consumer goods and services include products like pocket calculators, watches, 
toys and power for services such as garden lights, road signs and water sprinklers. Off-
grid applications pertain to systems operating independently of the national grid 
network, while on-grid applications refer to PV systems connected to the public 
electricity grid via a suitable inverter (Luther et al., 2003). These include PV systems 
installed on top of a roof or integrated into the facades of houses or public buildings 
(PV building integrated — BIPV). Grid-connected applications are the motor of the 
recent fast growth in PV installed capacity. 
Figure 24 PV market applications in 2005 
Off-grid electricity 
generation , 18% 
Consumers goods 
and services, 2% 
 
Grid-connected 
systems, 80% 
Source: Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006 
As illustrated by Figure 24, in 2005 80% of the solar electricity installed 
worldwide came from grid-connected systems. Support schemes promoted particularly 
by mature economies (see more details in Section 4.6) greatly contributed to the boom 
in grid-connected PV electricity. While in 1994 only 20% of new capacity was grid-
connected, in 2005 the figure had grown to over 80% (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006). 
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4.5.3 Production capacity development 
The dramatic growth in the demand described above has been matched through 
time by an expansion of solar cell and module production capacity (Figure 25). 
Maycock refers to a world PV cell and module production of 1195 MW in 2004 
representing a 57% increase on the previous year (761 MW) (Maycock, 2005). Half of 
the world's cell and module production in 2004 originated in Japan, where the national 
and local governments, the utilities and the PV manufacturers have all been actively 
working on the development of PV systems (Ikki, 2004). 
Although the bulk of the remaining supply comes from Europe (mainly from 
Germany) and the USA, it is interesting to note that the manufacturing production of 
the rest of the world has been growing at an annual rate of 38%, the second fastest 
growth rate after Japan (50% annually since 1995) (Aratani, 2005). Among the 
emerging producing nations, China's Si cell producers increased their capacity from 19 
MW in 2000 to 70 MW in 2005118. 
Figure 25 World PV cell and module production in 1995-2004 (MW) 
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Table 13 provides the list of the world's top 10 manufacturers of solar cells in 
2004 and their ranking in 2001. 
118 Data collected during interviews in China (May-July 2005) and confirmed by data available in 
Zhao, 2005. For more information on China's specific market and production developments see Chapter 
5. 
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Table 13 Top 10 solar cell and modules producers in 2004 
PV cell/module producers 	Production in MWp (2004) Rank in 2001 world PV cell/module manufacturers 
Sharp (Japan) 	 324 	 1 
Kyocera (Japan) 105 3 
BP Solar (Spain) 	 85 	 2 
Mitsubishi (Japan) 75 9 
Q-Cells (Germany) 	 75 
Shell Solar (Germany) 72 	 4 
Sanyo (Japan) 	 65 7 
RWE Schott Solar (Germany) 	 63 	 6 
Isofoton (Spain) 	 53.3 8 
Motech (Taiwan) 35 
Source: Maycock, 2005 
Although until the early 2000s the market was dominated by Sharp and BP 
Solar (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006, Maycock, 2005), the situation has radically 
changed with the entry of new Japanese and European players. 
4.5.4 Forecast for future PV development and contribution to (a) global 
electricity generation (b) emission reductions (c) employment 
A recently published study (Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006) highlights the 
contribution PV could make to future global electricity supply, climate change 
mitigation and employment. The study suggests that in twenty years' time enough solar 
power could be produced to satisfy the electricity needs of 20% of the entire EU-25119. 
This would imply a 353 million tonne reduction in CO2 emissions, equivalent to the 
emissions of both Australia and New Zealand combined. On the supply side PV 
module shipments have been forecast to increase by a factor of 40 by 2025 and more 
than 3.2 million jobs might be created along the PV value chain around the world 
(Greenpeace and EPIA, 2006).120 
119 Provided that a number of conditions are met, including the continuation of the existent (or the 
establishment of new) national and regional market support programs. 
120 The largest employment opportunities are expected in the installation and marketing of PV 
systems (Greenpeace, 2006). 
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4.6 PV policy drivers 
This section provides a brief overview of the policy drivers that are behind the 
recent development and diffusion of solar PV. This is useful to help in assessing the 
possible policy measures that the Chinese government is putting in place to support 
PVI21 and to suggest policy recommendations for the future development of the PV 
industry in the country. 
As explained before, PV is not cost competitive with conventional electricity 
generation technologies based on fossil fuels and benefits from public supporting 
schemes. These are required to increase solar electricity installed capacity as well as to 
incentivise widespread investment in PV and to allow the industry to develop scale 
effects that in turn should allow players to bring down prices (Kluftinger et al., 2005). 
The two main drivers behind public support to PV development are climate change and 
security of energy supply. 
At present, policy instruments that contribute to PV worldwide expansion are 
part of broader schemes aimed at supporting RET. 
Two main policy instruments can be identified: subsidies and fiscal mechanisms 
(see Figure 26). 
Figure 26 Policy options to stimulate PV 
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Source: Anderson et al., 2006 
121 These aspects are all presented and discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Subsidies, which have been quite successful in encouraging a wider diffusion of 
RET, fall in two categories: capital investment subsidies and subsidies directly aimed at 
stimulating installed capacity. Subsidies for the installed capacity may focus on 
quantities (i.e. a national target of RET diffusion could be established together with 
tender or quota systems providing for green certificate trading), or on prices, where 
electric utilities are obliged to purchase electricity from green power generators at 
guaranteed prices (i.e. fixed feed-in tariffs). It is this latter support mechanism (widely 
adopted in Germany, but also in other EU countries) that has triggered major 
investments in solar electricity, and RET more in general (EPIA and Greenpeace, 2007, 
Ragwitz and Huber, 2005). Fixed tariffs, over a clear timeframe, provide certainty of 
income, which is a key issue for investors, and encourage the entry in the market of 
entrepreneurs (Sijm, 2002). When tariffs are differentiated to take into account 
technological maturity, technological differentiation in the RET available portfolio is 
encouraged. Moreover feed-in tariffs seem to be more favourable than mechanisms 
regulating the quantity, in stimulating technological innovation because they reduce 
revenue risks and enable manufacturers to invest more heavily in R&D and to 
consolidate their industrial base (Menanteau et al., 2003, Mitchell and Connor, 2004, 
Gross et al., 2007). 
However, to spur technological development and diffusion of solar PV 
technology more technology specific policy instruments are required (Sandell, 2005). 
These would need to include not only R&D funding but also market creation and 
especially the stimulation of niche markets to encourage learning. 
As pointed out before a successful policy support should take into account not 
only market diffusion (by targeting installed capacity) but also the fact that the future 
PV technological landscape is uncertain and that, as a consequence, technologies in 
their infancy should be promoted by appropriate R&D schemes to guarantee 
technological variety and to prevent a country from becoming locked-in to technologies 
that in 15-20 years may well become obsolete. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Knowledge of specific technological and market aspects of PV is essential if we 
are to assess the innovativeness of the Chinese firms operating in this sector. We have 
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argued that there is technological uncertainty surrounding the future of PV 
development and that the technology family that dominates the market today (i.e. c-Si) 
will not necessarily be that with the largest market share in 10-15 years time. This has 
implications for firms' future competitiveness, for the development strategies they set 
up today and for the learning effort that will allow them to add value. We have also 
argued that PV will need to reduce its production costs to compete with other electricity 
generation technologies based on fossil fuels. In order to do this, the innovation effort 
of firms (and more broadly of the research community) should focus on both those 
links of the c-Si value chain, like wafer, cell or indeed feedstock production, that can 
contribute more to cost reduction or on investing in alternative PV technology families 
that can offer brighter prospects towards cost reduction (i.e. thin-film technologies or 
new concepts involving organic materials or concentrators). 
We have explained how the recent expansion of world grid-connected solar 
electricity would not have happened (at least not at the current speed) without public 
subsidies, which are still concentrated in a limited number of countries (mainly in 
Germany, Japan and the USA) 122  This makes firms highly dependent on, and 
potentially highly vulnerable to changes in, markets commercially supported by 
government policies. On the positive side the uncertainty that surrounds the durability 
of current policies acts as a driver for the industry, which is put under pressure to find 
innovative solutions to reduce technology costs before state subsidies phase out. 
These issues play a significant role in determining the Chinese firms' ability to 
undertake technological change and will be further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
122 The concentration of the PV on-grid market in a few countries has rapidly changed since 2005 
with more countries, like Italy, Spain (Jager-Waldau, 2007) promoting supportive polices to encourage 
PV installed capacity (Blok, 2006). 
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5 THE CHINESE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT: 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL 
INNOVATION SYSTEM AND THE MACRO PV 
PICTURE 
Picture 6 Old guard Chinese leaders in a shop window in Beijing 
Picture 7 The new China: the Pudong area in Shanghai taken from the Build 
Source: Pictures taken by the author during fieldwork in China, May-July 2005 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 we provided a PV technology-specific profile and explained why 
the information provided in that chapter was required for an understanding of the 
innovation dynamics in the Chinese PV firms. 
In this chapter we focus on some China-related innovation and PV specificities 
that need to be appreciated to deepen our understanding of micro-level and systemic 
dynamics in PV in China. 
The chapter contains two distinct parts. Section 5.2 investigates the structure of 
the Chinese innovation system123 and its evolution over time. Moreover, it includes 
some of the measures recently introduced to transform China into an innovation-driven 
economy (Section 5.2.3). We argue that capturing the main features of the Chinese NIS 
123 A theoretical underpinning of the NIS concept has already been provided in Chapter 2 (section 
2.4.6) 
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and its evolution over time will be useful to better understand the determinants of the 
innovative behaviour of the PV firms in China. 
Section 5.3 uses information collected in 2005 during fieldwork to introduce the 
Chinese macro PV picture. Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.3 discuss PV current and future 
contribution to the domestic electric demand, the structure of the national industry (i.e. 
not the innovative behaviour of the firms, which is the object of this study and is 
presented and discussed in Chapters 6 and 7) and the policies promoted by the 
government to boost the domestic PV market and industry. 
We decided to include this macro PV picture in this chapter, rather than, for 
instance, in Chapter 4, because we want to highlight some features of PV development 
that are specific to China (for instance the priority given by the government to off-grid 
rural applications and the striking disparity between the country's installed capacity and 
production capacity) and because this will provide a useful macro introduction to the 
PV micro aspects that are discussed in Chapter 6 that follows. 
As it has been the case for Chapter 4, the information contained in this chapter 
has informed the analytical framework and is required for an understanding of the 
results presented and discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Moreover, similarly to Chapter 4, 
the information refers to 2005. This is done to sketch the NIS and the PV macro 
picture at the time when the empirical part of this study was undertaken (mid 2005). 
5.2 The evolution of China's innovation system: from plan 
to market 
China has a long history of innovation and progresses in science and technology. 
The seminal work of Needham shows that China made great advances centuries before 
the West in many important fields: gunpowder, silk and printing are only few of the 
many examples (Needham, 1954-). Table 14 provides a snapshot of when some 
selected innovations have been introduced in China and in the West. 
176 
Table 14 The timeline of China's technological advances 
Type of innovation 	 First introduced in China 	First introduced in the West 
Silk 	 1300 B.C. 	 582 A.D. 
Paper 105 	 1150 
Porcelain 	 851 1709 
Printed book 868 	 1456 (Gutenberg's Bible) 
Compass 	 1050 1190 
Explosive 1151 	 16th century 
Source: Adapted from Columbia University, 2004 
However, during the Industrial Revolution that occurred in Europe in the 18th 
century, China started to lag behind Western countries and for three hundred years 
contributed little new to the world's science and technology124. 
In the twentieth century China entered a new phase of technological 
development when it started to catch up with the rest of the world by increasingly using 
western technology. 
Since the beginning of the PV story in China dates back to late 1950s (see 
Chapter 6 for more details) and this is when the innovation system for this technology 
started, it is useful to recall some key features in the structure and dynamics of the 
Chinese innovation system over time. This should enable us to better appreciate 
whether the Chinese system's structure, dynamics and performance, together with the 
innovation policies put in place, have affected the development of the domestic PV 
industry over time and the firms' ability to move forward. 
5.2.1 The Chinese national innovation system during the planned economy 
In the 1950s a centrally planned economic regime was established in China 
along with extensive imports of technology from the former Soviet Union (Naughton, 
1995, Nolan, 1995). 
In this period the industrial organisation was highly centralised and under 
complete state ownership (Garrett-Jones and Liu, 2002). There were functionally 
specialised organisations whose activities and interactions were managed by the central 
government directly or by governmental industrial bureaux, such as the different 
124  An investigation of why China did not experience an industrial revolution despite its previous 
contribution to the world science and technology is beyond the scope of this study. The issue is however 
widely debated in the literature. Nolan (1993) and Balazs (1964) offer interesting points of view. 
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Ministries (Liu and White, 2001). The government decided what to produce, in which 
quantity, how and what resources to allocate to these functionally specialised 
organisations. 
There were government research institutes (such as the Chinese Academy of 
Science - CAS) whose only role was to conduct research according to the priorities 
identified by the government. They produced research reports with limited applied 
industrial use because their understanding of manufacturing requirements was limited 
(Liu and Lundin, 2006). 
Similarly, firms were only in charge of manufacturing and had, as a driver, not 
the market demand but the production targets set by the government. Moreover, 
important elements for industrial technological change and innovation 125,  such as 
creating links with suppliers or final customers were dealt with by government's 
bureaux and not by the firms (Liu and White, 2001). 
During the planned economy period, the Chinese innovation system was hence 
characterised by a linear and hierarchical model of innovation (i.e. research was 
detached from production and priorities, as well as resources, were allocated 'from 
above' by the government) with a clear division of labour126 (Liu and Lundin, 2006). 
This industrial organisation structure had at least two important implications for 
innovation and for our understanding of how the PV firms' capacity to add value over 
time could have been affected. First, firms had neither interest nor incentive (not even 
under the government's mandate) to upgrade their capabilities or to innovate (i.e. to 
introduce, adopt or diffuse innovation proactively). The innovation system not only 
provided few incentives for innovation but also created barriers: "knowledge in many 
cases accumulated on the shop floor from daily operations on how to improve 
technology in use. However factory managers could not take initiatives because 
innovation decisions had to be made by the planners following the yearly or five-year 
plan procedure" (Gu, 2001, p. 207). 
Second, the innovation system had a limited number of actors so feedback and 
interactions for the exchange of knowledge and information were extremely limited. 
Moreover, as pointed out above, the government and its industrial bureaux were 
responsible for linkage activities and directed the technology developed by research 
institutes to manufactures. Firms, research institutes, distributors and users had no 
125 See chapter 2 (section 2.5.4) 
126 R&D was undertaken by research institutes, manufacturing by factories and linkages by 
industrial bureaux (Liu, 2007). 
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incentive to initiate linkages with other actors in the system because they "[...] 
depended on top-down allocations for necessary inputs, whether personnel, technology, 
capital, intermediary inputs or other resources" (Liu and White, 2001, p. 1098). 
5.2.2 The evolution of the innovation system since 1978 
In 1978 China entered a period of extensive reform and opening to the outside 
world. This market-oriented economic reform had significant effects on the structure 
and dynamics of the Chinese IS. The number and the relative importance of key actors 
have significantly changed together with the forces that drive the development of the IS. 
Thanks to the reform, not only there are more actors in the IS but also more functions 
(i.e. knowledge creation and diffusion, etc. See Sections 2.4.2 and 3.2.3 in Chapters 2 
and 3 respectively) can be satisfied by a larger number of agents. 
In what follows selected aspects of the IS, as it started to emerge since the late 
1970s, are discussed for their particular relevance for this study. 
First, after the beginning of the economic reform in the late '70s, a drastic 
reduction in the direct state involvement occurred and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
were granted more autonomy and took more responsibility (Gu, 1995, Nolan, 2005). 
Firms were given the freedom to take decisions on production planning, investment, 
marketing, acquisition of technology and personnel recruitment. 
Moreover the involvement in the industrial production of non-state enterprises 
has been encouraged. China's non-state sector, which comprises collectively-owned 
enterprises, private businesses, foreign investment firms and joint ventures has been the 
engine of the country's rapid economic growth in the past three decades (Mango, 2004). 
The entrance into the Chinese IS of new actors with a greater functional 
diversification and autonomy has increased knowledge and information flows between 
the different system components (Liu and White, 2001). 
Second, funds and resources granted to SOEs and the R&D institutions by the 
government have been drastically reduced and research funding, together with 
employment, have been made contingent on performance: scientists have to show they 
are able to acquire funds or to commercialise their research results (Garrett-Jones and 
Liu, 2002, p. 34). Some commentators note that, although this competition-based 
funding system created incentive for innovation and for a faster commercialisation of 
the research results, at the same time: "[...] it increased pressure on scientists and led to 
short-term research projects for pursuing more immediate economic returns" (Liu and 
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Lundin, 2006, p. 4). Moreover, to speed up the process from research to commercial 
products, the government also prompted research institutes and universities to set up 
their own spin-offs and encouraged scientists to leave their research position and 
engage in commercial activities. 
Third, as a consequence of the open door policy, China's international links 
have been substantially intensified in terms of the inflow of investment, technology and 
capital goods. Although imports have become the most important source of industrial 
technology they have also created fierce competition for domestic suppliers who are 
under pressure to improve performance and quality of the products they sell in both the 
domestic and the international markets. 
Despite the increased role of market forces in the Chinese economy, the 
government still plays a significant role in the development of the domestic innovation 
system. Since the economic reform of the late 1970s, the Chinese government has 
consciously invested considerable resources in building different aspects of its NIS to 
accelerate the pace of local generation of technology. These steps include the efforts to 
develop human resources (i.e. education and beyond), the promotion of specific policy 
and measures to foster science and technology (i.e. government direct support of 
national R&D and in particular of technology related research), as well as measures to 
promote industrial innovation (for instance, the establishment of high-tech zones and 
the support of technology-based SMEs). More recently, the government has been 
encouraging the development and the utilization of indigenous technology. We discuss 
below the major initiatives taken in each respect and devote a separate section (5.2.3) to 
the latest developments in terms of indigenous innovation. 
Developing a human resources with a particular focus on science and engineering 
In recognition that a good tertiary education and an adequate supply of well 
trained scientists and engineers are considered essential to assimilate technology and to 
propel innovation (Yusuf and Evenett, 2002), China has set up a system of higher 
education that has produced, only in 2002, more than 300,000 scientists and 
technologists (National Science Board, 2002). Science and engineering (S&E) degrees 
represented 73% of total first university degrees awarded in China in 2002 and greatly 
outnumbered the number of S&E degrees in mature economies (Figure 27). 
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Figure 27 Ratio of science and engineering degrees in selected countries, 2002 
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DEGREES 
TOTAL S&E 
DEGREES 
% OF S&E DEGREES 
ON TOT 1st UNIV. 
DEGREES 
DETAIL OF S&E DEGREES 
Social & Natural behavioural 	Engineering sciences sciences 
Total, all 
regions 6,781,885 2,649,460 39 917,721 872,629 868,340 
Brazil 245,401 78,049 32 32,556 27,421 18,072 
440,935] I 322,769 67,0111 185,354i 
EU 1,908,967 439,171 23 182,089 122,390 134,692 
Hong Kong 11,362 5,425 48 2,370 1,233 1,822 
India 750,000 176,036 23 147,036 NA 29,000 
Japan 532,436 350,535 66 32,718 214,377 103,440 
Malaysia 10,511 4,760 45 1,685 2,198 877 
South Korea 204,390 91,296 45 29,527 16,624 45,145 
Taiwan 87,421 34,722 40 12,911 5,173 16,638 
United States 1,199,579 384,674 32 144,441 185,263 60,914 
Source: National Science Board (2002) 
Moreover, starting from a very low base in the 1980s, China has been able to 
increase the number of its S&E doctoral students127 and also to invert a trend that, until 
the mid 1990s, saw students preferring to go abroad (mainly to the USA) to obtain their 
doctoral degrees (Figure 28)128. 
127 According to the National Science Board, by 2002 China had the largest capacity for S&E 
doctoral degrees production in the Asian region and ranked fifth in the world (National Science Board, 
2002). 
128 China's capacity to increase its number of doctoral students could be the combined result of: 
China's ability to deliver good quality S&E higher education, the increasing attractiveness of the country 
as a place where to work and live (see following section on attracting back talents), and the increasing 
difficulty to enter the USA that has followed the September 11th terrorist attacks (Broad, 2004). 
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Within Chinese universities 
Within U. S universities 
Figure 28 Doctoral S&E degrees earned by Chinese students at home and USA universities, 
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Source: National Science Board (2002) 
Development of science and technology 
National R&D expenditure is an important indicator that shows the importance 
(and indeed the commitment) given by a country to scientific and technological 
activities and to innovation. 
Since 1995, China has more than doubled its R&D spending (understood as a 
percentage of GDP) passing from 0.6 to 1.3% of GDP in 2005 (EurActiv.com, 2006). 
By the end of 2006, China was expected to overtake Japan and become the world's 
number-two R&D investor after the United States 
The importance attached by China to R&D spending as a means to promote 
technological development, has been visible since 1986, when China promoted the 
high-tech R&D programme, better known as the `863' programme. The aim of the 
programme, which is still running, is to enhance China's international competitiveness 
by promoting R&D in selected high-technology areas. The six areas at the core of the 
programme are: information technology (IT), biological and advanced agricultural 
technology, advanced materials, advanced manufacturing and automatic technology, 
energy technology and environmental technology. The programme, which is directly 
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financed by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) 129 has received 
approximately 10 billion RMB (about £970 million) from 1986 up to the end of 2001 
(Sigurdson, 2005). 
Attract talents back home 
An important policy set up by the government to enhance creativity focuses on 
attracting back to the country Chinese nationals who have been trained overseas and 
who can bring with them modern technology and concepts. There are many different 
types of returnees: entrepreneurs, multinational managers, academic researchers and 
investors. "For those wanting to work in academic research, there are attractive 
governmental schemes such as the '100 Talents' programme, which offers high salaries 
and generous research budgets to promising scientists under the age of 45" (Wilsdon 
and Keeley, 2007, p. 30). The Chinese National Natural Science Foundation (NSFC) in 
2005 also promoted a scheme where annual grants of up to 1 million RMB (about 
£97,000) for four years were offered to overseas Chinese scientists willing to return (Jia, 
2005)13°. 
Special support for technology-based firms 
In 1998 the State Council established the National Foundation for 
Technological Innovation aimed at supporting technology-based SMEs through grants, 
low-interest loans and funds for capital investment (Garrett-Jones and Liu, 2002, 
Sigurdson, 2005). 
Moreover "high-tech enterprises are now required to spend no less than 5% of 
their annual sales volume on R&D. A company's investment in S&T can be written off 
as production costs" (Garrett-Jones and Liu, 2002, p. 35). 
Another key measure taken by the government to specifically promote industrial 
innovation has been the development of high-tech zones. They have been created to 
129 MOST was created in 1998 out of the former State Science and Technology Commission and 
is responsible for science and technology strategy. Besides the 863 programme for high-tech R&D, it 
finances also a large amount of research through other programmes such as the Basic R&D programme 
(also known as the 973 programme) and the Spark programme for the support of rural industries and the 
diffusion of technology to township-village enterprises. MOST also administers development zones and 
oversees international collaboration. 
130 Despite the positive attitude of the government towards returnees, there is a widespread sense 
of resentments on the side of the local research community who feel they are overpaid or unfairly 
promoted ahead of local talents 
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serve as a platform for innovation activities and interactions, via the establishment of 
clusters to promote close cooperation among firms. Moreover they provide preferential 
treatment to high-tech firms in the form of a broad range of tax incentives (Liu, 2007). 
5.2.3 Latest developments in the innovation system: from imitation to indigenous 
innovation 
In 2005 China launched the National S&T Development Plan for the 2006-2020 
period (Erawatch and CORDIS, 2006). While the formulation of long-term science and 
technology programmes has a long standing tradition in China dating back to 1956 
(Sigurdson, 2005), this most recent strategic plan contains a new noteworthy element: 
the need to re-focus the development model and to strengthen 'independent' or 
`indigenous' innovation. Several reasons demand for a change in the existent 
development trajectory. 
China's rapid economic growth has been driven by a combination of low-cost 
manufacturing, imported technology, substantial flows of foreign investment and 
growing demand for China's exports (OECD, 2007). Such growth model is now under 
scrutiny. Years spent in attracting foreign technology and capitals have not resulted in 
the knowledge and technological spillovers the Chinese policymakers had hoped for 
(Liu and Lundin, 2006). 
A culture of imitation and copying is common not only in product development 
and design, but also in the field of scientific research131. Hence, even if manufacturing 
will remain crucial in the future economic growth of the country, it will not be 
sufficient to carry China through the next stage in its development (Wilsdon and 
Keeley, 2007). Challenges ahead include securing energy and resources, reducing the 
levels of environmental pollution (the strategy 'grow first, clean up later' is 
increasingly challenged) and enhancing capabilities for innovation, which includes new 
managerial skills and new organisational practices. These challenges, which point in 
the direction of a more sustainable and harmonious development, demand a new focus 
131 Plagiarism affects China scientific research. In an interview given by Prof. Ze Zhang, the vice 
president of Beijing University of Technology, to Wilsdon and Keeley of Demos, he declared: "[...] 
There are policies to encourage people to generate publications and patents and prizes. You get a score 
and if you are an 'A', you get 25 per cent more salary. It's easy to understand why this leads people to 
plagiarise results. Every university has this problem. I've suffered from it myself. Some ex-students of 
mine took my data and published it in Science. This happened only five months ago" (Wilsdon and 
Keeley, 2007). 
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on indigenous innovation (Gu and Lundvall, 2006, Liu, 2007, Wilsdon and Keeley, 
2007) and for a 'high-performing enterprise-based innovation system' (OECD, 2007). 
Ad hoc policies and new measures are being introduced to pursue the 
government's indigenous innovation goal. These include: increase in R&D expenditure 
in science from the current level of 1.3% to 2% of GDP in 2010 and 2.5% in 2020 (Liu 
and Lundin, 2006); favourable tax policy for firms' R&D expenditure; public 
procurement of indigenous technology; new banking policies and fiscal incentives to 
support innovative start-ups. 
We move now to the second part of this Chapter, which will serve as a macro 
PV picture to the firm-level analysis that will follow in chapter 6. 
5.3 The Chinese macro PV picture: market, supply and PV 
role in the current and future China's electricity demand 
The Chinese PV macro picture presents some distinctive features that are 
important to understand to appreciate the domestic context within which the PV firms 
undertake technological change. In the following pages we explore specificities 
pertaining to both the domestic PV market and industry. 
5.3.1 PV demand in China: installed capacity and market applications 
At the end of 2005 China's total PV installed capacity was about 70MWp (see 
Figure 29). Although this represented a small amount when compared to other 
countries that lead in terms of installed capacity (Germany had 1.9 GW at the end of 
2005, see Chapter 4), it was nevertheless an important result considering that in 1995 
China had less than 7 MW installed (REDP, 2004). 
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Figure 29 China's PV installed capacity (1976-2005) 
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Source: Wang, 2006 
The recent rapid growth in PV installed capacity occurred mainly in off-grid 
rural applications (they represented nearly half of the installed capacity in 2004 as it is 
illustrated by Figure 30) driven by the massive rural electrification programme 
launched by the government in 1998 and better known under the name of the 
`brightness programme' (Ma, 2004 and 2005). 
The overall target of the programme is to provide electricity for 23 million 
people in remote areas by 2010 using PV modules and wind power systems (Marigo, 
2007)132. If the government's rural installation schedule is going to proceed according 
to plan, by 2010-2015 all Chinese households should be electrified. 
So far the programme has succeeded in electrifying rural population and in 
increasing PV installed capacity at an average annual rate of 27% since 1990 (Ma, 2004, 
Ma, 2005). However the programme has not provided a long and good enough 
incentive to local firms interested in expanding their presence in the domestic market. 
This is illustrated in Figure 29 by the blip in PV power installed in 2002. In late 2001 
the government launched a new phase of the Brightness programme (the Township 
Rural Electrification Programme, see footnote at the bottom of the page), which lasted 
for just 20 months. The programme was too short and failed to have a long term impact 
on the industry that remained along the same growth path initiated in the late 1990s. 
132 The Brightness Programme includes the Township Electrification Programme and its follow 
up, the Village Electrification Programme, that have been adopted by the government (since 2006) to 
provide electricity access via solar energy to remote rural areas. 
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Figure 30 China's main PV applications (2004) 
Source: Wang, 2006 
Besides rural applications other potentially promising markets, such as on-grid 
applications, are at little more than a demonstration stage (see Figure 30). 
It is worth recalling that the recent boom in the global PV installed capacity 
described in Chapter 4 has occurred in residential grid-connected applications 
supported by stable market support mechanisms. Moreover several studies have shown 
the big potential and economic rationale for an increase in grid connected applications 
in China (Byrne et al., 2001, Zhang, 2005, Li et al., 2007). It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that, as soon as the rural electrification programme is over, the main opportunity 
for PV in China will be in grid connected applications and this will require a stable and 
rewarding policy scheme, as it happened in other markets like Germany or Japan (see 
Chapter 4). However, the director of renewable energy at the Chinese National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has recently declared that: "[...] China 
has decided that grid-connected PV is too expensive for incentive support, with projects 
only being considered on a case-by-case basis" (Photon International, 2006). 
5.3.2 PV's role in future electricity demand 
Despite the scarce attention of the government for the PV domestic market (off-
grid rural applications aside), a study by the Chinese Electrical Power Research 
Institute (CEPRI) has shown that PV is bound to play a larger role in the Chinese 
electric supply in the future (REDP, 2004). According to the study China's electricity 
demand is expected to rise 5.6% annually, from 357GW capacity in 2002 to 950GW in 
2020. Since conventional energy sources (i.e. coal, nuclear and hydro) will not be 
sufficient to satisfy the increasing demand, RET like biomass, PV, small hydro and 
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wind, are expected to fill the gap and to provide nearly 11% of the total electricity 
needs by 2020 (see Table 15)133. 
Table 15 China: electricity generation capacity in GW and as a percentage of the total in China 
in 2002 and projection for 2010 and 2020 
Mode 	of 	electricity 
generation 
2002 
GW 	% 
2010 
GW 	% 
2020 
GW  
Coal 266 74.5 400 68.40 592 62.3 
Hydro 86 24.1 135 23.10 220 23.2 
Nuclear 4.5 1.3 12.5 2.10 36 3.8 
Renewables 0.5 0.1 37 6.40 102 10.7 
Total 357 100 584.5 100 950 100 
Source: REDP (2004) for 2010 and 2020 projections; Wang, 2006 for 2002 data 
PV will certainly play a role in closing this gap but how significant this role will 
be remains an open question. Solar energy R&D representatives and experts 
interviewed in China in mid 2005 seem to believe that a 41% per year expansion of PV 
installed capacity until 2010 followed by a 36% rate of growth until 2020, can be 
achieved. This would bring PV from the 2005 level of 70MW to 500MWp in 2010 and 
10GWp in 2020 (see Figure 31). 
Figure 31 Three possible scenarios for China's PV cumulated installed capacity 
Source: for experts' roadmap: Wang, pers. comm. 25 May 2005; for NDRC official estimate: 
REDP, 2004, Wang, 2006 
133 Although a more recent Figure by CEPRI seems to suggest that the gap to be filled by 
renewables in 2020 may be smaller (8.2%) due to a larger role to be played by gas generation of 
electricity (Wang, 2006), the government's commitment towards a greater reliance on renewable energy 
by 2020 seems firm (Watts, 2005). 
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A recently published report (Wang, 2006) suggests, however, that the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) might have far less ambitious 
expectations, not as much as for the short term, where 400MWp by 2010 are foreseen, 
but for the medium term where only 2GWp by 2020 are expected. 
If the experts' roadmap, which is quite likely based on the hope for a long term 
incentive scheme, possibly a feed-in tariff for grid-connected PV electricity, appears to 
be ambitious, the new government forecast for 2020 appears even lower than what 
would be achieved by following the current business as usual scenario. It is worth 
noting that the total internal installed capacity has grown at a constant rate of about 
27% between 1990 and 2005. If this trend is confirmed during the next 10 years, the 
total installed capacity would reach 1 GWp in 2015 and would fall just short of 3.5 
GWp by 2020. Figure 31 summarises the three possible scenarios. 
5.3.3 PV industry in China: an overview 
The details provided in this section about the PV industry are the result of the 
information and insights obtained during fieldwork in China in 2005. Before 
undertaking the empirical part of this research little was known about the PV industry 
in China, who the main industrial players were and in what segments of the value chain 
they were involved (not to mention their ability to innovate, which is indeed the object 
of this study). The only information available at the beginning of 2005 was contained in 
a few articles and reports (Yang et al., 2003, Zhao, 2004, Zhu, 2004, Zhao, 2001, Dai 
and Shi, 1999), which were either out of date or reflected only partially the changes 
underway in the industry since the early 2000s134. 
What follows presents a broad overview of the Chinese PV manufacturing 
industry as it was at the end of 2005 (soon after the completion of fieldwork) and 
summarises some of the findings recently presented by the author of this study in a 
journal paper (Marigo, 2007). It is worth emphasising that all the issues pertaining to 
the firms' ability to enhance their technology capabilities and add value are presented 
and discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Since the early 2000s, when two new cell and module manufacturers, Suntech 
Power and Tianwei Yingli New Energy Resources, began production, China's PV cell 
134 As discussed in Chapter 3, the limited information available before undertaking fieldwork in 
2005, made the selection of the target population to be included in the survey quite challenging. 
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and module production has been growing rapidly. Domestic capacity has increased 
from 14 MW in 2003 to over 64 MW in 2004 (Zhao, 2005) and in the first half of 2005 
the country ranked no. 5 in world PV production (Chen, 2004). 
Figure 32 China: total PV production capacity (asterisks) and production only for the domestic 
market (small dots) compared to global production (triangles) 
Source: Compilation of data from: Ma, 2003 for China's early total production capacity; Maycock, 
2004, for global production; REDP, 2004, for domestic (no export) market production; Zhao, 2005, 
for 2005 China's total production capacity 
Figure 32 shows the evolution of both the total Chinese PV production capacity 
and the production only for the domestic market, together with the growth of global 
production capacity. As illustrated by the Figure Chinese PV production capacity 
follows the global trend quite closely but with a noteworthy difference: while global 
PV production has been growing at an average annual rate of 36% since 1997, the 
annual growth of production capacity in China has been nearly double this, 70%, 
during the same period. 
Another striking fact emerging from the data plotted in Figure 32 is the 
existence of a growing gap between the real production sold in the domestic market and 
the industry's production capacity. As emerged during the fieldwork interviews, on 
average between 70 and 80% of the modules produced in China are exported. 
As pointed out previously, the vast majority of the Chinese PV industry is based 
on c-Si technology. Solar presence on the value chain is from wafering to cell 
production, module assembly and PV system installation (REDP, 2004). 
190 
Feedstock Wafer Cell Module 
350 
300 
250 
0. 200 
2 150 
71.5 MWp 
(domestically available only 100 
50 
0 
Figure 33, compiled by the author from information collected during interviews, 
provides an overview of the domestic capacity along the c-Si production chain in 2005. 
Figure 33 Capacity along the c-Si production chain (2005) 
Source: Wang, 2006 for data on feedstock and wafer production. Cell and module data have been 
collected by the author during interviews in China, May-July 2005 
Silicon feedstock 
China's PV industry depends almost entirely on imports of Si feedstock from 
abroad. Despite having a domestic semiconductor industry that supplies electronic 
grade Si, its production capacity is very limited (less than 200 tons/year) and almost 
entirely devoted to the integrated circuit industry (REDP, 2004, Wang, 2006). 
Currently between 30 and 40 tonnes/year of the domestically produced Si feedstock is 
for the internal PV market; this translates to a mere 3 to 5 MW of c-Si solar cell 
production. Some relief from the heavy dependence on imported feedstock could come 
between 2007 and 2010 as a consequence of a planned expansion of the domestic Si 
production capacity, which could possibly reach 1500 tons/year. However, it remains to 
be seen how much of this expected expansion in production will go to the PV industry 
and how much will be provided to the national and international integrated circuit 
industry. 
Wafer production 
There were fewer than ten sc-Si and me-Si wafer manufacturers in China with a 
total capacity of 71.5 MWp by mid 2005. They were unable to satisfy the whole 
domestic demand coming from cell producers not only because their capacity was 
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limited, but also because they exported the majority of their production mainly to 
Japanl 35. 
New wafer manufacturing capacity was expected for 2006 and the years to 
follow. New anticipated additions in capacity may well help in re-balancing the 
domestic c-Si value chain that is currently skewed towards module assembly 
(Figure 33), and so ease the dependence on imports. 
Cell production 
Cell production in China has surged recently from a 64 MW capacity in 2004 
(56 MW of me-Si and 8 of sc-Si) to a probable 257 MW at the end of 2005. This is due 
to both the expansion plans undertaken in 2005 by nearly all the existing cell producers 
and the emergence of a new actor on the Chinese solar cells scene: Nanjing PV-Tech. 
Co., which was expected to come on line with 30 MW by the end of 2005. When 
fieldwork was undertaken in mid 2005, the largest cell manufacturer (producing both 
sc-Si and me-Si) was Suntech Power with a capacity of 120 MW. 
Module production 
Module production in China offers a scattered picture, with a lot of producers 
with less than 5 MW capacity. Total module production capacity was expected to reach 
nearly 300 MW by the end of 2005. The largest module producer at the end of 2005 
was Suntech with a capacity of 180 MW, followed by Tianwei Yingli, which in the 
same year was completing a new line with 100 MW production capacity. The multitude 
of module producers with limited production capacity is not surprising. Assembling 
cells into modules does not require the same level of technical expertise needed in cell 
production and putting in operation a module assembly line is technically easier and 
faster than setting up a cell production line. This is particularly true if the module 
assembly line is partially or even fully manual, which is often the case with Chinese 
module producers. The vast majority of the modules produced in China are based on c-
Si and only a very limited number of producers specialise in amorphous Silicon (a-Si) 
modules. 
135 Less than 20% - between 15 and 20 MW - of the wafers they produced were for the internal 
market. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
The first part of this chapter presented the transformation over time of the 
Chinese NIS. This evolved from a linear model where few functionally specialised 
actors were strictly guided by the government's decisions, to a non-linear and multi-
agent model where the government has a less pervasive role, the actors are more 
autonomous and functionally diversified and where more information can flow 
horizontally. 
These different system configurations had profound implications for firms' 
innovative behaviour. During the planned economy period, the role played by firms in 
the innovation system was limited and they functioned only as manufacturing or/and 
sales units. They were output-oriented, strictly separated from innovative activities and 
were not supposed to undertake any R&D or to look, for instance, for the most suitable 
resources to feed their productive needs. National research institutes by performing 
R&D under the government's guidance were closer to an innovator's role than firms. 
Since the late 1970s, a recombination of competences, where research institutes 
are encouraged to undertake commercial activities and where firms are supposed to 
respond to market inputs, has granted firms a central position in the innovation system. 
Firms are now free to invest and innovate based on their own strategic decisions and 
are bound to become a key pillar in the new development trajectory based on 
indigenous innovation that the Chinese government intends to undertake. 
The second part of the Chapter instead focussed on the macro PV picture, which, 
since the early 2000s, has been dominated by the rapid take off of the domestic c-Si 
industry. This has resulted in substantial export towards those EU and USA markets 
where PV installed capacity is supported by rewarding public schemes. 
By comparison, the development of the domestic market and the goals set by 
the Chinese government for future PV deployment, are quite modest. Contrary to what 
has been happening in the rest of the world, the Chinese PV market remains dominated 
by off-grid applications and for the time being there is no government intention to 
support the untapped potential of the on-grid market136 . This delay in promoting 
policies that can create larger opportunities in the domestic market means that the 
136 A few weeks before submitting this thesis the Chinese government announced its intention to 
promote 	incentive 	policies 	to 	support 	the 	domestic 	on 	grid 	market 
(http://progettonuovaenergia.blogspot.com/2009/03/cina-mette-in-campo-incentivi-per.html).  
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entrepreneurial spirit of the domestic industry is poorly mobilised and exploited to 
serve domestic environmental and development purposes. The extent to which this 
domestic industry has been improving its technological competence and has undertaken 
a purposive effort to add value is the object of the following two chapters. 
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6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS FROM THE 
QUESTIONNAIRE WITH THE PV INDUSTRY 
AND THE INTERVIEWS WITH OTHER PV 
STAKEHOLDERS IN CHINA 
Picture 8 A 340 watt module of one of the Chinese firms visited during the fieldwork 
Source: Picture taken by the author during fieldwork in China, May-July 2005 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapters we laid the theoretical, analytical and methodological 
foundations of this study, which aims at understanding if, how and why PV firms in 
China innovate. We decided to focus on the firms' technological capabilities and on the 
innovation system that surrounds them, to explore the nature of their innovation, how it 
came about (i.e. how the technological capabilities had been accumulated) and what 
affected it. In this Chapter we present the results obtained by applying the framework 
described in Chapter 3, while undertaking two months of fieldwork in China from May 
to July 2005. 
As explained in Chapter 3, two main methods were adopted to collect the 
necessary empirical data (see sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4): a questionnaire survey 
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administered to a selected sample of 8 PV firms in China; and semi structured 
interviews conducted at the national level with key representatives of the Chinese PV 
research community, policy-makers, international organisations and an NGO (the 
WWF) that foster PV development and diffusion in China. 
The results presented in this Chapter synthesise the information obtained by 
applying these two methods. They are organised, as suggested by the way in which the 
analytical framework has been developed (see in particular Figure 7 in Chapter 3), in 
two main sections. Section 6.2 presents how advanced is what the Chinese PV firms 
can do (i.e. it provides information about the nature of innovation useful to address 
research question 1). Section 6.3 is about the determinants of the technological effort in 
the PV firms (i.e. it contains the findings functional to answer the research question 
2)137. In particular, section 6.3.1 presents the results obtained by applying the approach 
suggested by the TC literature, where the focus is on firm-level technological learning 
and what affects it. Section 6.3.2 is devoted to the systemic analysis and presents the 
evolution of the PV innovation system over time and its influence on the firms' ability 
to undertake technological change' 38. 
When fieldwork for this study was undertaken in mid 2005, little was known 
about the PV industry in China, particularly about the technical competence of the 
firms and their efforts to acquire, assimilate and manage a knowledge-intensive 
technology such as solar PV. What was known was that a domestic PV industry existed 
but, at least until the late 1990s, was producing low efficiency c-Si solar cells and 
modules and was far from being globally competitive (Dai and Shi, 1999). At the end 
of the 1990s several barriers (i.e. small market size, high production costs, capital 
shortage, unfavourable tax policy and limited R&D funding) were known to prevent 
this sector's growth and its capacity to enhance technological capabilities and add-
value (Dai and Shi, 1999). What was also known was that in the early 2000s, only few 
years before the fieldwork took place, a few new cell and module producers had started 
to emerge and produce in the domestic market (Zhu, 2004). Very little was known 
about their activities and technological performance, however. 
137 The specific questions that were asked during the survey at the firm level and the semi-
structured interviews can be found in the Appendix 1 and 4 respectively. 
138 See Section 3.2.3 for details on how the analytical framework to explore these issues has been 
developed. 
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With this limited information available it was clear that a thorough investigation 
about technological change in this industry in China (i.e. what sort of innovation is it 
and how it can be explained) was badly needed. It was also apparent, however, that the 
expectations the author of this thesis had about the firms' ability to enhance their 
technological capabilities and indeed to innovate were limited and possibly conditioned 
by the dominant view emerging from the literature139. This pointed in the direction of 
an abundance of solar module assemblers and PV product manufacturers (i.e. a strong 
presence in the low-tech. end of the value chain), whereas the high-tech content of the 
production, like Si cells or wafers, was largely imported from abroad. Local cheap and 
abundant labour was expected to be extensively used to reduce production costs and 
enhance competitiveness'4°. 
Some solar cell producers were also thought to be present in the country and 
joint ventures with firms in mature economies were expected to play an important part 
to ensure the cell's performance, quality and customisation, but also to guarantee the 
necessary know how and capital141, all factors that constrained the growth of the local 
industry until the late 1990s (Dai and Shi, 1999). 
Similarly, a strong government role was expected, both in creating market 
opportunities 142 and in controlling part of the industry through its own SOEs. Back in 
the 1960s, when national research in Si solar cells was initiated by the government'43, 
PV had been considered a strategic national industry, so some form of public 
involvement was expected. 
Innovation was expected to take place but was thought to be about re-creating, 
adapting to local needs (i.e. for rural electrification in sunny and remote locations in the 
western part of the country — see Section 5.3.1) and diffusing a technology developed 
in mature economies, rather than about undertaking substantial modifications or even 
moving the technology forward. 
139 See in particular what has been said about innovation in a developing country context 
(Sections 2.5.2 to 2.5.6) and about China's innovative potential (Section 2.2.3). 
140 This was a reasonable expectation given that the PV module assembly process, contrary to 
other production processes along the value chain, can be largely manual. 
141 As explained in detail in Chapter 4 and briefly recalled in this Chapter, as you move up the c-
Si value chain the technological know-how and capital requirements become more demanding. 
142 The Government's extensive rural electrification programme launched in 1998 and presented 
in Section 5.3.1 was expected to have been an important leverage for the local industry. 
143 See the following discussion in Section 6.3.2. 
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Although an emerging conducive environment for innovation144, together with 
the rapid rate of economic and social change underway in China and the recent market 
entrants in the domestic PV industry, seemed to suggest that there might have been 
more to the PV experience in China than cheap labour and small incremental 
technological adaptation, it was difficult to fully appreciate the rich picture that 
emerged instead from the analysis. 
6.2 Results about the nature of innovation in the Chinese 
PV firms 
This section starts with a brief profile of the 8 PV firms that responded to the 
questionnaire survey145. Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 focus on their capabilities in processes 
and products and on how they perform with respect to competitors. It should be noted 
at this point that the firm-level data presented in this section does not attempt to 
tabulate a full range of firm-level innovative activity. Rather, it gives a set of examples 
of the kinds and levels of innovative activity that the firms were engaged in. 
6.2.1 Basic profile of the firms in the sample, their technology choice and 
presence along the PV value chain 
Table 16 provides a snapshot of the 8 firms selected to respond to the 
questionnaire survey146. The firms' names are identified with letters, for confidentiality 
reasons 147 . The table includes information about the firms' age (i.e. date of 
establishment), size, ownership and market orientation. It also contains information 
about their choice of technology (i.e. with which PV technology family they engage) 
and their presence along the manufacturing value chain. As explained in the analytical 
144 I.e. capacity for advanced science and engineering education, increased national R&D 
expenditure, see Section 5.2.2. 
145 Although the findings discussed below and in the rest of the Chapter are the results of both the 
questionnaire with the firms and the semi-structured interviews with the other stakeholders (as explained 
in Chapter 3), only the profile of the firms will be presented here while a brief presentation of the 
respondents of the semi-structured interviews can be found in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.4). A detailed 
description of the methodology adopted to collect the data and of the fieldwork is also provided in 
Chapter 3. 
146 See Section 3.3.3 for details on how the sample has been selected and the questionnaire 
designed 
147 A list of the firms that have been interviewed is provided in the Appendix 2. 
198 
framework (see Section 3.2.2) an understanding of these two aspects is important for a 
broader appreciation of how advanced is what firms can do. 
The choice of PV technology 
As shown by the second column in Table 16, the sample included only firms 
involved in c-Si technology148. This confirmed what had already emerged during a 
preliminary search performed before undertaking the fieldwork in China (see Chapter 3 
section 3.3.3): that the vast majority of the PV firms present in China in 2005 were 
involved in c-Si manufacturing. 
Presence along the PV supply chain 
As Table 16 shows, the sample included firms involved in c-Si wafer, cell, 
module and product manufacturing (see the third and the fourth columns in Table 16). 
As previously mentioned, feedstock producers, although they were intended to be part 
of the firms' population to be surveyed (see Section 3.3.3 and in particular Figure 12), 
could not be interviewed. This was due to the impossibility of getting access to the only 
two semiconductor producers who, in 2005, supplied the domestic PV industry with Si 
feedstock (in the form of rejected or substandard product from electronics grade sc- 
si)149.  
Figure 34 visually presents with shaded areas the links in which the firms in the 
sample were positioned along the c-Si value chain. 
148 See discussion about the different PV technology families in Chapter 4 
149 As discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.3), at the beginning of 2005, 95% of the Silicon 
feedstock demanded by the domestic PV industry was imported from abroad. The domestic 
semiconductor industry provided the remaining 5% by supplying 50 tons (about 3MW) of electronic 
grade silicon per year (REDP, 2004) 
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Table 16 
firm 
Basic information about the firms in the sample (June 2005) 
PV technology 	Presence in the manufacturing Age farruly chain Size Ownership 
Market 
Main 
product line 
Other 
product lines 
Production capacity2' 
1' half 2005(MW) 
Production capacity 
2'" half 2005(MW) 
Personnel 
A Modules PV products 1995 4 70 12 (Private) D, E5 
B c-Si Modules Cells 2001 1 25 L (Private) D, E 
C c-Si Modules Wafers, cells 1998 16 100 >600 L (shareholding) D, E 
D c-Si Modules Wafers, cells 1979 4 50 400 L (stock firm) D, E 
E c-Si Wafers 1999 2 35 L (shareholding) D, E 
F c-Si Modules Cells 2001 25 180 > 1000 L (stock fain) D, E 
G c-Si Modules Cells 1998 10 30 200 L (shareholding) D, E 
H c-Si Modules 2001 15 25 240 WOFE4 D, E 
Note: c-Si = crystalline Silicon. 2 Production capacity refers to the main product line. Since 5 of the 8 firms 
of a production capacity's expansion plan, both the capacity in the first and in the second half of 2005 are indicated 
foreign enterprise. 5 D = domestic. E = export 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
that were interviewed in May-July 2005 were in the middle 
in the table. 3 L = locally-owned. 4 WOFE = wholly-owned 
PV process equipment 
(Screen printers, furnaces, 
module testers and laminators, etc.) 
A 
/ 
/ 
Solar grade silicon 	Ingots & Wafers 
	
Cells 	Modules 
PV systems 
BoS components 
(batteries, inverters, charge controllers) 
PV products 
(solar water pumps, solar 
garden/street lights, 
solar consumer products, etc) 
Material suppliers 
(EVA film, backing sheets, 
solar cell tabbing ribbon, glass, etc) 
Figure 34 The Chinese PV firms presence along the c-Si value chain 
Note: the shaded boxes indicate where the firms in the sample operate 
Source: Author's elaboration 
Although firms tended to have one main product line, usually module 
production, as shown in column three, which constituted the bulk of their sales, it was 
not uncommon for them to undertake manufacturing also in other business areas along 
the c-Si value chain (see column four, Table 16). It was for instance possible to find 
firms involved in module as well as cell production or producing modules and 
assembling them into PV consumer products (such as garden lights, watches, 
calculators, etc.). Usually firms that had more than one product line (for instance wafer 
or cell manufacturing, besides the main PV module line) tended not to sell these 
products but to use them to feed their own module production. 
By choosing firms that participated in more than one manufacturing link along 
the c-Si value chain, this study was able to gain a fairly wide spread of firm types and 
sectors. Table 17 groups the firms in the sample according to the manufacturing links 
along the PV supply chain they operated in and indicates: 
- The proportion they represented of all firms operating in China in the same 
manufacturing link in 2005 (when the fieldwork was undertaken). 
- How significant they were with respect to the total production capacity available 
in China in 2005 in each manufacturing link. 
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3 7 42.9 
5 7 71.4 
7 22 31.8 
Wafer 
Cell 
Module 
Table 17 Proportion of population surveyed relative to total firms operating in that specific 
productive process and their significance in terms of production capacity 
Productive Sample 
process 	surveyed 
Tot. no. of 
Chinese firms in 
productive 
process 
(2004/early 2005) 
% of 
population 
surveyed 
relative to tot. 
no. of firms in 
that productive 
process 
Tot. production 
capacity for 
productive 
process, MWp 
(2004/early 
2005) 
Significance of 
population 
surveyed in terms 
of production 
capacity (%) 
	
71.5 	 12.6 
199 94.0 
255 	 76.9 
Note: In mid 2005 there were 26 firms in China producing solar wafers, cells or modules. However, 
since companies might be present in more than one of the productive processes, the total number of 
companies in column 3 is higher than 26. 
Sources: Author's fieldwork for production capacity pertaining to the 8 firms in the sample. 
REDP, 2004, Wang, 2006 for data pertaining to the firms not in the sample. 
As illustrated by Table 17, when the firms selected to take part in the survey are 
grouped according to the productive processes they participated in, they represent a 
significant share of the total Chinese PV firm population, both in terms of total number 
of firms and production capacity. The only exceptions are the wafer producers in the 
sample, which constituted only 12.6% of the total capacity available in the country at 
the time of fieldwork. The location of the domestic wafer producers or the difficulties 
encountered in getting access to some of them prevented the author of this thesis from 
including a broader number of wafer producers in the selected sample. 
The location 
As illustrated by Figure 35 the firms in the sample were concentrated in two of 
the zones with the highest industrialisation rate in China: 1) the Tianjin-Beijing area, 
identified by the circle in the north-eastern part of the map; and 2) the Jiangsu-Zhejiang 
(Shanghai included) area, identified by the circle along the coast on the eastern side of 
the map. 
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Heilongjiang 
Jilin 
Liaoning 
Nei Mongol 
Nogx,a Shanxi Shandon 
Qinghai 
Xizang 
(Tibet) 
Figure 35 Location of the firms visited and interviewed during fieldwork in China in mid 2005 
Source: Author's fieldwork, May-July 2005 
The firms' ages 
The majority of the firms interviewed were established between the late 1990s 
and the early 2000s, while only one dated back to the late 1970s when PV 
manufacturing was first established in the country (see section 6.3.2 in this chapter). 
The Firms ' sizes 
The size of each firm (columns 6, 7 and 8, Table 16) was assessed with 
reference to: the number of people employed and the production capacity (MW/year) 
the firms had in the first half of 2005 as well as that they expected to have by the end of 
2005. When assessed in terms of the number of people employed, the sample was made 
of micro and small firms, with the largest firm employing around 1000 people and the 
smallest one just 2515°. 
150 According to the Centre for SME studies of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) 'small' 
enterprises operating in the industrial sector in China are those having between 200 and 2000 employees 
(http://www.smeiift.com/sme/SME_Overseas.asp. Viewed in April 2009). 
203 
The firms in the sample resulted small also when the production capacity they 
had in the 1st  half of 2005 was compared with the production capacity of the top 10 
world module and cell manufacturers in 2004 (see Table 13 in Chapter 4). 
However, when the plans for the expansion of the production capacity the firms 
had for the second half of 2005 were taken into account, then more than one PV firm in 
China was on the way to become a large world PV player151. 
Ownership 
As illustrated by column 9 in Table 16, seven firms in the sample were locally-
owned. Only one firm was a wholly-owned foreign enterprise (WOFE), but with an 
entirely Chinese management and labour force. Remarkably there were no joint 
ventures152. Of the domestic firms, three were shareholding enterprises absorbing both 
domestic state-owned and private capital; two were joint stock enterprises, while the 
remaining two were entirely privately owned153. 
Market orientation 
Although firms produced for both the domestic and the international market (see 
last column, Table 16), the large majority of their output was exported. This is further 
illustrated by Table 18, which details both the share of the production that was devoted 
by each firm to export and the final destination of the goods. On average, 80% of the 
firms' production was exported abroad and very little remained for the internal market, 
which was increasingly resorting to imports. Europe (mainly Germany), followed by 
the USA, were the most popular markets of destination for the Chinese PV modules. 
Much less popular seemed to be the Japanese market, despite its geographic proximity 
and the far-reaching programmes promoted in the early 2000s by the Japanese 
government to boost installed PV capacity in the country (Ikki, 2004). 
151 Indeed by 2007 two of the Chinese firms in the sample entered the top 10 PV world producers 
(Photon International, 2008). 
152 This applies not only to all firms in the sample but also to the vast majority of the PV firms 
that were producing in China in 2005 (see Chapter 5 for more details). 
153 Wholly foreign-owned enterprises are exclusively invested by foreign companies or individuals 
in China, in accordance with the laws of China. Joint-stock company refers to a company or corporation 
whose capital is divided into shares. Any legal entities or individuals may invest in the company in 
exchange for the proportional amount of shares. Entirely private firms are invested by a natural person 
and the company and all its properties are owned by the investor 
(http://www.chinadetail.com/Business/InvestmentChinaCompanyOwnership.php).  
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Table 18 The sample firm's main markets and their location 
Firm 	% of products exported 	Main destination markets 
A 	 80 	 Germany, USA, Ecuador 
B 33 Germany (only small amount), countries around China 
C 	 90 	 EU (mainly), USA, Africa 
D 80 USA, Africa, EU 
E 80 	 EU (Germany, France, Italy) 
F 	 80 EU (mainly) 
G 90 	 EU, USA, Japan, other countries in Asia 
80-90 EU (France, Italy, Germany, Spain), USA, Canada, Mexico 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
Who was interviewed within the firms 
The last information presented in this section pertains to the people who 
responded to the questionnaire within the firms. 
Table 19 List of people interviewed within the firms 
Firm 	Position held by the person(s) interviewed 
A 	 General manager and production manager 
B General manager 
C 	 Project manager of overseas business department 
D General manager 
E General manager 
F 	 Vice Chief engineer 
G CEO and Senior scientist of R&D centre 
H Senior buyer 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
As illustrated by Table 19, the majority of the interviewees were the general 
manager or the chief engineer of the firm. They were selected on the assumption that 
they could reasonably be expected to possess the best information about the firm's 
history and technology. As Table 19 shows, in two cases, where the general manager 
was not available, other senior figures were interviewed. 
6.2.2 Capabilities in process and product manufacturing 
In the analytical framework (Section 3.2.2) we discussed the importance of 
assessing how advanced the firm's processes and products are. We also explained that 
this can be empirically studied by: (a) distinguishing between different 
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complexity/maturity levels (i.e. basic, intermediate and advanced); and by (b) 
observing possible technological capability improvements over time. We suggested 
checking, for instance, for the firms' possible ability to diversify products over time or 
to increase product complexity. 
In what follows we present the results obtained in exploring these aspects in the 
selected Chinese PV firms. 
Capabilities for processes 
Basic capabilities: routine operations on turnkey production line and minimum 
maintenance on the production line  
The analysis of the results obtained from the questionnaire shows that all the 
firms interviewed were adopting commercial equipment, which usually came from 
more than one supplier, both abroad and, where possible, in China. In some cases, as 
discussed below, firms could even manufacture in house some of the equipment they 
needed. 
Only in the case of one firm was the whole turnkey production line bought from 
a unique foreign supplier, who helped with the installation and maintenance. 
All the firms were able to source from the most appropriate suppliers the 
equipment that was relevant for their production, i.e. they had the minimum technical 
capabilities and knowledge to choose what was more appropriate for their needs and 
did not need to rely solely on one supplier (maybe foreign) for the provision of turnkey 
equipment and for the assistance in the equipment's installation and maintenance. 
Table 20 provides some examples of the type of equipment acquired by some of the 
firms in the sample and their origin. 
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Table 20 Origin of some key equipment along the sample firms' production line 
Type of equipment 	 Country of origin Firm 
B 
	
Furnace 
Laminator 
C 
	
Furnaces 
E Furnace 
Wire saw 
Other equipment 
D 
	
Wafer Etch equipment 
G Main key equipment 
F 
	
Screen printers 
Coating and Passivation equipment 
Other equipment 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
Made in-house 
USA 
USA 
UK 
Switzerland 
China 
made in-house 
China 
Italy 
Germany 
China or made in-house 
All the firms in the sample were able to undertake on their own (i.e. without 
external help) routine operations on the production line and were fully capable of 
conducting the necessary maintenance (both ordinary and extraordinary) to guarantee 
basic quality standards. 
Intermediate capabilities: small modifications of production line installation and 
equipment and self-construction of small pieces of equipment 
As detailed in the analytical framework (Section 3.2.2), several questions were 
aimed at understanding whether the firms were able to undertake small modifications. 
These might include: changes in how the production line is installed, small changes to 
some of the equipment along the production line or the ability to construct small pieces 
of equipment by themselves. As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2), these 
capabilities can be used, with specific reference to PV, as proxies for adaptive or 
intermediate process capabilities based on search and experiment. 
Modifications of the way in which the production line was installed did not play 
an important role in the firms' technological activities. Although, to suit different 
domestic conditions, two firms modified the standard installation suggested by the 
foreign supplier, the majority of the firms followed the instructions provided for the 
installation. 
Far more important were changes in the single pieces of equipment. All the 
firms interviewed were in fact both able to undertake small modifications in the main 
production line's standard equipment and to construct small pieces of equipment to 
meet their specific production needs. These could include, for instance, adding to the 
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standard equipment a customised basket to catch the c-Si wafers as they were cut from 
the Si ingot, or manufacturing some spare parts or tools. These modifications were 
carried out either by the firms themselves or in close cooperation (and according to the 
firm's instructions) with the domestic suppliers or, in a few cases, with local 
universities with whom the firm had cooperative projects. 
These modifications were undertaken either to improve production processes or, 
more often, to reduce production costs. During the survey it emerged that firms 
preferred to construct by themselves some of the spare parts to be used in the 
production line, because this was a much cheaper option than buying the same 
equipment from a local or indeed a foreign supplier (savings could be up to 50% and in 
some cases, depending on the type of equipment, 70%). 
Advanced capabilities  
a) Major modifications to productive processes and/or manufacturing of entirely 
new equipment to be used in the production line 
Only five of the eight firms interviewed were able not only to make small 
modifications but also to substantially modify productive processes or to design 
entirely new equipment to be used for their own specific productive needs154. As for 
minor modifications, in some cases these changes were made entirely in-house by the 
firms, while in some others they asked their suppliers (where possible Chinese) to 
produce the required and customised equipment according to their own design and 
instructions. 
In what follows, several examples of the major modifications or novelties 
undertaken by the firms on the productive process or on the equipment are briefly 
illustrated. Their relevance to PV cost reduction or process improvement is also 
explained. 
1. Improve cutting processes to reduce the thickness of the wafers. One 
firm mentioned it aimed at achieving 1801.tm wafers (improving from the 
current 220µm) by improving its wafer slicing technology. As explained 
in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.1), producing thinner wafers allows significant 
savings in the Si used in the productive process but presents a 
154 As explained in Chapter 3, these modifications are different from doing small piece of 
equipment or spare parts: they require significant technological effort, search for solutions and 
willingness to improve/move forward. 
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considerable technological challenge because reduction in wafer 
thickness should occur without increasing wafers breakage. 
2. Producing larger wafers and designing a bigger and suitable furnace to 
accommodate them. As pointed out in Section 4.4.1, an increase in wafer 
or cell size allows to optimize the watts per kilogram of Si consumed. 
One firm was constructing its own customised furnace to accommodate 
the larger wafers it intended to produce. As in the case of the thickness 
of the wafers, also increasing the wafer's size is technologically 
challenging because there is a limit to how large a single cell can be 
built before current collection would start suffering, causing a drop in 
the cell's efficiencies (Kluftinger, Roller, & Gallagher 2005). Moreover 
temperature in the furnace is the primary factor that controls the strength 
of the Si wafer, and this must be taken into account when setting the 
furnace's temperature ramping conditions (http://www.memc.com/t-slip-
breakage-furnace-slip.asp). Smaller diameter wafers can be ramped 
slightly faster, but larger wafers must be ramped more slowly to avoid 
physical deformation of the wafer as well as wafer breakage. This 
requires technological competence and experience. 
3. Special surface treatment to produce a cell's front surface of minute 
pyramids. One of the firms that was interviewed had patented a cell with 
an inverted pyramid surface, which could guarantee superior light 
trapping performance. This is important to enhance cell's efficiency 
because: "the more sunlight that goes into a PV cell and the less that 
reflects back, the higher the cell's efficiency can be" 
(http://www.gatech.edu/newsroom/release.html?id=2708).  
It is important to recall (see Section 3.2.2) that all these modifications to 
production processes or production equipment should be understood as 
`major/advanced'. This is because they are the result of an autonomous technological 
effort to move forward in order to add value. These improvements can not be easily 
reproduced by some other firms (as in the case of small modifications to the production 
equipment, which are used by this study as evidence of intermediate capabilities), but 
they require advanced technical knowledge and problem solving skills that are firm-
specific. 
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b) Adopting alternative c-Si production technologies and novel manufacturing 
methods based on emerging technology families (i.e. non c-Si)  
Findings from the questionnaire suggest that one firm was considering entering 
Si feedstock production by purifying inexpensive, readily available metallurgical grade 
Silicon into solar grade Silicon (SGS) for the PV industry. This is a complex 
technological process that requires advanced technological capabilities. Moreover, 
ramping-up SGS production is a slow (between one to two years) and capital intensive 
activity (see Section 4.4.1.). This means that a firm willing to enter feedstock 
production should not only possess the necessary (advanced) technological capabilities 
but also be able to gather the necessary capital and plan investment and production 
capacity well in advance. 
No evidence collected during the survey seems to suggest instead that there 
were firms thinking to adopt alternative and advanced c-Si production technologies 
such as, for instance, growing ribbons of me-Si, which make an excellent use of Si and 
can offer a high potential for cost reduction (see Section 4.4.1). Although no firms 
among those interviewed adopted novel manufacturing methods based on emerging 
technology families like, for instance, organic PV, one firm was considering setting up 
in two years time a thin film R&D and manufacturing facility in China. 
Capabilities for products 
Basic capabilities: delivering standard PV products at a minimum quality 
requirement 
All the firms in the sample could manufacture standard 'off the shelf(see 
Section 3.2.2) c-Si products (i.e. wafers, cells and modules) with minimum quality 
requirements and to be used for off- and on-grid applications as well as for PV products 
such as garden lights, calculators, etc. This is evidence of the fact that they had 
assimilated basic product design and could satisfy the mainstream market demand. 
Intermediate capabilities: small product modifications and international level of 
quality standards and procedures 
All the eight firms interviewed stated they were able to make small 
modifications to their standard 'off the shelf' products. Modifications were usually 
undertaken to satisfy specific customers' requests or to improve the products' quality. 
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Examples of small modifications were numerous and varied across the firms, the type 
of product (i.e. wafer, cell or module) and the type of customer's request. Some 
examples included: 
— Low-weight or double-glass modules for roof-top applications or large-
area solar power plants. 
— Modules for very humid weather conditions or for very extreme 
temperatures. 
— Custom-sized solar modules. 
These modifications require understanding of the scientific/technical principles 
necessary to make the technical changes and imply some modification in the way in 
which the products are produced (i.e. modifications in process capabilities). 
Six of the firms in the sample obtained accreditations of product quality from 
international certification and regulatory bodies. Some of the certifications acquired 
included: IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) solar simulation 
requirements for PV module qualification testing; TUV (Technischer Uberwachungs-
Verein, in English: Technical Monitoring Association), to ascertain the safety and 
quality of the modules; CE (Conformite Europeene), to declare conformity with the 
legal and technical directives of the European Union. 
As detailed in Chapter 3, this study uses the acquisition of international 
certifications as evidence that firms have moved beyond the basic capabilities 
necessary to deliver products with minimum quality requirements and have acquired 
the necessary knowledge to improve product quality and keep up with the changing 
quality requirements of the global demand155. 
Advanced capabilities  
a) Greatly modified and/or new products  
Five firms stated they intended to produce greatly modified or new products 
between the second half of 2005 and 2006. These included: larger size wafers and solar 
155 Conversations had by the author with users of some the PV modules produced in China, seem 
to suggest that the effective quality of the modules (or indeed of other PV products made in China) might 
not be as high as the obtainment of international certification would instead lead to think. Since 
ascertaining the actual quality of the Chinese PV products is beyond the scope of this study, we use the 
obtainment of international certifications as evidence of the quality level achieved by the PV 
manufacturers in China. 
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cells; cells with higher efficiency and solar modules for non standard applications (e.g. 
for PV building integration) and markets (e.g. to be used in the automotive industry). 
All these undertakings require advanced technical skills and knowledge. 
Enhancing the efficiency of a c-Si cell requires, for instance, increasingly sophisticated 
processing techniques because the higher the efficiency the more difficult it gets to 
achieve further improvements. Similarly, cutting thinner c-Si wafers from the ingot 
presents mechanical problems that should be understood and overcome in order not to 
break the wafer while trying to reduce its thickness. Finding non-standard applications 
for modules previously produced for conventional on-grid or off-grid markets implies 
improving not so much the technology but the applicative aspects of it and hence 
deepening knowledge and understanding of new markets. 
Although these new products do require advanced product capabilities and the 
need to modify and manage more complex productive processes (i.e. they are evidence 
of the fact that a few firms in the sample had proceeded well above efficient imitation 
and skilful adaptations), they are not necessarily groundbreaking new products. 
A small section of the questionnaire (see Appendix 1 at the end of this thesis) 
was aimed at understanding whether some of the firms intended to explore the 
possibility of producing completely new products, particularly whether they intended to: 
1. Use new materials, like organics, HI-V semiconductors, carbon 
nanotubes, etc. 
2. Experiment with alternative module design (cells embedded in glass, 
concentrators, etc.). 
3. Produce solar modules with complementary functions (for instance, for 
electricity production and solar thermal water heating). 
Only one firm in the sample was thinking, and indeed very close to start 
producing, modules with an alternative design and with a material not used in its 
standard production: a module, based on a-Si, with a semitransparent finish, to be used 
in curtain walls or other vertical or sloped glazed surfaces. 
b) Having patents or licensing own technology to third parties  
Four firms, out of the eight in the sample, responded that they had patents or 
other protected intellectual property (i.e. trade marks, designs and copyrights) and in 
two cases they also licensed them. Two firms instead stated that, although they came up 
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with innovative product or process solutions they preferred not to apply for patents, 
fearing technological leakages, but to apply for a so called 'innovation award' granted 
by different Chinese governmental bodies at both the local and the national level. These 
certificates are domestically awarded to firms for significant quality or technological 
improvements and are used by the firms as an important selling point that enhances 
their reputation with domestic customers. 
The improvement of technological capabilities over time 
As explained in Chapter 3, in order to understand how advanced is what firms 
can do and to monitor possible advances in technological capability, this study observes 
the evolution of a number of indicators over time. These include: increase in product 
complexity, degree of product diversification, quality and technical improvements and 
expansion of production capacity. Two points in time were considered: when the firm 
started producing and when the survey was undertaken (May-July 2005). 
Increasing product complexity 
As explained in Chapter 3, increases in product complexity can be used as an 
indicator of firms' technological deepening over time (Romijn, 1999, Romijn, 2002). 
Five firms reported they had been able to increase the complexity of their 
products through time. Examples vary across firms and include: the ability to produce 
cells with a higher efficiency and larger or thinner wafers over time. 
As far as the efficiency of the cells is concerned, in 1999 the average efficiency 
of the cells produced in China was between 10 and 12% (Dai and Shi, 1999)156. At the 
time of the survey the average cells' efficiency was between 13% and 17% (depending 
on whether sc- or me-Si was used). 
In terms of Si wafer thickness, one of the firms interviewed declared that in the 
mid 1980s it used to produce 450i.tm thick wafers (this was also the national average at 
the time as confirmed by interviews had in China with different PV stakeholders). At 
the time of the survey, the same firm was producing 250µm-thick wafers and aiming 
for a mid term target of 180µm. 
156 Although during the interviews with the firms in the sample it was asked what was the 
efficiency of the cells they used to produce at the beginning of their activity, the interviewees could not 
remember the exact figure. They only stated that the efficiency was certainly much lower than the one 
they could achieve at the time of the interview. For this reason we adopt historic data obtained from 
secondary sources. 
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Degree of product diversification 
Another important indicator, as discussed in Chapter 3, is the ability to diversify 
products over time and move along the PV Si value chain from less to more 
knowledge-intensive manufacturing links. 
Table 21 shows the products manufactured by the firms in the sample at the 
time of the fieldwork (May-July 2005), together with those: (a) they manufactured 
when they started producing; and (b) they intended to invest in the future. 
Table 21 Past, present and future products' plans of the Chinese PV firms along the c-Si value 
chain 
Firm Past 
Main product line 
Present 
Main product line 	Other product lines 
Future 
Plans for new product 
lines 
BoS and PV products Modules PV products Wafers 
Modules Modules Cells Wafers, silver aluminium 
paste 
C Modules Modules Wafers & cells PV systems 
D Wafers Modules Wafers & cells Wafers 
E Wafers Wafers Cells 
F Cells & modules Modules Cells Solar grade Silicon 
G Cells, modules & BoS Modules Cells Cells 
H Modules Modules Modules 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
As shown by the table, at the beginning of their activity (see the second column 
of the table) four firms (A, B, C and H) were producing balance of system components 
(BoS) 157 , PV products or solar modules only, i.e. they were taking part in those 
manufacturing steps of the PV supply chain with a relatively low technological content 
(see Section 4.3). Through time all but one of these firms were able to diversify their 
activities and to enter new and more technologically demanding manufacturing links, 
like cell and wafer production (see columns 3 and 4), where the role of the technology 
and the ability to master it are more important. 
Two other firms (G and D) have been able either to abandon the more low-tech 
activities or to diversify their product range by entering new manufacturing steps along 
the PV supply chain. 
157 For an introduction to the BoS see Section 4.2.2. 
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As far as plans for future investment are concerned (see the last column in 
Table 21), five firms (A, B, D, F and G) intended either to consolidate their presence in 
the knowledge intensive links of the value chain or to move further upstream along the 
c-Si supply chain and to engage in even more high-tech processes, like the production 
of wafers or indeed solar grade Si, as mentioned previously. Only one firm (C), which 
was already present in wafer, cell and module production, intended to expand its 
activity to a more labour intensive sector, PV systems, with the intention of becoming 
the only fully vertically integrated PV firm in China. 
Improvements in quality and technical performance 
Six firms had international quality certifications at the time of the survey (see 
previous discussion) and had been able to improve the quality of their products over 
time. 
This pertained to both the products' technical performance (i.e. ability to sell 
products with a longer life time or with better electric contacts) and to the ability of 
obtaining an increasing number of international certifications. During the semi-
structured interviews with stakeholders involved with PV development and diffusion in 
the country, it emerged that only two of the firms in the sample were able to deliver 
products at an international quality standard only two years before the survey for this 
study was undertaken. 
Further evidence of quality improvements over time came from a report 
published by the Chinese Centre for Renewable Energy Development in 2000. The 
report lamented the low technology level of the industry, not only in terms of cells' 
efficiency but also poor performance: "After 3-5 years of usage, yellowing, bubbling, 
de-lamination of contacts, and an efficiency decrease appeared in some modules. Thus, 
their actual service life is shorter than that of foreign products" (Centre for Renewable 
Energy Development and NREL, 2000, p. 22). 
Expansion of production capacity 
As explained in Chapter 3, the possibility of expanding the production capacity 
is an important indicator that indirectly affects the technological capabilities of PV 
firms. This is so because firms with limited production capacity may find it difficult to 
cut down production costs, to source materials at reasonable prices and to compete (see 
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Chapter 4). This could, in turn, affect the enhancement of their technological 
capabilities. 
In terms of solar cell capacity, four cell producers (C, D, F and G), out of the 
five that were interviewed for this manufacturing link, had been able to increase their 
production capacity since the day on which they started producing. Figure 36 shows 
their progression over time and highlights what plans they had in 2005 for expansion 
capacity in the following year. 
Figure 36 Cell production capacity (MW) of the firms in the sample: start date - 2006 
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These cell manufacturers had been able to respond to the challenge of rapidly 
rising global solar electric demand (especially in Germany), by ramping up production 
capacity. In particular, two of them (firms C and F) managed to enter the group of the 
top ten world PV cell and module producers by 2007. 
Only one cell producer (firm B), of the five interviewed, had not been able to 
increase its quite limited production capacity and declared during the interview that this 
was a major constraint to its future competitiveness and ultimately to its ability to 
deepen its technological capabilities. 
In terms of production capacity for solar modules five firms — C, D, F, G and H 
- (out of the seven in the sample producing modules) increased their production 
capacity over time and intended to further expand it in the future. This is illustrated in 
Figure 37 below. 
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Figure 37 Module production capacity (MW) of the firms in the sample: start date — beyond 2006 
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6.2.3 Chinese firms versus competitors 
As detailed in the analytical framework (Section 3.2.2) the complexity of what 
the PV firms in the sample can do with respect to international competitors is assessed 
with respect to two different dimensions: 
a) The ability to manufacture products that are commercial state of the art 
b) The ability to take steps to push the technology frontier. 
The indicators used to explore each of the two dimensions, how they have been 
measured and how the level of the firms' capabilities with respect to the 'best practice 
model' (i.e. the top world c-Si module producer in 2005) has been assessed have been 
presented in Chapter 3 (see Table 3 and Table 4). Here we draw on an existing study by 
Rush et al. (2007), to develop spider maps that graphically represent the extent to 
which the seven c-Si module producers in the sample can deliver products that are 
commercial state of the art158 ( 
Figure 38). It should be recalled at this point (as already explained in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.2.2, point D) that only 7 out of the 8 firms in the sample are represented in 
the spider diagrams. Firm E, which is the only wafer producer in the sample, is exluded 
from the analysis because it was not possible to retrive some of the data relative to its 
production. 
158 For a definition of 'commercial state of the art' see Chapter 1, Section 1.4. 
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Three spider maps are generated where the level of capabilities of the different 
firms is represented against each of the four indicators we proposed to use in the 
analytical framework. The four indicators are: technical performance, meeting 
customer's demand with a wide range of products, qualitative performance and meeting 
demand for utility scale installation (i.e. meeting large demand). 
Despite considerable differences among the firms, 
Figure 38 illustrates that all the seven firms had in 2005 a good level of 
technical performance with 2 firms producing c-Si modules with the same efficiency as 
the world's top module producer that was taken as the 'best practice model'. Moreover, 
3 firms were able to produce modules with efficiencies that were 75% of the reference 
value159. Also in terms of qualitative performance, although differences across the firms 
remained, the firms in the sample were able to produce, or got quite close to producing, 
modules that were commercial state of the art. 
Where the Chinese PV module producers seemed instead to be far from the best 
practice model was in their ability to produce a wide range of products and to achieve a 
production capacity large enough to meet demand for utility scale installation (i.e. to 
have a large production capacity that could allow them to satisfy not only small 
residential applications). As will be discussed in the following chapter, limited 
production capacity was indeed a constraint on the ability of some of the PV firms in 
the sample to innovate. 
Figure 39 illustrates the possible steps taken by the seven c-Si module producers 
to push the technology frontier. As illustrated by the three spider maps in the figure, 
only one firm, firm F, scored high for all the six indicators we have suggested to use 
(see Section 3.2.2) and showed itself to have a strategic vision by wishing to enter in 
the near future high value-added links on the c-Si value chain (i.e. the production of c-
Si feedstock) and by investing in additional marketing and distribution channels where 
the demand was booming (in particular in Japan). 
159 See Section 3.2.2 for detail on how the levels of capabilities have been assessed with respect of 
the four indicators. 
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Figure 39 The ability of the PV firms in the sample of taking steps to push the technology 
frontier 
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Although the other six c-Si module producers might well have scored high in 
one or two of the indicators we developed (for instance, the commitment to continuous 
improvement as measured by in-house R&D or having proprietary assets), they were 
far from the best practice model especially for what pertained to strategic decisions. 
6.3 Results on the determinants of innovation in the Chinese 
PV firms 
This second part of the chapter reports the results on how technological 
capabilities were accumulated by firms and what influenced their ability to innovate. 
As explained in the analytical framework (Section 3.2.3), two different approaches 
were adopted to deepen understanding: 
1. That suggested by the TC literature, where the focus is on firm-level 
technological learning and what determines it from a static perspective. 
2. That proposed by the IS literature, where the attention is on the system of 
which firms are part and on how its structure and performance conduces to 
innovation development and diffusion in the firms. 
The findings presented below combine insights obtained from both the firm-
level questionnaire and the interviews with the other stakeholders of the Chinese PV 
sector (see Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4). 
6.3.1 Knowledge accumulation as a result of firm's learning and of the factors 
that affects it 
This section is devoted to the results obtained by applying the insights from the 
TC literature as suggested by the analytical framework and schematically represented 
in Figure 9. The section is divided in two main parts: the first presents how the PV 
firms in the sample learn and the second reports the results about what influences this 
learning. 
Learning 
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Firm In-house R&D 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
H 	✓  
Evidence from the interviews suggests that new technical knowledge was 
acquired and assimilated by the firms in the sample by different means. In what follows 
they are presented. 
In-house R&D  
All the firms reported that they undertake in-house R&D and stated that this 
means of learning played a crucial role in their technological enhancement. 
Table 22 In-house R&D: activities and personnel involved 
R&D expenditure 
( )`/0 of tot turnover) 
10-15% 
More than 50% 
10% 
10% 
5% 
3-5% 
less than 10% 
n.a. 
Personnel in R&D 
(as % of tot. labour force or as n. of people) 
10% (7 people) 
40% (10 people) 
n.a. 
6% (2 people but not full time) 
6-7 people 
15% (30 people) 
3% (30 people) 
6% (12 people) 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
Table 22 above presents the resources devoted by the firms to in-house R&D. 
On average seven firms out of eight devoted between 5 and 10% of their total annual 
turnover to R&D activities. There was only one notable exception: firm B spent more 
than 50% of its turnover in R&D. This expenditure was used to modify existing 
processes and products and to design part of the production equipment, such as the 
previously mentioned furnace to accommodate large size Si wafers. It should be noted 
that this was a 'special case' in the Chinese PV industrial context. Firm B, as illustrated 
by Table 16, had in fact a very limited production capacity (to the extent to which the 
firm found it difficult to compete with the other domestic PV cell and module 
producers). However the long standing entrepreneur's experience in a national research 
institute devoted to c-Si PV made R&D the focal activity of the firm16°. 
As shown by Table 22, on average, less than 15% of the firms' workforce was 
employed in R&D activities in 2005. 
160 The entrepreneur, who set up the firm in 2001, had worked for more than 20 years in one of 
the earliest established national research institutes that first undertook R&D on Si solar cells and then 
initiated production. 
222 
During the survey, firms were also asked what the reasons why they undertook 
in-house R&D were. 
Table 23 Reasons for undertaking in-house R&D 
Firm 	Purpose of R&D 
A 	n.a. 
B 	Modifying existing products/design to suit different markets or/and satisfy specific customer's 
requests. 
Modifying existing production processes. 
Designing and developing new production processes 
C 	Modifying existing processes 
Modifying existing production processes 
E 
	
Modifying existing products/process 
F 
	
Modifying existing products/process + designing new ones 
G 
	
Modifying existing products/process + designing new ones 
H 	Developing new market applications - 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
The results, reported in Table 23, highlight two issues. First, as one would 
expect, companies tended to undertake R&D to modify existing manufacturing 
processes and products to reduce costs and to suit different market needs. This finding 
seems to be in line with Lall's claim that companies in developing countries are more 
inclined in using efficiently the existing technology imported from abroad rather than 
developing new products or processes in-house (Lail and Teubal, 1998). A rather more 
surprising result for a developing country dealing with a high-tech industry was the 
involvement in R&D activities to actually design and develop new production 
processes or new market applications. 50% of the firms had in fact either developed a 
new production process, for instance to increase the efficiency of the solar cells or to 
work with larger size wafers (see discussion in the previous part of the chapter), or 
were significantly modifying their products to exploit new market niches (possible 
applications to the automotive sector were one example). 
Training 
The majority of the companies, regardless of their production capacity volumes 
and level of technological competence, took courses or were trained by the supplier on 
how to operate specific pieces of equipment to be used on the production line. 
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Table 24 summarises all the training courses that were taken by the employees 
of the firms in the sample. If training given by the supplier of the equipment was a 
common way of learning for almost all the firms in the sample, firms with a smaller 
production capacity attended courses given by international organisations or national 
and local institutions. 
Table 24 Training received by employees in the interviewed firms 
Firm 
International 	 Bilateral 
National 	Local 	organisations organisation 	Private co. 
government government (i.e. supplier) (e.g. UNDP, GEF, ADB) 	(e.g. GTZ) 
✓ V 	 V 	 x 	 / 
✓ x V x 
x 	 x 	 x 	 x 	 ,./ 
V ,/ x V 
n.a 	 x 	 x 	 x 	 V 
x x x x V 
✓ ,/ 	 x 	 x 	 V 
✓ x V x V 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
Several companies took part, for instance, in the NDRC/WB/GEF Renewable 
Energy Development Programme161 aimed at encouraging technology improvement 
activities in the Chinese PV firms via direct grants and staff training. Since the second 
main goal of the Renewable Energy Development Programme is to sustain, via ad hoc 
financing, PV market development in China and to complement the Government's rural 
electrification programmes, the firms participating in the programme have also a better 
chance of gaining market shares in the domestic markets (ter Horst and Cheng, 2005). 
Factors that affect learning162 
Technology access  
Technology, understood in this instance as the hardware, was accessed from 
both foreign and domestic suppliers. However, as discussed in the initial part of this 
161 NDRC/ GEF/ The World Bank China Renewable Energy Development Project (REDP) is an 
international cooperation project between the Chinese Government, the GEF and the World Bank. The 
programme was launched at the end of 2001 and it is expected to end in June 2008. 
162 The section presents the findings about those factors that are known from the technological 
capability literature to affect the learning process and that have been put forward by the analytical 
framework. The extent to which they are relevant for the learning process in the PV firms in China is 
instead described in Chapter 7. 
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chapter, several firms stated they preferred to develop parts of the equipment in-house 
(alone or with the help of domestic suppliers for the mechanic parts of the equipment) 
rather than buying it from foreign suppliers, because it was cheaper. 
When technology was bought from foreign suppliers, this was done to acquire 
the best piece of equipment available to meet production needs rather than to access 
know-how via the use of foreign equipment by 'unpacking' it. 
Endowment 
a) Educational& professional background of the entrepreneur 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the entrepreneur and the personnel employed by the 
firm can contribute to the firm's technological upgrade and innovation because they 
bring, through earlier education and experience, a certain stock of knowledge and skills 
into the firm (Romijn and Albaladejo, 2002). 
Table 25 presents a snapshot of the professional and educational background of 
the entrepreneurs or the other senior figures who were interviewed during the survey in 
the firms (see Table 19). As illustrated by the table, six of the entrepreneurs had 
previous working or research experience in the PV sector. In some cases their 
involvement in the industry dated back to the 1970s when they were working for the 
early established state-owned PV firms (see section 6.3.2 in this chapter for the historic 
evolution of the PV industry). When these early PV firms went bankrupt between the 
late 1990s and the early 2000s, some of them decided to set up their own firms. 
Three entrepreneurs gained experience abroad (see last column in Table 25), 
where they went first to acquire further education and then working experience in the 
PV sector. 
As for their educational background, five entrepreneurs had a high educational 
level and some of them obtained their PhDs abroad. 
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Table 25 Entrepreneurs' professional and educational background 
Firm 	Previous experience in PV Highest level of education Education or working 
industry or R&D 	 completed 	 experience abroad 
A 	✓ 	 n.a. 
B 
✓ 
PhD 
C 	NO 	 Master degree 
D ✓ n.a. 
E NO 	 Master degree 
F 
	✓ 
PhD ✓  
x 
✓  (USA) 
x 
x 
(Australia) 
G ✓ 	 PhD 	 n.a. 
H ✓ n.a. ✓  (Canada) 
Note: due to time constraints during the interviews it was not always possible to ask entrepreneurs about 
their professional and educational background 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
b) Educational and professional background of the workforce 
Table 26 presents a profile of the firms' workforce in terms of education and 
experience gained abroad. 
There seems not to be a clear pattern of labour force skills across the firms. 
While some firms had a high percentage of skilled workers or university employees 
(for instance, firm C had only 4% of unskilled workers in its workforce) others had a 
much higher percentage of unskilled workers (see for instance firm H). This unclear 
picture seems not to be explainable simply by the incidence of labour intensive 
activities within the firms. A case in point is firm E, which was uniquely devoted to 
one of the most high-tech activities along the PV value chain (i.e. c-Si wafer 
manufacturing) but still employed 60% of unskilled workers. 
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Table 26 	Educational and professional background of the workforce 
Proportion of 	Proportion of 
Firm 	Total No. of technicians (skilled 	engineers/university employers labour force) 	trained employees 
A 	70 	 36% 	 23% 
B 	25 20% 12% 
C 	644 	 55% 	 41% 
D 	35 23% 17% 
F. 	100 	 35% technicians and engineers 
F 	>1000 n.a. 	 45% 
G 	200 	 n.a. 40% 
H 	241 n.a. 	 9% 
Source: Author's fieldwork 
People with working 
experience in foreign 
firms or with education 
gained abroad 
V 
x 
Note: Technicians are here defined as that part of the labour force with a secondary school degree 
and skill training; university trained employees include both under-graduate and post graduate. 
Other sources internal to a firm 
Other sources internal to a firm that might affect learning are, as indicated by 
the technological capability literature and highlighted in the analytical framework: the 
firm's size, age and ownership. The results about these aspects have already been 
presented in the initial part of the chapter, where the profile of the firms has been 
provided. In Chapter 7 we will discuss the extent to which these factors have influenced 
the technological capability accumulation processes in the Chinese PV firms (i.e. are 
larger firms more able to enhance their capabilities? Is the age of the firm, and in 
particular the number of years that it has been producing for, important in determining 
innovative behaviour?). 
Linkages  
As suggested by the analytical framework, inputs supplied by various agents 
(like suppliers, customers, research institutes, etc.) can complement the firm's internal 
sources of capability discussed above. Results from the questionnaire, about the 
existence and types of interaction with external agents, show that intensive interactions 
occurred with suppliers (especially domestic), research institutes and to a lesser 
extent163 with international organisations that offered training and market development 
programmes (see the early mentioned case of the REPD programme promoted by 
163 As previously pointed out, these programmes offered seem to attract mainly firms with smaller 
production capacity 
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NDRC/WB/GEF). Links with customers played instead only a marginal role mainly 
because the bulk of the market for the Chinese firms was located abroad and because 
they relied on distributors to commercialise their products to the final consumers (see 
Table 18). 
Several of the firms interviewed stated that they commission from their 
domestic suppliers the manufacturing of production equipment or spare parts according 
to their own design. Feedbacks from these suppliers regarding any possible 
improvement to the initial blueprint provided an important source of learning for the 
PV producers. In turn, the subcontracting of parts and components provided important 
occasions for upgrading for the suppliers of PV production equipment. 
Links between firms and research institutes were common, particularly in those 
firms in the sample with a limited production capacity. Firms tended to undertake 
collaborative research either with research institutes that possessed the necessary know-
how and were located nearby, or with academic institutions where the entrepreneur or 
the chief engineer in charge of the R&D department undertook his university studies. 
Remarkably, firms with larger production capacity preferred not to have 
collaborative research projects with universities except in the case of basic research. 
Geographic proximity 
While the PV firms in the sample were concentrated in two main geographic 
areas (the Tianjin-Beijing area and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang area, as illustrated by 
Figure 35) the evidence we collected seem to suggest that there were no proximity 
advantages (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). Firms seemed to be located where they were 
mainly because those were the areas where the economic development was the highest 
and where firms could offer more attractive living conditions for their employers. 
Evidence we collected do not seem to suggest that firms' location was motivated by 
possible spillovers they could enjoy from being close to their suppliers, R&D partners 
or customers who, as explained, were mainly located abroad. 
What seemed to be more relevant, instead of geographic clusters, were 
`relational clusters': firms tended to liaise with those R&D institutions or suppliers with 
whom they have established trust. This was for instance the case of firm A that was 
located at the outskirts of Beijing and had collaborative R&D projects with the local 
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University of Technology as well as with Harbin University, where the senior figures 
of the firms were originally from and where they conducted their studies. 
6.3.2 Structure and performance of the innovation system over time and its 
effect on innovation in firms 
The following section presents the results about what affects innovation in firms 
that emerge from applying the systemic approach. 
Findings about the system's structure (i.e. main agents and their interactions), 
the system's performance according to the seven functions suggested by the 
literature164, the main drivers for innovation as well as the specific implications of the 
IS configuration and performance for firms' innovation, are presented in this section 
and organised over three main periods: 
a) Late 1950s — 1978: the emergence of the PV system during the central 
planning economy and the 'first generation' of PV firms. 
b) 1978 — late 1990s: the evolution of the PV system during the transition from 
central planning to market reform. 
c) Late 1990s - 2005: the rapid take off of the Chinese PV industry and the 
`second generation' of PV firms 
As will be explained below, and as emerged during the interviews with both the 
Chinese PV firms and the other stakeholders in China, each of these three periods 
contain critical aspects to understand how the PV IS has evolved over time and has 
affected the PV firms innovative behaviour. 
a) Late 1950s — 1978: the PV system's emergence during central planning and the 
first generation' of PV firms 
PV system structure: components and interactions  
The story of PV in China starts in 1958, when the government entrusted 
national research institutes (NRI) to conduct R&D for c-Si solar cells (Dai and Shi, 
1999, Zhao, 2004). In the early 1970s the first PV pilot space and terrestrial 
164 See Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2, for the theoretical underpinning and Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3, to 
see how the 'system's structure and performance' have been operationalised. 
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applications165 were launched. True manufacturing at a national (although limited) 
scale started only in the late 1970s, however, with the conversion of three state owned 
(SO) semiconductor plants in production lines for sc-Si cell production166 (Cui et al., 
1990). 
The PV system in this formative period was characterised by a limited number 
of functionally specialised actors167 (Liu and White, 2001). The NRI were exclusively 
in charge of undertaking R&D on c-Si, while the three converted Si cell producers were 
responsible for manufacturing/implementation only. The activities of both these actors 
were strictly controlled and guided by the central government and its bureaux (i.e. the 
different industrial ministries), which were also supplying the resources necessary to 
both firms and research institutes. 
Until the late 1970s there was not a real PV domestic market and the limited 
domestic production was mainly used for pilot and strategic space and terrestrial 
applications (Cui et al., 1990). Other important actors along the PV supply chain, like 
for instance production equipment manufactures or PV service firms (i.e. installers, 
sellers, maintenance, etc.), were not present in China during this first phase of the PV 
IS. 
Horizontal links or interactions between NRI and the state manufactures hardly 
existed. They were expected to deliver both their respective research and their 
productive outputs directly to the government bureaux which vertically administered 
them according to the central government's guidelines and priorities (Liu and Jiang, 
2001). 
Figure 40 provides a map of the PV innovation system under central planning 
and illustrates both the main actors and the (vertical) interactions among them168. 
165 For example, PV lamps for railway stations or PV powered beacon lights for 
telecommunications. 
166 It is worth remembering that the PV c-Si industry uses a process technology quite similar to 
that developed by the semiconductor industry. For more details see Chapter 4. 
167 See Section 5.2.1 for a national overview of the innovation system during the period of the 
planned economy. 
168 The Figure provides a snapshot of the system's structure towards the end of the planned 
economy period. 
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Figure 40 The Chinese PV innovation system under central planning: late 1950s — 1978 
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Source: Author's elaboration 
The existence of organisations with a rigidly defined function (where 
innovation/S&T activities done by the NRI were strictly separated from the 
manufacturing activities of the firms) makes it difficult to map the PV IS under central 
planning according to the broadly-defined categories of actors (i.e. innovators, demand, 
policy support and facilitators) suggested by the analytical framework in Section 3.2.3 
(see in particular Figure 10). In other words: neither firms nor NRI were truly 
`innovators' because the range of activities they undertook was much more restricted 
than is usually assumed. 
For this reason, instead of identifying firms and research institutes as 
`innovators', we have preferred to use categories that describe their functions at the 
time: manufacturing/implementation for SO firms and R&D for NRI. We have 
however depicted these two actors in the Figure above with a thick blue line to allow 
the reader to follow their evolution in the following innovation maps (Figure 41 and 
Figure 42) where they are represented in blue and where their nature and activities get 
closer to the meaning of innovators (i.e. to create and share knowledge) we assigned to 
them in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.2.3). 
PV system performance and innovation drivers 
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As pointed out, during this first phase, the performance of the PV system in 
China was very dependent upon the central government's decisions. 
The Chinese government directly controlled several of the system's functions 
suggested by the literature (Bergek et al., 2008) and operationalised by the analytical 
framework as important for innovation to occur169. The government was the only body 
(together with its governmental bureaux) responsible for mobilising the necessary 
resources 17° , both in terms of inputs to be given to the actors in the system (i.e. 
hardware equipment, financial resources for firms and research priorities for research 
institutes) and in terms of 'who should do what' (i.e. competences)171. The PV market 
was artificially created by the government, which decided on the types of PV 
applications and their quantities. In this respect the government was also strictly 
controlling the direction of search, which was pointing exclusively towards c-Si. 
Technological legitimacy derived directly from the government's strategic decisions 
and not from pressure or influence groups, as in the case of PV development in 
Germany (Jacobsson et al., 2004). No 'virtuous circles' could be created because there 
was no interdependence between the different system's components and functions. 
The actors in the PV system other than the government were little more than 
mere executers and were supposed to accomplish only the specific task assigned to 
them: undertaking either production or research. There was no room for the creation of 
positive externalities (because there were no horizontal links) or, as discussed below, 
for entrepreneurial experimentation. 
Two main innovation drivers can be distinguished in this period. At the 
beginning of the formation of the IS (late 1950s — early 1970s) the main reason to 
establish a national R&D on c-Si solar cells originated from the government's concern 
to ensure national security and self reliance. 
From the mid 1970s, the innovation driver was the need to respond to the oil 
price shock that created global concerns about increasing energy prices. One of the 
Chinese government's responses was to kick off solar cell manufacturing (very limited 
169 The seven functions are: knowledge development; influence in the direction of search; supply 
of resources; creation of positive externalities; facilitation of market formation; stimulus of 
entrepreneurial experimentation; legitimation of nascent technologies or industries. 
170 From here to the end of the Chapter where the evolution of the PV innovation system in China 
is presented, we identify the different functions that characterise the system's performance in Italics. 
171 Under the planned economy and through the early 1990s, all university graduates waited for 
work assignments in SO organizations. They did not have the opportunity to choose where to work, nor 
could they freely change jobs after they started (Liu and White, 2001). 
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in scale until the mid 1980s) by converting three pre-existing semiconductor plants into 
solar cell production lines. 
Implications of the IS configuration and performance for firms' innovation 
As anticipated, during this first formative phase of the PV innovation system in 
China, firms were very far from the innovator's role that is usually assigned to them (i.e. 
being responsible to develop and improve technology and to implement strategies to 
diffuse it on the market). Firms were only in charge of manufacturing and followed the 
instructions and targets given by the government's bureaux, on the basis of the science 
and technology inputs received from the NRI. Although a part of the NM was affiliated 
to industrial ministries (like the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry) and focussed on 
more applied c-Si research and developmental tasks (Dai and Shi, 1999, Liu and Jiang, 
2001, Liu and Lundin, 2006), they were very far from production sites and unaware of 
production needs, so their research did not have a truly applicative value and could not 
be fully used by firms. 
By deciding on technological choices, providing all the necessary resources and 
by guaranteeing a secure market for the firms' products the system was reducing all the 
risks that are usually encountered by innovators. However, state PV cell/module 
manufacturers could not build on this advantage because they had little autonomy to 
experiment or to respond to the market needs. 
Since horizontal links between the actors were not allowed172, firms had no 
opportunities to liaise with the NM, which were undertaking the activity that is usually 
more closely associated with innovation, i.e. R&D. As a consequence firms did not 
have views on what they needed in terms of R&D requirements. 
Similarly, no inputs could be expected from customers or suppliers. 
During the planned economy period, as a consequence of the system's specific 
structure and performance, firms were hence closer to technology users than creators. 
They were output-oriented and had no incentives to introduce, adopt or diffuse 
innovation pro-actively. The only possible innovation-related activity they could 
undertake was to accumulate knowledge on the shop floor, as a result of the by-product 
of using the hardware provided by the government. 
172 Horizontal links were only allowed among the different governmental bureaux. For more 
details see Liu and White (2001) 
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b) 1978 — late 1990s: the evolution of the PV system during the transition from central 
planning to market reform 
As discussed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.2), the economic reforms implemented 
in China after 1978 have gradually dismantled the centrally planned economy. The role 
of the government has changed profoundly and an increasing number of actors have 
entered the economic scene. Moreover, in this period actors become more autonomous 
and functionally diversified than during the planned economy and the organizational 
boundaries around their activities have changed dramatically. These developments have 
greatly modified not only the national IS but also the PV sector. 
PV system structure: components and interactions  
a. Policy support 
A drastic reduction in the direct state involvement in the country's S&T and 
industrial development173 characterised this transition period. This translated into a 
substantial reduction in government funding, and resources in general, to both NRI and 
SOEs. Despite this, the government retained a certain influence on the PV sector. The 
State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) and the State Economic and 
Trade Commission (SETC) provided both the industry and the domestic research 
institutes (i.e. the Chinese Academy of Sciences, universities and other R&D 
institutions) with broad policy guidelines on how to advance domestic PV technologies. 
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) 
and the National Electric Power Company were instead the operative arms of the 
government and responsible to support both the PV industry via loans and subsidies 
and the research institutes via direct funding (Dai and Shi, 1999) 174. 
b. Demand 
The domestic market (no Chinese PV products were exported in this period) 
was no longer dominated by pilot spatial and terrestrial applications of a strategic 
nature but also by commercial applications like off-grid household-PV systems175. 
c. Innovators 
173 See Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 
174 MOST, for instance, managed a National Key R&D Program that included R&D fund for PV 
technology, during the period 1996-2000 (Dai and Shi, 1999). 
175 The internal market registered a rapid growth in the early 1990s with stand-alone household 
PV systems reaching 30% of the market share. 
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Three more domestic firms were added in this period to the three pre-existing 
ones. Two were SO enterprises manufacturing both sc- and me-Si solar cells while the 
other was a joint venture (JV) with a USA firm for the production of a-Si cells. Despite 
the doubling of the number of firms participating in the PV industry, the production 
capacity in the country remained low: only 5 MW towards the second half of the 1990s 
but with a lower actual capacity due to serious bottlenecks in the production lines. 
Foreign firms began to enter the domestic PV market in this period, both by 
providing domestic firms (initially via MOST) with the necessary production 
equipment for solar cell and module production176 and by selling their final products in 
the domestic market. 
While up to the first half of the 1990s the majority of the PV products sold in 
China were made in China, by 1998 50% of the market share was in the hands of 
foreigners who provided cheaper and better quality products (Dai and Shi, 1999)177. As 
we discuss below, this foreign presence in the local market had profound implications 
on the domestic firms' performance. 
Also domestic service firms, in charge of the sales, maintenance and installation 
of the PV systems started to emerge in this period. Until 1992, there were less than 10 
service firms, all affiliated with government sponsored R&D institutes. They used 
Chinese government subsidies and foreign technical aid to install PV systems in the 
country's remote rural areas (Dai and Shi, 1999). By early 1998, the service firms 
totalled 50 and several of them were private. Private service firms were, however, at 
disadvantage compared with SOEs service firms, which enjoyed larger market share, 
technological and financial advantage. 
A total of 40 R&D institutions existed in this period and concentrated on 
improving the efficiency of the existing c-Si solar cells and in exploring new types of 
solar cells (mainly a-Si). 
d. 	Facilitators 
International organisations, like the World Bank and the GEF, began to enter 
the PV system in this period with the aim of supporting the Government in the 
provision of loans for the installation of household PV systems in poor rural areas (Dai 
176 From 1983 to 19887 China imported 7 PV cell production lines from abroad, mainly from the 
USA and Canada (Dai and Shi, 1999). 
177 This was particularly relevant for telecommunication and navigation applications where 
reliance and quality of performance are particularly important. 
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and Shi, 1999) and of initiating a process of capability building (for both PV 
manufactures and installers) that would have consolidated in the following period. 
As a consequence of the decentralization of decision-making over both resource 
allocation and operational decisions, horizontal links between the different actors 
became not only possible but also encouraged. Both firms and research institutes were 
now exposed to market competition and supposed to look for their own production and 
research inputs. 
Figure 41 The Chinese PV innovation system under the transition from central planning to 
market economy: 1978 — late 1990s 
Source: Author's elaboration 
Industry-science links became particularly important and stronger over time. 
NRIs and universities were allowed and encouraged to set up their own spin-offs so 
that they could commercialize their technology directly and obtain additional funds. 
One of the 6 cell producers that participated to the industry in this period was actually a 
national research institute that started to undertake entrepreneurial activities. 
236 
Resources could flow in this period, not only vertically from the government 
and its bureaux to the SO firms and the NRI, but also horizontally from foreign 
suppliers to domestic service firms and from these directly to the customers in off-grid 
rural markets. 
Figure 41 provides a map of the PV system's main actors and interactions in the 
transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy. 
PV system performance and innovation drivers 
Contrary to the first phase of PV development in China, this 2nd period was 
characterised by a greater number of actors with a higher degree of autonomy and who 
could serve a wider number of functions. 
Knowledge creation in the form of R&D (although under the broad priorities 
specified by the central government) was no longer a unique feature of the NRIs. Firms 
were given the mandate to invest in their own R&D activities and innovate based on 
their own strategic decisions (Liu and White, 2001). In this respect, firms got closer to 
the conventional role of innovator that is usually assigned to them. For this reason they 
are identified in Figure 41 with a blue circle. Further important sources of knowledge 
came from the import of foreign production equipment, which was used by the 
domestic firms to build their initial industrial knowledge. Moreover, feedback from the 
commercial domestic market and the comparison with the superior performance and 
quality of the foreign products (also sold on the domestic market) made firms more 
aware of their technical weaknesses and of the areas where knowledge accumulation 
was more urgent. 
The government played an initial role in facilitating market formation by 
subsidising off-grid households PV systems. This created new knowledge on how to 
install and maintain solar modules and guided several private firms in their search 
process to enter installation and maintenance services. 
Resources were no longer provided exclusively by the government and its 
bureaux but also by new actors, such as foreign PV producers or international 
organisations like the World Bank or the GEF. 
In terms of technological legitimacy two opposite tendencies can be observed. 
On one side, the fact that PV was no longer considered a strategic sector, together with 
the government's reduced involvement in resource allocation, had weakened the 
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institutional status of both PV firms and research institutes. Moreover, the multi-
institution management of the PV sector mentioned above created fragmentation in the 
policy direction and an improper use of limited resources. This further weakened PV 
legitimacy. 
On the other side, the opening of the domestic market to commercial PV 
applications started to create public awareness of the benefits of the technology for off-
grid household applications. This stimulated the entrance in the system of both foreign 
module producers and domestic service firms, which in turn strengthened the 
legitimacy of solar power. 
Although the broad conditions for the establishment of a more self-sustained 
innovation system were laid (i.e. a larger number of less functionally specialised actors, 
the possibility of establishing horizontal links and expanded market opportunities), only 
limited self-reinforcing dynamics were initiated in this period. Among them was the 
entrance into the system of service firms attracted by the off-grid household market, 
initially supported by government subsidies. 
Implications of the IS configuration and performance for firms' innovation 
Three main events that occurred in the system in this period had a profound 
influence on firms' innovation/knowledge accumulation: 
1) The withdrawal of the government from the PV sector, both in terms of 
resources provision and market creation. 
2) The entry in the system of foreign products and production equipment. 
3) The possibility for NRI to engage in commercial activities. 
If on one side, as a consequence of the drastic reduction in the direct state 
involvement in the PV sector, firms had a larger autonomy and the entrepreneurs could, 
at least in principle, experiment with technologies and applications as well as search for 
their own most suitable resources and liaise with other actors in the system (like NRI, 
service firms, customers, etc), they were poorly equipped to use these factors as 
opportunities to accumulate knowledge and upgrade. The role assigned to them in the 
previous period, where they were detached from R&D activities and their performance 
was based on the government's output quota rather than economic measures (i.e. 
product's performance, quality, price, etc.), did not allow them to successfully 
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assimilate the technology they imported and to develop managerial and commercial 
strategies necessary to sell their (poor quality) products in a non protected market. 
Firms were caught in a vicious circle of import, lag behind, import again, then lag 
behind again. 
The negative effects of this path dependency on the firms' innovative behaviour 
became even more visible with the entry in the innovation system of foreign producers 
who could sell on the domestic market cheaper and better quality products (Dai and Shi, 
1999). Left without government support and with limited resources 178 (all of which 
resulted in reduced absorptive capacity), the firms could not stand up to foreign 
competition and went out of business. Of the six firms that made up PV industrial 
capacity until the late 1990s, only one was able to remain afloat without considerable 
restructuring and to participate to the rapid take off of the Chinese PV industry that 
begun in the early 2000sI79. However, as we will argue in presenting the next phase of 
the PV IS, although firms did not survive to foreign competition, some of the 
individuals who took part in the manufacturing activities during this period were able to 
`recycle' their knowledge by entering different (in some cases less knowledge intensive) 
links of the c-Si value chain. 
The possibility for NRI to engage in commercial activities and to set up their 
own spin-offs meant that new traditionally non-manufacturing but knowledgeable 
actors could now undertake production. Moreover, their engagement in manufacturing 
activities was the first step upon which industry-research institute links could be 
initiated and strengthen in the following period. 
To sum up, the system in this second period created the necessary pre-
conditions for technological change in firms to occur (i.e. the participation in 
production of more knowledgeable actors, the possibility for the entrepreneurs to 
experiment, to take autonomous innovation decisions and to liaise with other actors in 
the system). However, firms could not use this as an opportunity to add value because 
they had a low absorptive capacity (which originated from the role the government had 
previously assigned to them) and because the right 'spark' was missing. This would be 
178 Dai and Shi (1999) note that shortage of money needed to import full production lines resulted 
in serious bottlenecks of production. 
179 A second firm, of the six early-established, is still producing but it has undergone massive 
managerial and productive restructuring. 
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provided in the subsequent period by a fast surge in global PV demand, which acted as 
the main driver to market entrance, specialisation, labour division, quality and 
performance improvements. 
c) Late 1990s - 2005: the rapid take off of the Chinese PV industry and the 'second 
generation' of PV firms 
Two main features characterise this third phase of the PV innovation system in 
China: the rapid growth in global demand for grid-connected PV and the entrance of 
new powerful Chinese manufacturers in the domestic market, where the former acts as 
a main innovation driver for the latter. 
PV system structure: components and interactions 
a. Policy support 
On the institutional front, the National Development Reform Commission -
NDRC (the former State Development and Planning Commission) remains, as in the 
previous period, in charge of policy promotion18° and supports PV demand (and indeed 
other RET like wind and small hydro) by setting up rural electrification programs and 
by subsidizing the capital cost of the equipment in remote areas in Western China (Ma, 
2004). 
Provincial institutions, which share with NDRC the cost of capital grants for 
rural installations (Ma, 2004), also influence the sector. Regional initiatives such as the 
100.000 roof programme proposed by the Shanghai municipality can offer further local 
demand support (Liu, 2005). 
On the supply side, the grants given by the State Council and NDRC in support 
of technology-based SMEs (see Chapter 5) also affect the firms participating in the PV 
industry' 8' 
b. Innovators 
As previously explained and as it emerged from the initial part of the empirical 
analysis (see Section 6.2.1), the innovation system for PV in China is mainly focused 
around conventional c-Si technologies (both sc-Si and me-Si). At the time of the 
fieldwork there were 30 research institutes and universities working in the 
development of the materials used in PV cells and in the accompanying manufacturing 
18° NDRC designs and implements national comprehensive development strategies in the form of 
5-year development plans, which have a great influence in China's innovation policy. 
181 Two of the firms that have been interviewed benefited from these governmental grants. 
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process (Zhao, 2001). Although the main focus was on wafer-based solar cells (i.e. c-Si 
technology), several institutes and universities were also active in research for thin-film 
solar cells (Zhao, 2001, Yang et al., 2003). At the time of fieldwork, to the best of the 
author's knowledge, there was no R&D underway in high-efficiency solar cells under 
concentration and organic PV (i.e. the least mature of the PV technology families and 
the one that is still in the R&D phase - see Figure 19 in Chapter 3). 
Domestic production is now present along the whole c-Si supply chain (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.3). Although module and cell producers are more numerous, 
manufactures are also starting to emerge in the upstream knowledge-intensive links of 
the c-Si value chain (i.e. feedstock and wafer production). Domestic manufacturers of 
PV process equipment are also gradually emerging, although key components of the 
production lines are sourced from mature economies, mainly Europe or the USA (see 
details at the beginning of this chapter). 
A number of domestic firms have emerged since the late 1990s and are 
responsible for PV system design and integration, component manufacturing, sales and 
after-sales service. Some of them have also been involved in key government programs 
for rural electrification'82 (Ma, 2004). 
c. Demand 
As detailed in Section 5.3.1, the domestic market is mainly represented by off-
grid applications supported by the government's rural electrification programmes. On-
grid applications have instead only a marginal-demonstrative role183. 
The bulk of the demand is represented by the export market where about 80% of 
the domestic production is sold. This implies that the Chinese manufactures are 
crucially dependent on the policies promoted by foreign countries (mainly in Europe 
and the USA) and benefit from the high subsidies paid, for instance, by the German 
consumers. Therefore, both the export markets and their governments are considered by 
this study as important actors of the Chinese innovation system for PV and are shown 
in Figure 42. 
d. Facilitators 
There are also a number of domestic and international facilitating institutions 
whose role is to finance projects (i.e. to provide resources), to provide specialised 
182 See Table 24 for more details. 
183 This was so until April 2009 when the Chinese government announced its intention to support 
the on-grid domestic market (see previous footnote). 
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training to PV component manufacturers184 or to act as consultants/technical experts for 
project installations (i.e. to provide knowledge). These include, among others, Beijing 
Jike Energy New Tech. Development Co., the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), 
the World Bank (WB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and IT 
Power (UK). 
Several local energy institutes together with international (like the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fiir Technische Zusammenarbeit - GTZ) and local agencies are active in 
developing and implementing additional training programs for local engineers and 
technicians. 
Figure 42 presents an overview of the Chinese PV innovation system and of the 
systemic influences between the different actors as they appeared when fieldwork was 
undertaken. 
Ems Innovators 
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	I 	Decision making/Policy 
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184 As detailed in Table 24, several of the firms in the sample participated in the training 
programmes provided by these national and international facilitating institutions. 
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PV system performance and innovation drivers 
In this third phase of PV development in China the system has begun to evolve 
into a more self sustained one and a number of actors external to the Chinese 
innovation system play an increasingly important role. 
Knowledge is created and diffused within a number of institutions and thanks to 
the interactions between them. Universities and research institutes play an important 
role in undertaking basic research in cell's materials but also in maintaining a strict link 
with some of the PV firms with whom they share knowledge. Several of the 
entrepreneurs who were interviewed during fieldwork gained their education, or the 
first experience as young researchers, in local universities. These entrepreneurs still 
refer to their early established links to undertake basic research or to set up 
collaborative projects to address specific production problems185. 
In response to the growing domestic and international demand, a range of new 
actors, both upstream and downstream in the domestic PV supply chain, begin to 
enlarge the technological system, forming a more elaborate web of networks. Different 
types of markets emerge to satisfy the domestic producers' needs and to provide the 
necessary services to the final customers. A large number of production equipment 
firms, together with BoS producers and system installers also start to emerge. Similarly 
the number of firms involved in c-Si ingot and wafer production increases gradually. 
These new actors are strengthening the system by supplying resources and creating 
knowledge. 
Industry networks tend to be strong especially between solar wafers and cell 
producers and their suppliers of Silicon (mainly international) on the one hand and their 
domestic suppliers of PV process equipment on the other. These relationships have 
proved to have a strategic importance in securing Silicon in the presence of a severe 
Silicon feedstock shortage (which occurred between 2004 and 2006 and is not yet 
completely over) and in obtaining customised PV process equipment at prices cheaper 
than those offered by foreign companies for standard PV process equipment. 
In terms of market creation, although the Chinese government plays a part in 
supporting the domestic demand via its rural electrification programmes, the short 
duration of each programme (see Section 5.3.1) and the limited financial rewards 
185 This strict link between at least some of the entrepreneurs who have been interviewed and the 
universities where they gained their education and/or working experience is an example of what has been 
previously defined as 'relational clusters' (Section 6.3.1). 
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offered to the participating firms, do not provide a strong enough incentive for the 
domestic PV producers to invest in the domestic market. This is why the policies 
promoted by several governments in Europe and in the USA to increase the installed 
capacity from PV in their countries constitute a much more attractive alternative for the 
Chinese PV producers who, by exporting towards these countries, benefit from the EU 
and American incentive schemes. 
6.4 Conclusions 
In a nutshell, the results obtained by the study show a local industry that has 
entered the international market with its c-Si module production and is accumulating 
competencies all along the c-Si value chain, i.e. in both the low and high tech segments. 
Although knowledge has been accumulated in the PV technology family that is closest 
to commercial and technological maturity (i.e. c-Si), the Chinese firms can be 
competitive beyond cheap labour and have learnt to be more efficient and to reduce 
production costs through technological capability improvements and the acquisition of 
other non technological assets (like strategic view, enhanced business culture, better 
management). Differences between the firms in terms of how advanced their 
technological capabilities are, how competitive they are or how far they are from the 
technology frontier remain considerable and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
Overall, however, the domestic industry has been able to rapidly add value by 
improving the quality and the performance of its products and processes as well as by 
developing unique firm specific competencies. This has happened thanks to a learning 
process that has put emphasis on in-house R&D for quality improvements and for the 
development of enhanced or new production processes and products. It has also 
happened thanks to early investments in the sector and to a domestic innovation system 
that has grown over time creating the conditions for a rapid take off of the PV industry 
in the early 2000s. International surges in solar PV demand, together with promotional 
schemes to support PV installed capacity in several mature economies (like Germany 
or the USA), have provided the Chinese firms with the right opportunities and 
motivation to add technological and qualitative value. 
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7 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Picture 9 On how empirical findings on the type of clay and the firing temperature led to the 
discovery of porcelain and to a revolution in pottery (and to a more enjoyable cup of tea!) 
Source: Pictures taken by the author at the Shanghai Museum during fieldwork in China, May-
July 2005 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we examine critically the results we presented in the previous 
Chapter and discuss them in the light of the TC and IS literatures that underpin this 
study I" 
The chapter starts (section 7.2) with a brief summary of what we know and what 
is less understood about firm-level innovation in developing economies and RET 
emergence and development from an innovation system point of view. The summary, 
which draws on the literature that was critically and in more detail reviewed in Chapter 
2, is useful to recall key ideas that have been debated in the early pages of this thesis 
and that will be re-discussed in this chapter in the light of the results presented in 
Chapter 6. 
Sections 7.3 and 7.4 respectively pull out the main theoretical insights the study 
has obtained about the nature and the determinants of innovation in the Chinese PV 
firms and relate them to the existing TC and IS theories. 
I86 Chapter 2 offers a detailed review of the literature 
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7.2 What we know and what is less understood about firm-
level innovation in developing countries and RET 
systemic development: a summary 
There has been considerable progress in recent years in what we know about the 
processes that lie behind both technology change in firms in developing economies and 
RET emergence and development. 
While we know that technical change and innovation do take place in 
developing countries and outside large, globally famous, high-tech corporations, they 
should be understood in a rather different way, which encompasses not only the 'new to 
the world type of innovation' but also, and in particular, the continuous and incremental 
effort devoted by firms to adopt, assimilate and to improve known technologies. 
We also know that technological change is both a firm and a systemic matter, i.e. 
is the result of both the individual effort of the firm and the broader innovation system 
in which the firm is embedded. 
If firms want to move up the value chain they need to accumulate knowledge 
(i.e. 'technological capabilities'), which results from purposive learning. Learning does 
not encompass only the formal in-house R&D that is usually associated with innovation 
in firms in mature economies but also other informal activities (like, for instance and 
among others, incremental learning by doing, reverse engineering or training) that are 
nonetheless important for firms, in particular in developing countries. 
Learning in firms can be enhanced by a number of factors. A skilled labour 
force and an entrepreneur with a previous relevant working experience and educational 
background could for instance be crucial to unleash learning. Similarly, links (also 
favoured by geographical proximity) between the firm and its network of suppliers and 
customers could boost learning and allow for technological change to take place. 
In their knowledge accumulation process, firms in developing countries have 
tended to proceed from technology acquisition via technology transfer from mature 
economies, to adaptation and eventually to substantial improvements and possibly own 
generation (i.e. innovation). This progression from an initial low skill base and from 
simple to more complex, technology intensive tasks, requires not only getting better at 
how a firm produces (process innovation) and in what it produces (product innovation), 
but also at developing those capabilities that are unique to the firm and difficult to 
replicate (i.e. going proprietary). In the development of a technology base that is 
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proprietary to the firms, product innovation via the development of independent design 
capacity plays a particular important role. Design provides in fact to firms in 
developing countries "the potential to innovate in products without pushing out the 
technology frontier" (Forbes and Wield, 2006, p. 21). 
As said above, we also know that firms do not innovate in isolation but as part 
of a broader 'innovation system' in which they are embedded. When the emergence 
and diffusion of a specific technology, like PV, is studied from an innovation system 
perspective, we know from the literature that it is important to identify who is part of 
the system and how this performs with respect to a number of processes (i.e. 
`functions') that are known to be important for technological innovation to occur. 
Drawing on the experience of RET development in a number of mature economies, like 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, we also know that the process through 
which RETs emerge and diffuse on the market could be facilitated or indeed obstructed 
by a number of factors (Jacobsson et al., 2004, Foxon et al., 2005). These might include, 
among others, poor market articulation, lack of legitimacy of the new RET in the eye of 
the different actors, or failures in guiding actors towards different competing 
technologies and market applications. 
The identification of these inducing and blocking factors for each technological 
IS that we seek to study is essential to improve the functioning of the system and to 
ultimately foster innovation for RET. 
Despite all this knowledge about technological change and all the specific 
insights we possess about firm-level dynamics in developing countries and RET 
emergence and diffusion, there are still open issues that need to be understood. What 
remains unclear is the extent to which the firms' incremental innovation processes 
observed by the TC literature in engineering-based industrial sectors in developing 
countries also holds true for emerging RET like PV. These technologies are in fact 
characterised by a greater systemic embeddedness and knowledge intensity which 
could present lower opportunities for incremental innovation from a low skill base and 
indeed might constitute higher barriers of entry for firms in developing countries. 
Moreover a static understanding of the firm-level factors (i.e. entrepreneurial 
background/education, firm's size, age and links with suppliers or customers) that 
favour learning might not be sufficient to appreciate more complex and systemically 
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embedded dynamics. While each of the elements that, from a TC perspective, could be 
conducive to learning is potentially important, the relations between them and the 
broader institutional and organisational set-up within which firms are embedded are 
particularly important. 
On the side of an innovation system approach, the strength of the concept lies in 
its holistic perspective encompassing the analysis of actors, networks and institutions 
that influence the innovation processes. What we know less about are the micro-level 
system dynamics and particularly the extent to which the broad system and its 
components affect a firm's innovative behaviour. 
When we apply this innovation system perspective to study RET in a 
developing country context we know even less. We do not know if the dynamics that 
have been observed for certain RET in mature economies (like for instance PV in 
Germany. See Jacobsson et al., 2004)187 hold true also for emerging economies. In 
these countries where fragmentation, instability, etc. are usually referred by the 
literature to be common features, a system, or key elements of it, may not even exist or 
processes (i.e. the functions) that could be expected to be relevant for innovation to 
occur in mature economies may simply not hold true for developing countries. 
It is upon this knowledge, which we derived from both the TC and the IS 
literatures, and its limits that this study departed by exploring the nature and the 
determinants of the innovation effort underway in the PV firms in China 
7.3 Key issues on the nature and path of technological 
change in the Chinese PV firms 
This section draws out, from the results obtained by the study, three key insights 
that characterise the nature of the technological effort underway in the Chinese PV 
firms: the development of capabilities that go well beyond a minimum knowledge base; 
a knowledge accumulation path that has not followed stages conventionally observed in 
firms in developing countries and the need to understand technological capabilities in 
the PV firms in China as a sub-set of a larger bundle of competences. 
187 See also the detailed discussion in Section 2.4.7. 
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7.3.1 Beyond a minimum knowledge base: intermediate, advanced and 
proprietary capabilities 
A first important theoretical insight that derives from the results presented in 
Chapter 6 is that the PV firms in China have accumulated not only the minimum 
knowledge base (i.e. the basic TC that have been defined in Chapter 3) essential to use 
the technology, to reproduce it efficiently with minimum changes and adaptations (to 
suit for instance specific local requirements) but also those skills necessary to change 
the technology, i.e. to undertake significant modifications to processes and/or products 
or even to develop distinctive technological or strategic solutions that permit the firms 
to stay ahead of competitors. Although, as discussed below, the firms in the sample 
differ in their ability to 'change the technology' and indeed to be competitive, they 
have all been able to improve over time the depth and the breath of their technological 
effort. 
In terms of the depth of their technological effort, all the firms have been able to 
improve their productive processes and to deliver products with a better performance 
and quality over time188. Moreover all the firms sell their products with their own brand 
and organise their own distribution both domestically and abroad, capturing all the 
value added associated with production, branding and distribution. 
In terms of the breadth of the technological effort, all the firms189 have moved 
(or indeed intend to move in the near future) from less to more knowledge intensive 
links of the c-Si value chain. This move has implied not only a greater technological 
effort to learn more complex productive processes, but also the ability to articulate a 
strategic vision of where the firm intended to go in the future and where it expected 
global demand to go. Moving upstream and being able to master more than one 
productive process responded to the need to reduce costs19° but also to build up specific 
competences that fewer firms in China possess. In other words, firms responded to the 
need to compete not only on the basis of the cheapest possible product but on the basis 
of technological assets that are more difficult to gain and to reproduce and that can 
guarantee higher profits. While for some of the firms 'going proprietary' has meant 
In We recall here that these improvements result from a purposive technological effort that 
requires firms to develop ad hoc technological solutions to technological problems encountered (see 
Section 3.2.2). 
189 This applies to all the firms in the sample apart from two that are respectively and uniquely 
devoted to module and c-Si wafer production. 
1" Recall the importance of moving towards vertical integration and scaling up in this technology. 
See chapter 4 
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patenting their process or product innovations, for others it has implied reaching a high 
and difficult to match degree of vertical integration or manufacturing speciality solar 
devices for niche applications, like for example the automotive sector. 
Although, as explained below, remarkable differences remain between firms, 
these technological improvements are giving firms a competitive edge that goes well 
beyond an efficient running of routine operations and are taking them closer to the 
international competitors in terms of quality and performance191  
Despite the progresses made by the Chinese PV firms in the depth and the 
breath of their technological effort, however, this is taking place only in the most 
technologically and commercially mature PV technology family: c-Si. Although, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, there might be scope for firms to continue to operate in this 
mature technology for several years to come, important technological breakthroughs 
could come at any time. In this respect the PV firms in China show a shallow 
technological effort with a limited forward vision, which may cast doubt on their ability 
to continue to add value and to compete in the mid term. 
Noteworthy differences exist in the firms' ability to 'change the technology' and 
to add value by moving closer to international competitors192 . We take three of the 
firms interviewed as examples of the differences in their technological effort. Figure 43 
illustrates the differences in the capabilities accumulated by these three firms. Besides 
the division in basic, intermediate and advanced capabilities adopted in the previous 
part of the chapter to describe how advanced is what the Chinese PV firms can do in 
processes and products (see how the analytical framework has been developed in 
Section 3.2.2), we have added here two extra degrees of complexity: proprietary and 
strategic capabilities. Proprietary capabilities account for any possible proprietary steps 
taken by the firms from patents and beyond (for instance the move of one of the firms 
in the sample towards vertical integration is included in this category). Strategic 
capabilities encompass instead those possible strategic decisions a firm might take to 
move the technology frontier forward and that we have used to assess firms' 
capabilities with respect to international competitors (see the final part of Section 3.2.2). 
191 As illustrated in Chapter 6, all the firms interviewed possess international quality certifications 
(which was not the case in the late 1990s) and deliver cells or modules with efficiency and life time quite 
close to that of international players. 
192 Possible reasons behind these differences are discussed both in Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, as 
well as in Section 7.4. 
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Firm F 
Firm G 
Firm F 
Firm D 
Firm G ; 
Firm D ; 
We believe the addition of two more complexity levels better reflect the level of 
maturity of the TC that the Chinese PV firms have accumulated in both absolute (with 
respect to the firms' themselves) and relative terms (with respect to competitors). 
Firm D started to produce c-Si wafers and cells (and to assemble them in 
modules) in the late 1970s. It has managed to significantly improve its process and 
products by enhancing, for instance, its wafer slicing techniques and delivering thinner 
wafers over time (and indeed it aims to achieve even thinner wafers). Moreover, it has 
remained afloat without radical management changes even with the entrance of foreign 
PV products and producers into the domestic market in the mid 1990s (see Chapter 6) 
and with the rise of powerful new domestic competitors in the late 1990s-early 2000s. 
Nevertheless, the firm has not developed proprietary capabilities that are distinctive to 
the firm. Although the firm exports its production, its strength is in the domestic market 
where its market share depends on the reputation it has gained after such a prolonged 
presence there. In its ability to 'change the technology', firm D positions itself in 
between what we have defined as intermediate and advanced technological capabilities, 
but it does not possess distinctive or proprietary capabilities other than reputation. 
Figure 43 Capabilities differences across the firms 
Capabilites level A 
 
Strategic 
Proprietary 
Advanced 
Intermediate 
Basic 
PV system installation 	Modules 	Cells 	Ingots/Wafers 	Si feedstook 
or BoS components 
Low tech. activities 	 High tech. activities 
Source: Author's elaboration 
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Firm G is a spin-off from a Shanghai science and technology university. The 
firm, which produces c-Si cells and modules, has greatly improved its processes and 
products over time and has entered proprietary innovation by patenting its products. 
Despite being strongly export oriented, however, it remains far from international 
competitors (and indeed leading domestic PV firms) in terms of strategic vision and the 
capability of scaling up production (see 
Figure 38 and Figure 39). As discussed in Chapter 4, this latter aspect could 
hinder not only a firm's capability to compete but indeed to devote necessary resources 
to further innovation. 
Firm F, which produces both PV cells and modules, started producing in 2001 
and was 'born global', showing a very rapid international growth, selling proprietary 
products under its own international brand. The firm possesses its own globally-leading 
manufacturing process operations, which allow it to be ahead of national competitors 
and to compete with international players on an equal basis. Moreover, the firm 
possesses a strategic vision (see Figure 39) and is involved in taking the c-Si 
technology frontier ahead by designing and developing new ranges of products and by 
producing record efficiency commercial c-Si solar cells (and aiming at further 
increasing these efficiencies). 
These examples highlight how international competitiveness and the 
commitment to continuous value added depends not only on advanced technological 
capabilities (possessed for instance also by firm G) but also on other strategic assets 
such as vision, management and marketing. These aspects are all discussed in Section 
7.3.3. 
These insights support the already strong body of evidence emerging from the 
TC literature that innovation takes place also in developing countries (at least in rapidly 
industrialising countries like China) and that TC are indeed accumulated by firms in 
these countries and not only by leading foreign multinationals (Forbes and Wield, 2002, 
Bell and Pavitt, 1995, Romijn, 1997, Lall, 1992). 
We observe, however, a technological deepening that is more profound than the 
TC literature suggests for firms, in particular SMEs, in developing countries 
(Intarakumnerd et al., 2002, Arocena and Sutz, 2000, Romijn, 2002). The Chinese PV 
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firms are in fact not only interested in usinL; a technology developed and produced 
elsewhere (as a predominant presence in module assembly and PV installation would 
possibly have suggested) but also in developing domestic capacity to add further 
technological value and to generate own technological solutions. 
Contrary to what is observed in the existing literature, the domestic PV market 
plays an extremely limited role in diffusing the technology developed by the firms. The 
test for the firms' technical and qualitative performance happens in the global market. 
Although the firms' entry point in the international PV market has been non-
technological (the firms exported in 2005 only the final assembled c-Si modules where 
the technological content is relatively modest — see Figure 21), our findings do not 
support the view that they can only produce the low knowledge intensive components of 
the c-Si value chain nor that they compete exclusively on the basis of cheap labour and 
heavy discount. Although we do not deny that discounting might be an important 
leverage in the firms' commercial strategy, from an innovation point of view we note a 
distinct separation between what firms sell and what they can do. In other words: there 
is a considerable difference between production capacity and technological capabilities. 
This separation is at the core of the Chinese PV firms' competitiveness. 
7.3.2 From a reversed accumulation model to 'born global' 
A second important theoretical insight that emerges from our findings concerns 
the knowledge accumulation path followed by the firms in the sample. Two important 
features are: 1) there is a considerable difference between the innovation path followed 
by the firms that started to produce in the 1970s (i.e. the first generation of PV firms), 
when PV manufacturing was first established in the country, and those that started to 
produce in the late 1990s — early 2000s (i.e. the second generation of PV firms); and 2) 
in understanding the technological innovation path of the Chinese PV industry it is 
analytically useful to observe the trajectory followed not only by firms but also by 
another non-firm actor: the national research institutes (NRI). As we explained in 
Chapter 4 and further explored in Chapter 6 with specific reference to PV (see Section 
6.3.2), in the formative phase of the Chinese IS manufacturing and R&D activities were 
strictly separated and the activity that is usually more closely associated with 
innovation (i.e. R&D) was not conducted by firms but by the NRI. We hence believe 
that observing the paths followed by both firms and NRI could provide better insights 
in the Chinese PV knowledge accumulation path. 
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Assimilation 
(limited by low absorptive capacity) 1978 to 
late 1990s 
Entrance of foreign 
products/expertise/equipment\,v_,/ 
Knowledge acquired by single 
individuals via own education 
and professional experience 
(often abroad) 
Lag behind with little improvement 
1° generation PV firms NRI 2° generation PV firms 
Late 1950s 
to 1978 
Manufacturing/implementation only 
(knowledge limited to learning by 
doing) 
R&D 
(little applicative value) X 
Technology transf;D 
Applied R&D (spin-off) 
•  
Acquisition 
Improvements 
Late 1990s 
to 2005 
Some firms disappear 
but individuals 
knowledge remains 
Material and PV process equipment suppliers 
Generation 
Source: Author's elaboration 
As discussed in Section 2.5.6 and briefly recalled at the beginning of this 
chapter (see Section 7.2), the literature suggests that catching up firms follow a reverse 
innovation path that goes from acquisition, to assimilation and adaptation, to 
improvement and eventually to own generation. 
Figure 44 The Chinese PV firms' accumulation path 
Figure 44 shows that the firms that started to produce PV modules and cells in 
the 1970s (hereafter called first generation PV firms) seem to have followed a path 
similar to that suggested by the literature. Firms started to import production lines from 
abroad in the early 1980s, after having spent years in manufacturing c-Si cells and 
modules under government direction and without the possibility of undertaking any 
innovation-related activity (i.e. R&D or networking with other actors in the system). 
Accessing foreign technology and using it to learn basic production operating 
techniques provided firms with the first building block of technological capabilities. 
An initial assimilation started but this was of a limited scale for two reasons: a) 
firms lacked the necessary sound technological background to produce cells and 
254 
modules of good quality and performance; and b) firms did not have the necessary non-
technical competence (i.e. organisational and managerial capabilities) to search 
autonomously for the necessary financial, human and capital equipment resources 
previously provided by the government. With the entrance in the domestic market of 
superior foreign c-Si cells and modules, the majority of the domestic firms could not 
face competition and went out of business. 
So the first generation PV firms' technological innovation path stopped at (poor) 
assimilation. The knowledge accumulated by the single individuals who used to work 
for these firms did not disappear completely, however. Some of the former general 
managers or chief engineers 'recycled' their knowledge by entering less knowledge 
intensive links in the c-Si value chain (i.e. production equipment for c-Si cells and 
modules) and constituted the basis upon which new firms that entered the market in the 
late 1990s-early 2000s (i.e. the second generation PV firms) could develop. 
In the meanwhile, NRI, which had been totally devoted to R&D activities until 
the late 1970s, were starting to undertake productive activities. Their technological 
accumulation path begun with their own scientific education and R&D activities. For 
them, the import of equipment was more a tool to have the necessary hardware to 
produce than a means to learn and to obtain technological knowledge. 
The technological accumulation path followed by second generation PV firms is 
closer to that followed by NRI than to first generation PV firms. What is striking about 
at least some of the firms that entered the domestic market in the late 1990s-early 2000s, 
is that they have been able to add value quickly and to enter the world PV market as 
global players. These firms have skipped the two initial phases of acquisition and 
assimilation and have entered the innovation path directly from improvement and 
generation. This stage-skipping behaviour is, however, only apparent because 
knowledge acquisition and assimilation happened at the individual level. As an 
example, the CEO of firm F took years of education and working experience to develop 
the capabilities that allowed his firm to quickly become one of the top 10 world PV cell 
and module manufacturers. He was able to start from a leading position because he had 
already completed all the preliminary knowledge accumulation process at an individual 
level. 
What our findings seem to suggest is that a traditional technological 
accumulation path, as the one suggested by the TC literature, was indeed followed by 
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the Chinese PV firms until the late 1990s. This was so because at the time PV cell 
manufacturing was treated not as a knowledge-intensive industry but as an engineering-
based industry, where knowledge could be acquired via technology imports and where 
ideological and strategic concerns had the priority on technological requirements. 
Evidence of this could be found in both the strict separation between innovation related 
activities, like R&D, and manufacturing and in the fact that firms were not supposed to 
look for their productive resources or to develop non-technical capabilities and market 
strategies. 
Moreover, a true PV market hardly existed until the late 1990s so there was no 
market pull that could stimulate PV firms to improve their knowledge. When the global 
PV market started to take off in the late 1990s those individuals who already had 
accumulated the necessary knowledge via their own education or by participating in 
R&D activities, for instance in NRI, were in a good position to emerge. 
These insights confirms that the technological accumulation process is indeed 
gradual, but initial knowledge (i.e. learning how to do things) in this sector is not 
acquired by firms via technology transfers, as suggested by the literature, but derives 
from the knowledge that the individuals (i.e. the entrepreneur and the technical 
employers) already possess. This partly explains why the firms that started to produce 
in the early 2000s have been able to skip the lengthy two stages of acquisition and 
accumulation and to move fast towards improvements and own generation. In this 
respect second generation PV firms seems to behave more like firms in technologically 
leading countries than like technology followers in developing countries, as the 
literature suggested. 
The path that firms follow in accumulating their technological knowledge may 
well be related more to the knowledge intensive nature of the technology in which they 
embark than to the nature of the economic development of the country within which the 
firm operates. In other words: the accumulation path followed by firms that started to 
produce c-Si cells in China since early 2000s does not seem related to the level of the 
economic development of that country, as the reverse innovation model put forward by 
the literature suggests. A 'reverse model' of catching up, which starts with the import 
of hardware from mature economies to acquire the initial technical knowledge base, 
makes it possible to enter those links of the c-Si value chain where the technological 
content is lower, like, for instance module assembly. 
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7.3.3 Technological capability as a sub-set of a larger bundle of competences 
In assessing how advanced is what the PV firms in China can do, we adopted a 
technological focus. Studying firms' technological capabilities made sense both 
because this was the approach suggested by the TC literature that underpins this study 
and also because technological innovation constitutes one of the main avenues through 
which the PV industry worldwide could drive solar electricity to cost competitiveness 
(see Section 4.4). 
While undertaking the interviews in China, however, it soon appeared clear that 
the firms that possess more advanced TC are not necessarily also the most competitive 
or indeed those that are better positioned to generate technological change. In other 
words: to successfully move up the c-Si PV value chain and to increase 
competitiveness, a good mastery of the technology is not sufficient. Organisational and 
managerial capabilities, as well as vision and strategy, are at least as important for 
success in this technology. 
A few examples taken from the interviewed firms serve to illustrate this point. 
Firm B possesses intermediate to advanced TC 193,  but has an extremely limited 
production capacity and it struggles to gain market shares in both the domestic and the 
international market. As discussed in Chapter 4, scale is becoming an increasingly 
important factor for the PV industry and firms that are not able to increase their 
production capacity are bound to be cut off from competition. Scaling up does not 
require 'how to do' technological skills but rather those non-technical capabilities 
necessary to mobilise additional resources and to raise cash via capital increases 
(Kluftinger et al., 2005). 
Firm C has possibly not achieved the same technological deepening as firm B194 
but it possesses strong organisation and managerial capabilities that have allowed it to 
become not only the first and only vertical integrated PV firm in China195 , but also to 
rapidly scale up production and to gain market shares in the international markets196  
What our analysis shows is that in the Chinese PV firms, technological 
capabilities are a necessary (and indeed essential) requirement to produce, especially 
193 The firm has not only developed the necessary technological capabilities to enter more 
knowledge intensive links of the Silicon value chain (i.e. from module assembly to wafer production) 
and to improve its processes and products over time, but can also construct customised pieces of 
equipment to be used on its production line. 
194 It is interesting to note that firm C required the technological assistance of the general manager 
of firm B when it started to establish its production facilities in the late 1990s. 
195 The firm is present on the c-Si value chain from Si wafer production to PV system installation 
196 The firm in 2007 was among the top ten world c-Si module producers. 
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in the knowledge intensive links of the value chain, but they are not sufficient to add 
value and to compete. Technological capabilities are an important sub set of a larger 
array of organisational and managerial competences necessary to the firms to move 
forward. It is only when a strong technical knowledge is combined with a strong 
management and a forward looking vision that a firm becomes successful. This is for 
instance the case of firm F, where a combination of advanced technical and non-
technical capabilities allowed the firm to become, in less than seven years, the fourth 
world c-Si cell and module producer (Jager-Waldau, 2007a). 
As we discussed at length in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.1) the TC approach 
originated in the early 1980s to explain firm-level dynamics in 'technology followers'. 
Its main focus has been on the creation of a minimum knowledge base necessary to 
select, install and deploy existing engineering-based technologies created elsewhere 
(Caniels and Romijn, 2003). Organisational and managerial capabilities are not among 
the concerns of the TC literature because they are implicitly considered to belong to a 
more advanced level of knowledge (i.e. non-technical capabilities could come only 
after a firm knows how to do things). 
Although we do not deny that knowing 'how to do things' is a sine qua non 
requirement for firms that operate in c-Si PV, we claim that the development of 
organisational and managerial capabilities is also essential and needs to be understood 
to draw a comprehensive picture of firms' innovative behaviour in this technology. 
Although a detailed coverage of the role of non-technical aspects in the 
innovative behaviour of the PV firms in China is beyond the scope of this study, we 
suggest that a deeper analysis in this respect should be encouraged in further research. 
New insights might come from looking at key contributions that come from recent 
theories of firm behaviour in economically advanced countries, where organisational 
learning and core competences are given a greater emphasis (see among others, 
Dodgson, 1993, Dosi et al., 2000). 
7.3.4 Revisiting understanding of innovation in developing countries 
The level of technological capabilities accumulated by the Chinese PV firms 
and the path they have followed to accumulate them are indeed different from those 
observed in other more traditional and engineering based technologies. This challenges 
our understanding of technological change and innovation in developing countries. In a 
global context, where knowledge intensive technologies are becoming more important 
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and widespread (this refers not only to technologies like c-Si PV, but also, and among 
others, to pharmaceuticals, biotechnologies or nanotechnologies), does it still make 
sense to use an analytical perspective that considers the technological effort of firms in 
developing countries to be a 'special kind of innovation', in which acquisition of 
foreign technology followed by assimilation and improvement are the dominant pattern 
of the innovation process? Moreover, does it still make sense to claim that "[...] 
entrepreneurship should be understood [in these countries] within the context of 
latecomer catch up, behind the frontier innovation, and technology acquisition from 
abroad" (Hobday and de Barros Perini, 2005, p. 2). 
We believe that adopting this point of view a priori conditions our analysis 
because we tend to pay attention only to certain aspects like incremental innovation 
from a low knowledge base and less to others like the transition process from this stage 
to build strategic capabilities to approach or even take forward the technology frontier 
(Dutrenit, 2007). 
The recognition that there is limited understanding of what innovation means in 
developing countries and how it is challenged by emerging knowledge intensive 
technologies, would also allow us to improve our conceptual frameworks and 
consequently, to suggest policy recommendation that could better reflect new 
challenges and requirements of firms in these countries. 
7.4 Key issues on the micro approach to industrial 
innovativeness 
This second part of the chapter considers key insights relating to what 
influences the Chinese PV manufacturers' ability to innovate. This section discusses 
the micro-level learning mechanisms (i.e. we pull out the theory insights we obtained 
by applying the approach suggested by the TC literature), while Section 7.5 covers the 
systemic determinants of firms innovative behaviour. 
7.4.1 R&D as the main mechanism for learning in the PV manufacturing firms 
In-house R&D has emerged as the most important mechanism through which 
the Chinese PV manufacturers learn. 
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There are two purposes of this R&D effort for all the firms: 1) to improve 
productive processes in order to reduce production costs and enhance competitiveness; 
and to 2) strengthen the knowledge base necessary to enter more knowledge intensive 
links in the c-Si value chain. 
The outcome of the R&D activities might not be new to the world but is 
certainly new to the firms. Firms need R&D to sort out specific technological problems 
they encounter in production (for example, how to enhance cutting techniques to obtain 
thinner wafers without breaking them) and to improve. These are improvements that 
can hardly be learnt from the technology leaders' experience and that hence require 
firm-specific purposive innovative effort. 
While the overall focus of the R&D effort is the same for all the firms 
interviewed (i.e. to enhance competitiveness by reducing the production cost while 
improving at same time the quality and the performance of the final product), the depth 
of the R&D effort is different in firms with small production capacity and in firms with 
large market shares. Firms with limited production capacity tend to use their R&D 
departments to develop in-house those parts of the production equipment that could be 
bought more expensively outside. This is because they are already so constrained in 
resources that they cannot afford to push the frontier any further. 
Since these firms compete with the big (domestic and international) players in 
the international markets, however, they have to place themselves in the market 
segments that allow high profitability margins and ensure they keep this position. This 
also explains why firms with small production capacity need to move upstream and to 
acquire proprietary assets with the strategic role of their R&D departments. Since these 
firms are constrained in both financial and human resources, they tend to complement 
their in house R&D with other types of learning like the training courses offered by the 
production equipment suppliers or by international organisations active in China for the 
promotion of RET (i.e. the GEF or/and the World Bank). 
For firms that have already acquired large market shares, especially in 
international markets, in-house R&D is about gaining strategic positions in these 
markets with significantly enhanced processes and new products. 
As we discussed in Chapter 2, firms' R&D activities are associated in the 
literature with the acquisition of advanced technological capabilities. This is because, in 
building the minimum knowledge base necessary to kick off the catching up processes, 
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formal R&D is often substituted in firms in developing countries by other more 
informal learning mechanisms like reverse engineering, debugging or training. When 
firms in developing countries undertake in-house R&D this is done to quickly learn 
from the leader's experience, to customise products or processes to a particular user's 
need or indeed to come up with a new design. Design, it has been argued, can provide 
the potential for firms in developing countries to move substantially up the value chain 
of global manufacturing while following the technology frontier set by technology 
leaders as efficiently as possible (Forbes and Wield, 2000, p. 1097). So, it is suggested, 
context (i.e. the development context) does matter when explaining the profile of R&D 
activities, which are opened to firms in developing countries (Forbes and Wield, 2000). 
What our study seems to suggest is that the types of R&D activities that the PV 
firms in China tend to undertake seem to be determined not so much by their catching 
up and behind the frontier nature, but rather by: a) the level of technological 
capabilities that the individual firm already possesses; b) the knowledge intensity of the 
link in the value chain at which the firm operates; and c) the competitive, more than the 
developing, context. 
For all the PV firms the context matters, but this is not necessarily the one 
where firms are located but rather the context where they have the largest market share 
and that determines the performance and quality conditions. Our evidence shows that 
PV firms have substantially improved the performance and quality of their products 
since they started to export. These outcomes have been the result of the effort of the in-
house R&D departments. 
When it comes to undertake R&D activities, it is argued (Hobday, 1995, 
Dutrenit, 2007, p. 137-138) that the context within which firms in developing countries 
operate constrains them in three main respects: a) disarticulation and distance from the 
main sources of innovation and R&D centres; b) distance from the most advanced 
markets, which make it difficult to benefit from the user-producer links for innovation; 
and c) they confront imbalances in the national systems of innovation where they 
operate and find difficulties in accessing scientific knowledge at the frontier so as to be 
able to move the technology frontier by themselves. 
The firms that operate in the c-Si value chain in China are more and more 
globalised, so the above factors are less relevant for them, especially b). 
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We argue that, when it comes to firm R&D, the context matters but it is the 
international context within which firms operate more than the developing context they 
are based in. 
7.4.2 Scientific education and intra-firm linkages are the main drivers of a 
Chinese PV firm's learning 
A sound technological knowledge gained both via education (i.e. university 
degree in physics, material science, electrical engineering) and working experience in 
the sector by the founder/manager(s) are the prime drivers behind the in-house R&D in 
the Chinese PV firms. 
PV is a knowledge based industry, which depends on formal research to 
advance the technology frontier (see Chapter 4). This particularly applies to the links of 
the value chain, like wafer or cell production, that have higher know-how requirements 
(see Chapter 4, Section 4.3). Moreover, a specific technical knowledge is necessary to 
modify production processes, since innovating in PV means reducing the cost of the 
technology while maintaining useful cell efficiencies. 
More than half of the PV manufacturers that were interviewed either grew out 
of research institutes and universities or were led by people with a sound scientific and 
technical background who had built up their expertise over many years of research in 
such organisations. It is this strong R&D background that has allowed the deepening of 
the technological capabilities and explains why half of the firms that have been 
interviewed hold patents. 
Intra-industry links are another important driver for learning for both the 
Chinese wafer, cell and module producers and their suppliers, particularly domestic. 
Since: "Even the best-resourced organisation cannot do everything with respect to 
technology [...] part of the strategic challenge lies in choosing which technology 
activities to conduct in house and which to outsource to partners" (Rush et al., 2007, p. 
227). Outsourcing to domestic suppliers part of the production equipment to be used by 
the firms in the sample to meet specific production and qualitative requirements have 
not only allowed producers in lower end of the c-Si value chain to emerge but has also 
provided them with an extraordinary opportunity for learning. 
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7.4.3 Partnership with research institutes and international organisations 
provides competitive advantage to Chinese PV firms with limited 
production capacity 
For firms with limited production capacity, other factors seemed relevant to 
unleash learning and to accumulate knowledge. 
In the sample, the firm's size seems to have a negative impact on innovativeness 
and competitiveness. Firms with a limited production capacity are not necessarily 
poorly technologically equipped (or have accumulated less knowledge), but they may 
be less able to compete. This means that they have less resources to devote to their 
further technological upgrading, but also tend to have fewer links with suppliers and, as 
a result, fewer inputs into their innovative activities. As a consequence, these firms end 
up being less innovative (which includes the ability to diffuse what you can do on the 
market) even if they are technologically competent. 
The firms try to compensate for this limited production capacity by 
strengthening links with a number of partners. Interactions between these firms and 
research institutes or universities play an important role in stimulating the firms' 
knowledge and the ability to solve fundamental problems related to the production (for 
example, how to improve cell's efficiency via better cell surface texturing, etc.). 
Also links with international organisations tend to be important to provide 
additional knowledge via ad hoc capability building programmes. Moreover affiliation 
with international organisations that operate domestically can also provide additional 
domestic market opportunities197. 
7.4.4 Innovating in PV in China challenges traditional modes of firm-level 
learning 
Learning in PV (c-Si) has a strong 'knowledge' component, where ad hoc 
education/experience is a necessary condition to enter the industry. Firms, especially in 
developing countries, that want to enter this industry face barriers higher than for 
engineering-based technologies where entry from a low skill base is possible (Mytelka, 
2004). Foreign technology, in the form of imported equipment, has a negligible 
learning impact per se and needs to be accompanied by individual effort to acquire 
knowledge and stimulate learning. 
197 See discussion done in Section 6.3.1 under the 'training' heading. 
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Technology imports have been a vehicle of knowledge used by first generation 
Chinese PV firms. This failed as an innovation strategy however, because it was not 
backed by a sound scientific and knowledge base and by in-house R&D. Technology 
import seems to work as a strategy to acquire knowledge for those engineering based 
technologies like automotives, textile, etc. (Mytelka, 2004). C-Si PV, and in particular 
certain links on the value chain where the Chinese firms are moving into, needs special 
knowledge, which is not acquirable via imports. 
These findings imply that although the manufacturing of PV components has a 
role to play in the low carbon industrialisation strategies of developing countries (see 
Section 1.1.), not all nations will possibly be in the position to benefit from it, because 
the traditional entry point from a low skill base is hardly possible. 
Moreover, the findings we obtained by applying the micro-level approach 
suggested by the TC literature provide us with a quite static view of the learning 
process in the Chinese PV firms. This is to say that we know 'how' the PV firms in the 
sample learn but we do not know 'why' firms decide to learn in the first instance and 
how the system in which firms are embedded concur to their learning effort. 
Focussing only on the static firm-level learning mechanisms would lead us to 
suggest policies that are broadly related to firm learning alone. We would suggest, for 
instance, more education to be promoted in the country or more university-industry 
links and more international programmes. This would give us only a partial insight into 
the technology accumulation process that occurs in firms, however. 
By adopting a system level perspective we miss somehow the firm's perspective 
(which we will hence suggest to include in a framework where the TC and the IS 
approaches are integrated, see Section 7.6) but we obtain a richer picture of other 
processes that are relevant for innovation by firms and indeed for their learning: most 
of all, we have a view on 'who' provides these inputs or 'how' they are provided. 
7.5 Key issues on the systemic approach to innovation in PV 
firms 
This Section draws out the main insights we obtained by studying the PV firms' 
innovation determinants from a systemic perspective. 
We begin the discussion with two questions: is in-house R&D firmly anchored 
in the sciences and enhanced by intra-firm linkages enough to explain the rapid growth 
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of the Chinese PV industry since the early 2000s (see Chapter 5) and its ability to go 
well beyond a minimum knowledge base? Can the systemic analysis provide some 
additional insights? 
We will argue that acquiring the necessary knowledge (both technical and non-
technical) is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the industry to emerge, 
to add value and compete. Knowledge needs to be 'activated' by market demand, 
resource availability and by supporting policies. Although this is broadly intuitive, what 
is new is that these 'activating mechanisms' do not need to be local for innovation in 
PV to occur in a certain local context. On the contrary, local system dynamics can 
intertwine with global technological dynamics for the local system to create innovation. 
7.5.1 Learning needs to be 'activated' by viable markets and resources: on what 
systemic functions/process are vital for firms to innovate 
Drawing from the systemic analysis we presented in Chapter 6, we notice that 
certain processes of the seven that are usually identified by the TIS literature for a 
technological systems to emerge and diffuse are particularly relevant for the PV firms. 
These are: 
— Knowledge, which should be both technical and managerial 
— Resource availability 
— Market creation 
`Knowledge development' was the very first constituent of the Chinese PV 
innovation system. Even if the initial knowledge developed under the central 
government priorities and guidance was not conducive to innovation (i.e. 
manufacturing and R&D activities were strictly separated and horizontal links between 
the — few — actors were not allowed) and even if the early PV firms did not succeed in 
moving into the high growth period of the Chinese PV industry (from the early 2000s 
onwards), it provided an initial opportunity for the individuals to learn and to respond 
quickly to the new domestic demand in the late 1990s-early 2000s. Individuals that 
participated in what we have defined as the first generation PV firms, used their 
learning to enter less knowledge intensive sectors of the c-Si value chain and to satisfy 
the demand for PV production equipment coming from new entrants. 
These knowledge-related factors are important to appreciate that what matters to 
better understand innovation in PV manufacturing firms is not necessarily 'how long a 
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firm has been producing for' but 'how experienced the single individuals are'. This is 
not to say that PV firms, as such, do not need to learn. But individual learning rooted in 
science education seems likely to be far more important in knowledge intensive 
industries. 
The Chinese government played a key role in creating initial knowledge, but 
withdrew gradually from a sector that was no longer perceived as strategic. With the 
opening up of the domestic PV innovation system from the early 1980s, knowledge 
inputs have been provided by other actors (like foreign PV equipment manufacturers) 
that either did enter the national system or that were external to it, like foreign 
universities or R&D institutions. So the knowledge creation function evolved from 
`totally nationally provided' to being more and more global. 
This knowledge role confirms the findings of the TC analysis but enriches them 
by providing insights in the sources of knowledge provision (not only links with 
suppliers but also education acquired abroad and entrance in the system of a number of 
new actors that contributed in disseminating knowledge). Moreover, the IS approach 
helps us to understand that knowledge accumulated by an individual firm per se is not 
enough; it needs to be activated by market and resources availability. In other words, 
the functions 'market creation' and 'supply of resources' act as triggering mechanisms 
for the accumulated knowledge. This was intuitively apparent also from the insights we 
obtained from the TC approach, where we emphasised the role played by inter-industry 
links to enhance learning. 
PV firms from the late 1970s — late 1990s struggled to stay afloat because they 
did not have enough scientific and non-technical knowledge, but also because they did 
not know what they needed in terms of R&D and equipment. So even when the system 
expanded by providing new market opportunities and resources, as well by giving the 
firms the freedom to decide on their innovation related activities, firms could not 
benefit and the 'market' and 'resources' switches could not provide the right sparks to 
ignite knowledge, which was quite restricted. 
If we compare these first insights obtained from the IS analysis with the TC 
analysis, we can say that we have a less thorough view of micro-level dynamics (i.e. 
with the systemic analysis we are not able to assess the importance of the firm's 
learning mechanisms, such as R&D or the importance of a diversified number of 
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interactions for firms with limited production capacity), but a broader view of the 
system. 
While these insights (that knowledge and early investments in the technology 
are necessary first steps that need to be activated by resources and market 
opportunities), are hardly new, what is interesting from the IS analysis is that it 
explains by whom these inputs are provided and this, as we will argue, has significant 
theoretical and political implications. 
7.5.2 Functions do not need to be satisfied locally: on the importance of defining 
the system boundaries 
In observing the 'market creation' and 'supply of resources' functions, as well 
as the policies that have been promoted to support them (in particular market creation), 
we notice that they are not necessarily provided from within the Chinese NIS. The 
function 'market creation' is provided, for instance, both domestically, through the 
rural electrification programmes promoted by the Chinese government, and 
internationally by the on-grid installations that are driving the global PV market and 
that are supported by conducive policies in mature economies. Similarly, although the 
domestic innovation system has grown over time and can now provide domestically 
resources, such as PV production equipment or materials, that until the late 1990s were 
acquirable only abroad, foreign suppliers still play a predominant role in the broad 
system to which the Chinese PV manufacturers belong. More subtly, other functions 
like for instance 'legitimation' are, to a certain extent, also provided abroad. The 
Chinese PV manufacturers are in fact benefiting from the legitimation process that has 
taken place in countries like Germany and that has resulted in policies to support the 
domestic German market, to which the Chinese PV firms largely export. 
By applying the TIS perspective to the Chinese PV innovation system, as 
suggested by the literature, we observed that several of the functions necessary to the 
firms to achieve innovation are not provided locally (at least not entirely). So why did 
the domestic PV manufactures that entered the Chinese market in the early 2000s 
decide to do so if the processes/functions necessary for their development and 
innovative effort were provided abroad? Because there were favourable local 
conditions that induced them to do so and that intertwined with the international 
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dynamics. Among the domestic drivers, the policies promoted by the government to 
attract back home Chinese scholars or entrepreneurs who were gaining their education 
or professional experience abroad played a significant role in attracting back home 
some of the people who now run the PV firms in China. Moreover, cultural factors, 
expectations of the growth of the domestic market, the existence of a science and PV 
specific knowledge base — resulting from previous national/individual investments —
together with other favourable macro policies, such as the `SMEs fund' (see Section 
5.2.2) and the export policies, contributed to driving powerful new players in the 
domestic market. 
These insights show that an emerging and PV conducive macro environment 
intertwined with stronger drivers, such as market creation, coming from abroad. This 
could have important implications for the application of a technological IS to a local 
context. If we adopt a 'technology perspective' and want to understand more about the 
development and diffusion of that specific technology, looking only at inducing and 
blocking mechanisms in a specific national context (as it is done in the existent 
literature, see for instance Jacobsson et al. 2004, Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004, Negro et 
al., 2007, Negro et al. 2008, ) can lead to misleading conclusions about the 'goodness' 
of that system in achieving innovation and the policy prescriptions we are able to give. 
7.5.3 What is good to unleash technological innovation at a broad innovation 
system level is not necessarily good for the firms 
In the TIS literature it is argued that in guiding the direction of search of the 
different actors in the system it is important to stimulate technological variety 
(Jacobsson and Johnson, 2000). It is suggested that this can be done by providing 
financial and market incentives that can guide firms or indeed research institutes to 
enter the system because they see important opportunities for further growth or indeed 
rewards in the sector. 
The Chinese system has not been good at creating technological variety - quite 
the contrary. The Chinese government initially guided the actors' search into only one 
technology, c-Si. The system has specialised in this technology and a division of labour 
has emerged, driven by the demand from several powerful c-Si cell and module 
producers that entered the market in the late 1990s-early 2000s. So although we 
recognise that a lack of technological variety could compromise the future of the 
Chinese PV innovation system (i.e. what will happen to the c-Si centred Chinese 
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innovation system if c-Si is substituted by other technology families that are rapidly 
approaching technological and commercial viability?), our findings do not support the 
view that a lack of technological variety (so a weak domestic 'guidance for search' 
function) has prevented firms from entering the market. Quite the contrary, it has 
created specialisation and a division of labour which are among the competitive assets 
upon which new powerful PV manufacturers can count to cut costs further and to 
compete in international markets. 
The message we want to put across here is that the extent to which the system is 
conducive to innovation really depends on the goals of the different actors. 
7.5.4 Local system failures do not imply no local innovation: on how we assess a 
system's performance 
It is not necessarily the case that, if there are local system failures there is no 
local innovation. There are two main reasons for this: 
1. A weakness of the domestic system in meeting one of the functions 
that are relevant for PV manufacturing can be compensated abroad 
(see previous section). 
2. Moreover, certain system failures can be bad for innovation 
diffusion in the local market but not necessarily for the generation 
and the development of knowledge in the same country context. 
The existing TIS approaches use 'diffusion rates' as the yardstick of a system's 
success in achieving innovation. This happens even though the point of departure is to 
understand 'system emergence and diffusion'. Jacobsson and Bergek (2004), for 
instance, use diffusion level of wind turbines, solar cells and solar collectors in 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden to shed light on differences in the performance 
and evolution of the three systems over time (for instance, how could we explain that at 
the end of the system's formative period, "[...] the Netherlands and Sweden were ahead 
in wind turbines and solar collectors respectively [...] but lost their advantage 
subsequently"? Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). 
If we use 'diffusion rates' in assessing the 'effectiveness' of the Chinese PV 
innovation system in achieving high rates of installed PV capacity (see Figure 29), we 
conclude that the system has indeed not been successful. We would then investigate 
why and find out that there is a poor local PV legitimation, that the government prefers 
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to support other RET that are nearer to commercial maturity (i.e. wind and biomass) 
and that it promotes PV only for some specific rural applications that are socially 
necessary but not profitable for firms. We would then suggest strengthening the 
legitimation and the market creation functions. 
We cannot avoid noticing that the Chinese PV manufacturing industry is not 
only booming (i.e. it has been able to greatly expand its production capacity in a short 
span of time), however, but also that it has moved forward from an innovation and 
competitive point of view. We can then legitimately ask, how was it possible for a 
system that displayed failures (and these include, besides poor legitimacy and market 
failures, also poor resource provision, understood as part of the equipment which is 
largely imported from abroad) to be so successful in creating a rapidly growing and 
dynamic industry? 
Possible local system failures (e.g. the function 'market creation' is poorly 
served in the country x) do not necessarily result in scarce innovation (i.e. firms in the 
country x have been successful in taking the PV technology forward although the local 
demand has been modest; this is because the demand has emerged elsewhere). A lot 
depends on what criteria are used to assess the 'effectiveness' of the system's 
performance (which, we argue, should include both development and diffusion) and on 
whether some of the processes that are crucial for the firms could be satisfied elsewhere. 
We argue here that local system failures do not necessarily prevent innovation 
in that specific local context. Much depends on how global the system is and on how 
much local producers can benefit from global and indeed local opportunities (e.g. the 
Chinese firms have benefited from favourable export polices which have helped the 
boom in the industry). 
7.5.5 Conclusions on the insights obtained from the IS approach and how these 
compares to those from the TC approach 
All these issues question the validity of a functional approach as a useful 
analytical tool for policy makers, especially in developing countries. It is claimed that: 
"functional analysis can be a useful analytical tool for policy makers in that it helps 
these to systematically map 'what is achieved' in a specific IS in terms of seven key 
processes important in the evolution of an IS. System-specific weaknesses in an 
emerging IS can then be defined in functional terms and these can be used as focusing 
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devices for policy makers in their search for identifying the key policy issues" 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2006). 
Our analysis shows that indeed a system analysis is useful, also in rapidly 
industrialising countries like China, to identify the main process that are relevant for 
firms and who could best provide them with what they need. In this respect the IS 
analysis provides, with respect to the TC analysis, richer insights into how firms 
innovate and why. 
Problems arise when we use a TIS functional approach and apply it at the 
national level: problems with how the boundaries of the system are defined and to the 
benefit of whom or what we seek to give policy recommendations (i.e. what are our 
policy objectives? What do we want to have more of? PV manufacturing firms? PV 
installed capacity? Competing PV technology families?). These are all important policy 
objectives to define, because what is advisable to reach a policy objective is not 
necessarily also good for another goal (as earlier examples illustrated). 
In relation to the boundaries of the system, we have shown that studying an 
innovation system in a certain national context to understand more about the emergence 
and the diffusion of a certain technology can lead to ambiguous results because, as the 
Chinese PV case illustrates, domestic elements of the system can be affected by 
international dynamics that occur in other technological systems. As a result our policy 
recommendations could be distorted. In the case of the Chinese PV system, should the 
Chinese government, after having realised that its market creation policies in support of 
rural electrification have failed to attract the booming domestic industry into the 
domestic market, decide to open up the on-grid market with costly incentive policies 
while the local industry is booming because it is driven by markets and policies 
promoted by other countries? Would it not be better for the Chinese government to 
focus on more urgent development needs or to decide to support other RET that are 
closer to commercial maturity? 
The point here is that suggesting policy measures on the basis of a TIS analysis 
applied at the national level does not necessarily provide the best insights and focusing 
devices for policy makers. 
We argue that what is relevant is the view point we adopt and the objective of 
the policy we seek to promote. If we adopt a TIS approach, then we should take into 
account the TIS which is relevant to the technology and not to the country. This is 
because we have seen that the PV IS in China is affected by a great number of 
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components, institutions (with policies) and networks that are not local. We would then 
have a TIS that contains both national and international elements. What is relevant is 
that this not only pertains to the actors, but also to the links between them and to the 
institutions. Institutions in one country can affect the development and diffusion of the 
technology in anther country. This has profound implications for our capability to 
recommend policies. 
7.6 An integrated TC and IS approach? 
The results obtained by the study showed that the innovation behaviour of the 
PV firms in China was not merely due to the individual capability effort/learning of the 
firms. By superimposing a system analysis it became clear that a key role was also 
played by other elements of the system of which firms are part (for example, the 
international PV demand or the policies promoted by some governments in mature 
economies — most notably Germany - to increase PV installed capacity). 
Thus by using insights from both approaches (i.e. the TC and the IS literatures) 
it has been possible to provide a more complete explanation of the PV firms' 
innovation behaviour than would have been possible from using only one of the two 
approaches. 
It is legitimate to ask, therefore, whether an integration between the two 
approaches would be feasible. 
Although exploring ways for a full integration lies beyond the scope of this 
study, we can identify some conceptual issues a combined framework should address. 
A combined framework that seeks explanations into firm's innovation should: 
— Adopt an actor oriented focus, where the firm is the point of departure of the 
analysis and its learning and how this is affected by the broader innovation 
environment are at the centre of the analysis. Different from to a broader 
TIS approach that has technology as the main concern, the actor oriented 
focus we propose would allow a better understanding of one of the actors of 
the innovation system: the firms, of what influences their innovation 
behaviour and, in turn, how they contribute to the direction and the outcome 
of the innovation process for the specific technology under analysis. 
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The contribution already provided by Markard and Truffer (2008) could 
offer useful conceptual hooks for a better specification of an actor oriented 
focus and pointers towards a combined TC and IS framework. 
— Have a better specified definition of the system's boundaries, where not only 
the national elements and dynamics that influence innovation in firms 
operating in the technology under study are taken into account, but where 
the whole (i.e. national and international) IS of which firms are part is 
considered. 
— Be ideally applicable to different kinds of innovation (e.g. organisational, 
financial, marketing and technological innovation. See the definition of 
innovation provided in Section 1.4) and technologies (e.g. engineering-
based and knowledge-intensive). 
Our study has shown that the latter point could represent a major challenge for a 
combined TC and IS framework. The TC approach was in fact originally developed to 
analyse the creation of a minimum knowledge base necessary to firms to select, install 
and deploy existing engineering-based technologies created elsewhere 
Our study has already provided evidence of the limits of the TC approach in 
understanding firm-level learning in a knowledge intensive technology like solar PV. 
Moreover, we have shown how the non inclusion in the approach of non-technological 
capabilities (for example managerial or organisational capabilities) is a limit in 
understanding the innovative behaviour of firms, especially of those firms that operate 
in the PV sector. 
Consequently, it seems likely that an attempt to develop a fully integrated 
combined framework that could be used to study all types of technologies and 
innovation would encounter significant analytical challenges. 
7.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we pulled out the main insights the study has obtained about the 
nature and the determinants of the technological effort underway in the Chinese PV 
firms and critically discussed them in the light of the TC and IS literatures that 
underpin this study. 
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We found out that the Chinese PV firms, despite differences among them, are 
moving fast from being imitators and users of imported technology (i.e. only 
assembling modules by importing foreign cells and competing on cheap labour) to 
building up absorptive capacity to sustain genuine innovation. This technological 
deepening is more profound than the TC literature suggests for firms, in particular 
SMEs, in developing countries. Moreover, our findings suggest that the traditional 
technological accumulation models based on acquisition, assimilation and eventually 
improvement, observed by the TC literature for engineering-based technologies might 
well be no longer appropriate for high-tech industries like PV. In the manufacturing of 
PV components, our findings show that an initial knowledge base anchored in scientific 
education is a necessary condition to kick off production, especially in those links of 
the PV value chain (like wafer and cell manufacturing) that are more knowledge 
intensive and that allow participating firms to gain higher profits. This knowledge 
intensive nature of PV (in particular of certain productive links) narrows the 
opportunities, described in the literature, of firms' entry in the industry from a low skill 
base and makes the role of technology imports as the key mode of learning only 
marginal. 
The study also found that acquiring the necessary technological knowledge, as 
suggested by the unique application of the TC approach to the study, is only a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the PV industry to emerge, to add value and 
compete. Knowledge needs to be 'activated' by market demand, resource availability 
and by supporting policies. These results have been suggested by the application of the 
IS approach to the study. Although these insights are broadly intuitive, what is new 
about them is that these 'activating mechanisms' do not need to be local (as suggested 
by the application of the TIS literature to different national contexts) for innovation in 
PV to occur in a certain local context. On the contrary, local system dynamics can 
intertwine with global technological dynamics for the local system to create innovation. 
These findings call for an improved definition of the system's borders and an improved 
understanding of the criteria we use to assess the 'goodness' of the system in achieving 
innovation. 
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8 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
Picture 10 "All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover 
them", Galileo Galilei 
Source: picture taken by the author during fieldwork in China, May-July 2005 
8.1 Introduction 
The insights discussed in the previous chapter suggest several implications for 
policy. These have relevance for the further development of the Chinese PV industry 
and its ability to innovate further, for the technological and market prospects of PV in 
China as well as for other developing countries willing to enter PV manufacturing. We 
discuss these policy implications in turn. 
8.2 Policy recommendations for China: what way forward 
for the Chinese PV industry and for PV technology? 
The findings of the study show that the Chinese PV firm's ability to innovate 
has been based on the accumulation of individual knowledge and relevant experience, 
coupled with an intense firm-level R&D effort enabled by both domestic and 
international factors. Can the PV industry continue to move forward and possibly 
innovate? If yes, under what conditions? 
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China is rapidly becoming the world largest c-Si module producer. Indeed, if 
the 2005 trends in the domestic and global production capacity were to continue for the 
next 10 years, China's PV production would be set to saturate the global market by 
2015 (see Figure 45) . In other words, at current rates of growth, Chinese supply alone 
will soon exceed global demand. This is a potentially risky situation, given the over-
reliance of the Chinese industry on overseas export markets, especially in Germany and 
Spain (see discussion in Chapters 5 and 6). What will happen to the Chinese industry if 
the subsidies that currently support the export markets die out? Will the industry still be 
able to add value and innovate, without a market that provides rents and inputs to 
innovation? 
Recent trends seem hardly sustainable in the absence of new global solar 
electricity markets and in particular of the taking off of the domestic market. 
Figure 45 Illustrative extrapolation of the consolidated PV production capacity trend in China 
over the last 10 years 
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The promotion of sound and long-term measures for the development of the 
domestic on-grid PV market would possibly provide the local industry with an 
alternative to the over-reliance on overseas markets. This would particularly benefit 
those firms that currently have a limited production capacity and that struggle to 
compete with bigger domestic and international players. 
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Moreover, a major determinant in the future of the industry concerns the 
promising new PV technologies that are currently starting to be commercialized or are 
in their infancy. This will be a possible threat for the c-Si industry but also a challenge 
for the Chinese government, which, as we have seen, is currently doing little to support 
technological variety. If the c-Si industry has benefited so far from technological 
specialisation because it has increased the division of labour and ensured provision of 
services and components in the lower end of the c-Si value chain, putting all the eggs in 
the c-Si basket might be a dangerous strategy. c-Si technology is certainly in high 
demand at the moment, but it is also very close to technological maturity. It follows 
that further cost reduction opportunities and efficiency improvements are quite limited. 
Better prospects for a global larger scale PV adoption will possibly be provided in the 
mid-term by other technologies (i.e. some thin film, PV under concentration or novel 
PV), on which China is currently only marginally focussing its national R&D effort. 
Technological learning takes time and China might lose its current competitiveness 
should technologies that are now in the demonstration phase really take off. In this case 
countries where R&D in novel PV technologies is underway will possibly be 
advantaged. For a national PV strategy point of view, the promotion of PV 
technological variety in the early stages of R&D would allow further technological 
learning away from the nearly mature c-Si technology family and the heavy reliance on 
continuing international market pull. 
8.3 Implications for other developing countries willing to 
enter the same high-tech industry 
The findings of this study have several technological and strategic 
implications for developing/rapidly industrialising countries wishing to enter the 
PV sector. 
As discussed, several links in the c-Si value chain are more knowledge 
intensive than others and require a specific technological and science-based 
background. This applies in particular to Silicon feedstock, ingot casting and 
indeed wafer and cell production. Moreover, the knowledge intensive nature of 
the industry also implies a long time for learning. This refers to the time needed 
both by the individuals to acquire the necessary technical education and relevant 
working experience and by the system to develop. As a consequence, developing 
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countries that want to enter PV manufacturing should make an early start. This is 
risky, however, because an early decision to embark into the technology that now 
has the largest market share (i.e. c-Si) could lead to picking a losing technology. 
We know that other PV technology families have possibly better prospects in 
terms of cost reductions and performance. Similarly, late entry into the emerging 
PV market could result in 'lock out' if firms in other countries develop faster. 
This is indeed what has already happened: China has nearly saturated the market 
and has locked out other countries wishing to enter the same PV technology 
family, especially in module production. Even by producing super-large volumes, 
other firms will possibly not be able to compete, simply because there is currently 
an oversupply of c-SI modules. Moreover, there is little room for innovation in 
design, as design does not play an important role in module manufacturing 
Should then developing countries completely abandon the idea of entering 
the PV sector? No, the idea is to use possible knowledge and expertise that 
already exists in these countries, not so much for PV cell or module production 
but for ancillary/complementary services. Building integrated PV is bound to 
become more and more important in the years to come, so for a developing 
country departing from any possible already existing expertise in building might 
make more sense than embarking in lengthy PV components learning. This way 
they would not be cut off from a growing industrial sector but make the most of 
the already existing expertise to complement the strengths of other countries. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
Picture 11 Dancing the Tango at the Temple of Heaven (Tiantan) in Beijing 
Source: picture taken by the author during fieldwork in China, May-July 2005 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis was inspired by the limited attention given to firms in developing 
countries as autonomous generators or innovators of technology. This gap in our 
knowledge is particularly evident in emerging energy technologies, like solar PV, 
which have been increasingly affecting the volume, composition and direction of world 
trade (UNCTAD, 1993) and which could offer developing countries opportunities to 
follow more sustainable low carbon development pathways. 
In Chapter 1 (see Section 1.2) we suggested that considering firms in 
developing countries as 'users' or 'borrowers/imitators' of technologies developed in 
mature countries has two drawbacks: it not only limits our understanding of how 
technological change for low-carbon energy technologies takes place in these countries 
but also focuses our analytical attention only on certain aspects pertaining to the 'user' 
side of technological development. These are, for instance, the acquisition of a 
minimum knowledge base via technology imports or the promotion of policies to 
enable entrepreneurs or governments in developing countries to develop strategies to 
catch up with mature economies and learn from 'behind the technology frontier'. This 
study offers a different perspective and aims at contributing to redress this gap in the 
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literature by studying the innovation effort underway in a rapidly industrialising 
country, China, to develop domestic technological capacity for the manufacture of solar 
PV components. 
This final chapter begins by summarising the key findings about the nature of 
the innovative effort in the Chinese PV firms and the enabling factors and environment. 
It goes on to identify the contribution the thesis has made to the two literatures that 
underpin this study, the TC and the IS literatures, and more broadly to our knowledge 
about innovation for RET and firm-level learning in developing countries. 
The Chapter ends with a discussion of the limits of the study in particular for a 
broader understanding of innovation for low-carbon energy technologies in developing 
countries other than China and with suggestions for further research. 
9.2 Key findings of the study 
We began by asking two questions: 
a. How advanced is what PV firms in China can do? 
b. What factors affect their knowledge accumulation process, how have they 
changed over time and how might they drive the firms' innovation effort 
further? 
We found out (see Section 6.2.2 for the presentation of this specific result and 
Section 7.3.1 for its discussion in the light of the existent theory) that during the period 
under study the PV industry in China had progressed well beyond basic operational 
capabilities (i.e. those that can allow firms to run plants at a minimum efficiency level 
and to deliver standard products with minimum quality requirements) and was quickly 
moving away from being a mere borrower of imported PV components. 
Despite significant differences across the firms, in terms of technological 
competence and degree of competitiveness in the international market (see Sections 
6.2.3 and 7.3.1), there is a tendency towards the handling of more complex processes 
(like, for instance, advanced wafer cutting processes, enhanced solar etching and 
module coating techniques) and more complex/better quality products over time (for 
example, thinner or larger wafers; higher efficiency cells). Firms have been rapidly 
moving upstream (i.e. from module to cell or wafer manufacturing) where the 
technological know-how is higher and where more complex and deeper technological 
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capabilities are necessary. Moreover, some firms have developed proprietary 
capabilities and are competing with international PV module and cell producers on the 
basis of product performance and quality and not uniquely on heavy discounts based on 
cheap labour. 
Despite the significance of these findings, the Chinese PV firms have 
accumulated and deepened their technological capabilities mainly in the PV technology 
family that is closest to market and commercial maturity: c-Si (Sections 6.2.1 and 
7.3.1). In this respect the Chinese firms display a shallow technological involvement 
and are far from taking the lead in those PV technology families that are now in their 
infancy but that show good prospects of substituting c-Si technology in the mid to long 
term. 
How it has been possible for the Chinese firms to move from being 'borrowers' 
to 'generators'? At the micro level (see Sections 6.3.1, 7.3.2 and 7.4), the analysis has 
shown that a first necessary enabling condition has been a sound knowledge base 
firmly anchored in the sciences (i.e. it is difficult to undertake c-Si cell or wafer 
production if you do not have specific technical knowledge and lack a scientific 
background). This has fuelled in-house R&D, which has served as the main learning 
mechanism for firms. 
At the systemic level (Sections 6.3.2 and 7.5) markets and resource availability 
have acted as triggering mechanisms for this pre-existing knowledge base. Market 
opportunities, in particular abroad, have stimulated more firms to enter the Chinese PV 
system but also to improve the performance and the quality of their processes and 
products. 
These findings have allowed us to improve our understanding of what is meant 
by innovation in developing countries and what determines it. Our academic 
knowledge so far has been based on the study of traditional engineering based 
technologies where technological upgrading was possible from a low skill base and 
where imports of technology from abroad were the main way through which firms 
could learn and establish a minimum knowledge base upon which to develop 
incremental changes and adaptations. 
Our findings suggest these traditional accumulation paths are challenged by new 
knowledge intensive technologies, like PV, where a pre-existing technical and 
scientific background is essential and where market entry from a low skill base 
becomes extremely difficult. 
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Moreover, the findings also show that technological capabilities per se are no 
longer enough to enable firms to undertake technological change, move forward, catch 
up and compete. New technologies and the ways in which they are embedded in 
innovation systems require the development of other non-technological capabilities that 
pertain to organisational and managerial knowledge. These are necessary to elaborate a 
vision of the firm's technological and business path and to compete in the international 
markets. This means that the analytical tools scholars have used so far to study firm-
level learning in developing countries are no longer sufficient and need to be extended 
to encompass the learning requirements of knowledge intensive technologies. 
On the systemic analysis front, the study has shown that national dynamics 
intertwine with the international context of the specific technology under analysis (e.g. 
although PV industrial development is local, it has been driven by the global PV 
demand and indeed by the policies promoted in several mature economies to support 
it). This result questions the use of an innovation system approach that tries to 
understand local technical change by focusing exclusively on national specificities. 
Moreover, the study also shows that applying a technological IS approach to a local 
context could lead to misleading conclusions about both the 'effectiveness' of that 
system in achieving innovation and the policy prescriptions we are able to give. 
9.3 The contribution of the thesis 
This thesis makes significant novel contributions to knowledge of three kinds: 
methodological contributions by developing an analytical framework relevant for 
analysing PV innovation in China; empirical contributions by collecting and analysing 
contemporary and primary data on the state of the Chinese PV manufacturing industry; 
and theoretical contributions to the technological capability and innovation system 
literatures, and their inter-relation. 
9.3.1 Methodological contribution 
To understand how advanced is what the PV firms in China can do and what 
influences their innovativeness, this study has developed an analytical framework that: 
1. 
	
	Is PV technology specific.  Existing frameworks that study firm level innovation 
and learning have been developed for and applied to engineering-based types of 
industries (see for instance the case of farm equipment — Romijn 1997 — or of 
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steel production — Figueiredo, 2002). This is the first time, to the best of the 
author's knowledge, that an analytical framework has been specifically 
developed to study firm's TC in a high-tech industry and more specifically in 
the PV industry. 
2. Is more comprehensive with respect to the existing frameworks (Lail, 1992, 
Romijn, 1997, Ariffin, 2000, Figueiredo, 2002) that investigate firm-level TC in 
developing countries. This is because, beside the usual study of a firm's ability 
to increase the value added of its products and processes, this thesis also 
encompasses the firm's positioning in the PV manufacturing value chain and in 
a broader PV technology family and competitive context. 
3. It combines and contrasts two well-defined approaches — one with a 
technological capability and intra-firm learning focus and the other with a wider 
systemic perspective where the broader innovation system of which firms are 
part is also taken into account. Since until now the two approaches have been 
adopted separately to address similar broad issues (i.e. insights into the forces 
that drive competitiveness and economic growth), the effort of this study in 
combining them is a first attempt to establish a full integration of the two 
analytical levels. 
9.3.2 Empirical contribution 
On the empirical front, the main contribution lies in the application of this 
analytical framework to the PV industry in China, a sector which has not been studied 
before from an innovation view point. Moreover, this study represents the first 
application of the innovation systems approach to PV manufacturing and technology in 
China. This has provided valuable information upon which other PV centred 
innovation systems could be compared and contrasted (Marigo et al., 2007). 
Contemporary and primary data on the state of the Chinese PV manufacturing 
industry have been gathered, organised and presented for the first time (Marigo, 2007). 
These data constitute a unique body of empirical evidence on the sector which was not 
available before and which is extremely rarely obtained by researchers who are not 
Chinese 
Furthermore, since the study adopts a time-based approach, it has mapped for 
the first time the main actors and interactions of the Chinese PV innovation system 
over time. This allows us not only to understand the PV system's evolution and 
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dynamics in fostering innovation over time but also provides useful information for 
those scholars interested in better understanding the timing, phases and sequences of 
technological change in the industrial development of PV. 
9.3.3 Theoretical contribution 
The thesis makes the following contribution to the existing theory and more 
specifically to the technological capability and innovation system literatures that 
underpin this study: 
1. It adds to the debate about what we mean by innovation in developing countries 
and `how' and 'why' firms in these economies accumulate technological 
capabilities. Moreover, the study also supports and enhances the insights 
obtained by other researchers in the field of firm-level innovation in developing 
countries. By dividing TC, as suggested by the existing literature, according to 
the level of difficulty and the functions they have to accomplish (i.e production 
and processes), this study has shown that such a division is appropriate and 
relevant also to study the nature of the TC accumulated by firms in knowledge 
intensive sectors like PV. In this respect, the thesis also supports those scholars 
that have used or intend to use the TC literature as a framework for 
investigating knowledge intensive sectors. 
2. It also adds to the debate on how RET emerge and diffuse in the market by 
providing specific insights derived from the study of the PV innovation system 
in China. The study has shown that an innovation system approach can be used 
both to map the different elements of the PV innovation system of which the 
firms are part and to study the enabling factors and dynamics of their innovation 
behaviour. This approach has also allowed to show that the system as a whole, 
in which elements and dynamics both internal and external to the Chinese 
innovation system are included, has been important for the emergence and the 
development of the PV industry in China. These findings indicate that the use of 
an innovation system approach to study innovation in firms involved in RET 
also in developing countries is both possible and relevant. 
3. It provides evidence on how a static firm-level analysis provides only a partial 
picture of how firms (with a particular reference to Chinese PV firms) innovate 
and compete. 
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4. It also provides evidence on: a) how a broad systemic analysis leaves 
unexplored important micro level dynamics like firms' learning and suggests 
that an actor-oriented systemic analysis might compensate for these 
shortcomings; and b) why the application of a technology-centred innovation 
system (TIS) to a specific country-context gives partial, and possibly distorted, 
insights into how technologies, in particular RET, emerge and diffuse in the 
market. 
5. By combining and comparing two different and partially complementary bodies 
of literature (i.e. the TC and the IS literatures), the factors that affect technical 
change in PV manufacturers have been studied on two levels of analysis: micro 
and systemic. These two levels complement and strengthen each other and give 
a deeper understanding and knowledge about the factors related to technological 
development and diffusion in firms involved in PV component production. In so 
doing the study also provides an initial basis upon which an integration 
between the two literatures can be established. 
6. It provides enhanced policy guidelines for developing countries wishing to 
undertake PV component production and more broadly, RET manufacturing. 
These derive from the combined insights obtained by applying both the TC and 
the IS analytical approaches. 
9.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
9.4.1 Limitations and methodological reflections on the thesis 
In investigating the extent to which developing countries are becoming 
autonomous agents in the development of RET technologies, this study has focussed on 
a specific country, China, and a specific RE technology: solar PV. We recognise, of 
course, that there will be limits to the extent to which one can generalise from these 
country- and technology-specific insights to the experiences of other rapidly 
industrialising countries, like India or Brazil. First, China is a very special case due to 
its history, size, market opportunities, 'business attitude' and indeed profile of 
economic development. We suggest that it might be difficult to replicate in other 
rapidly developing countries the specific country conditions that have allowed the rapid 
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take off of the Chinese PV industry (i.e. early R&D investments in the sector, focus on 
one technology family that has favoured specialisation and division of labour; 
favourable policies for the return of top class scholars/entrepreneurs who had gained 
education and working experience abroad, together with funds for the support of SMEs 
operating in low carbon energy technologies). 
Moreover, PV is quite specific in terms of technology families and different 
degrees of complexity along the supply chain. It follows that the results obtained by 
this study for this specific technology could not necessarily be extended to other RET, 
in China or elsewhere. 
Despite these limitations, however, we believe some general lessons for other 
developing countries can tentatively be derived. An important insight is that learning, 
especially in knowledge intensive technologies, takes time for the individuals, the firms 
and indeed the whole system; this should be taken into account in undertaking 
technological decisions and in suggesting policy recommendations. 
A further important generalisable result is that an approach like that used by this 
study, in which firm-level factors have been observed together with systemic dynamics, 
is able to deliver deeper and more satisfactory results about firms' innovative behaviour 
in developing countries than that suggested by conventional approaches based only on 
quantitative indicators. The latter on their own can in fact give only a shallow view of 
the innovation potential of firms - or indeed of a country. 
Had more time and resources been available, it would have been valuable to 
extend the sample even further, to include the other firm that started producing in the 
mid 1970s and that was still in business at the time of fieldwork, as well as one or two 
other Chinese c-Si cells and modules producers that started their manufacturing 
activities in late 2004-early 2005. This might have confirmed or added new insights 
into the nature and drivers of technological change in the Chinese PV component 
producers. 
Moreover, it would have been valuable to interview some of the customers, for 
instance in Europe, that use the Chinese PV modules. This might have allowed a deeper 
understanding of the nature of the technological effort underway in China by keeping 
into account also the view of the final end users of the PV modules, or indeed of other 
PV products produced in China. 
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With more time and resources at our disposal it would have been interesting to 
explore how the domestic PV industry finances its business activities. Although this 
issue has remained somehow in the background in this study, there is no doubt that a 
better understanding of financing mechanisms would allow deeper insights into what 
influences innovation in the Chinese PV manufacturers. 
9.4.2 Suggestions for further research 
The aim of this section is to identify some key issues that could be fruitfully 
investigated by further research. 
First, there are some theoretical issues raised in the thesis that would benefit 
from further research. Two such issues are: how and to what extent to integrate the TC 
and the IS approaches more closely; and how to establish linkages between the TIS and 
the NIS approaches. In adopting the TC and IS literatures as the basis for exploring the 
nature and the determinants of the innovation effort underway in the Chinese PV firms 
and in combining the insights from them, we have established a first important link 
between the two literatures. There is, however, scope for further research on how 
micro-level dynamics could be better represented and integrated in a broader 
innovation system approach. 
On the need to establish a link between the TIS and the NIS approaches, our 
study clearly showed that using an NIS perspective to better understand technological 
change has profound limits. This is because firms and newly emerging technologies 
like PV are more and more affected by dynamics and system components that do not 
belong to the national context. A significant case in point is the driving effect of PV 
policies promoted in mature economies on the development and rapid take off of the 
Chinese PV industry. Similarly, we have shown that taking the innovation system that 
surrounds a certain technology and analysing it in a specific national context, can lead 
to misleading results because the TIS encompasses elements and dynamics that go well 
beyond national borders. These findings call for a better definition of the innovation 
system's boundaries and application areas, in circumstances where it is evident that 
technological variables are affected by both national and more global dynamics. 
In addition to these theoretical research issues, several empirical areas could be 
the focus of useful future research. An analysis, like that undertaken by this study, of 
the innovation effort underway in the PV sector in other rapidly developing countries 
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(India, for instance, where a PV component industry already exists) could provide 
further useful comparative information. In this way it would be possible to assess better 
the extent to which the insights obtained for the PV industry in China might be 
generalised and whether the systemic dynamics observed in this study are valid also in 
other developing country contexts. 
Finally, a second important empirical area of further investigation concerns the 
role played by non-technological capabilities in enhancing the PV firms' ability to add 
value and compete. We have shown how organisational and managerial capabilities, 
together with technological capabilities, upon which this study has focussed, have been 
crucial to the ability of the PV firms in China to move forward and compete. We hence 
suggest that further research should be encouraged in this area. Looking at key 
contributions that come from recent theories of the behaviour of firm in economically 
advanced countries, where organisational learning and core competences are given a 
greater emphasis (Dodgson, 1993, Dosi et al., 2000) could possibly add new insights to 
what we already know about firm-level learning in developing countries. 
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Appendix 1: the firm-level questionnaire 
survey 
Technological capabilities acquisition and competitiveness in 
Chinese PV wafer, cell and module manufacturers 
Questionnaire 
The Department of Environmental Science and Technology at Imperial College London (UK), is 
carrying out a survey to find out how Chinese PV manufacturers innovate and what is driving 
them in this process. 
Your participation would be greatly appreciated and your answers would be crucial for the 
success of the research. This questionnaire will take 1 hour to complete. 
ALL INFORMATION THAT YOU PROVIDE WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. Only information 
aggregated across firms will be used. 
A report detailing the results will be sent to you once the analysis is completed. 
Thank you for your participation in this study 
Date of interview 
V.T 
11  3C 
X 31: 
It rh :SC 
rilM WI 
FL 	ifi 
FL 	44- 
FL T 'WV 
Date of interview 
En Cn 
Name of respondent and his/her 
position in the company 
Respondent's e-mail 
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SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMPANY'S 
ACTIVITY 
1. Aqii—htiviisj? In what year was this plant established? 
2. frAAtA,L,Ak*ki 	NIDTAfin4k* Ik1 4.-M? What is your core business now (i.e.: 
the business which had the largest sales in 2004) and what was it when you 
started your business? (please tick all that apply) 
Jig& fil6W 
Solar cell materials (a-Si, p-Si,m-Si, CIGS, others) 0 0 
Device processing (wafer cutting, metal contacts, anti- 
reflection coating, encapsulation, etc.) 
0 0 
Module production (electric circuitry, circuit protection systems, 
front glass, temperature control, structural materials, module 
shapes and sizes, etc.) 
❑  0 
PV products (flat plate, building unit replacement, street 
illumination, car parks, etc.) 
Balance of system (inverters, charge controllers, batteries, etc) 0 0 
3. fillAtini4AAlltINk114? 9=FAW, 1,iliCP.AfIt3,Inik*II? Do you have other 
significant activities? Did you have other significant activities when you started 
your business? (please tick all that apply) 
"Yow 
fut-n Solar cell materials 	 0 	0 
trIEIMIERg processing 	 0 	❑  
FO,Aftit production 	 0 	0 
PV products 	 0 	0 
Balance of system 	 0 	0 
4. 2AT44*1- V,E, ailf]fiETh'ffl -FffinAMW5ti? Could you please specify 
what is the importance you attach to these activities in terms of future investment? 
(please rank up the activities listed below from 1 to 5. With 1 as the most important and 5 
as fifth most important) 
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Solar cell materials 0 
Device processing ❑  
Module production 0 
PV products 0 
Balance of system 0 
5. 	it 	ZirYL; r=d ryow4v? What is the ownership structure of your company? 
(please tick one) 
State owned enterprise 	 0 
Collective-owned enterprise 	 0 
Individually owned (i.e.: private) 	 ❑  
0 
Sino-foreign joint venture % local 
% foreign 
   
   
    
a. riv:(6-,_,iirmmo,hfriPhA. , ZiOrrq -Akigr — it -szlin? If you have a foreign 
partner (JV), in which year was the relationship established? 
b. 1 ffi iiim-frififi:g IA is t- ri*n ? What is the nationality of your principal 
foreign partner? 
SECTION B: PROCESSES 
1. efr]%,51-ta? How many production lines (working in parallel) do you have? 
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Description 
E.g. 2" Wafer 
production; cell 
processing 
fulA 	 Si#th 
E.g. Wafers, metals for 
contacts, reagents, etc. E.g. devices, i.e. cells 
2. I417 Ilr.lirPri1tntkIn1? Are you adopting commercial (turnkey) production 
lines? 
a. 	ta-M , 1416_,,i/VA t Q ? If yes, could you please specify the nationality of 
the supplier(s)? 
3. aiw-r.'':fozsinti'---d-witAfriViffl? tifilffMtiff70)1k*[14- , -LifYkr it? What 
are the input and the output of your production line(s) and what were they when 
you started your business? 
I-. Line 1 
.77-t-td 
Description 	 Input 	 Output 
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4. 1%Attt.ttrri/41M-CENIn? What is the layout of your main production 
line? (Please tick all the machinery and equipment you have in your main production line 
now as well as when you started this business) 
FOR WAFER PRODUCERS ONLY 
Equipment list 	 Today 	At start 
Crucible Spray System, Kiln 	 0 	0 
Wet Station 	 0 	0 
Furnace 	 0 	0 
Band Saw or Wire Saw 	 0 	0 
Wire Saw 	 0 	0 
Wet Station 	 0 	❑  
Resistivity Probe 	 0 	0 
Other (please specify) 
FOR CELL PRODUCERS ONLY 
Equipment list 	 Today 	At start 
Resistivity Probe 	 0 	❑  
Etch Station 	 0 	❑  
Dopant Sprayer & Belt Furnace 	 0 	0 
Plasma Etch Station 	 0 	0 
HF Etch Station 	 0 	0 
PECVD Furnace 	 0 	❑  
Screen Printers, IR Dryers/Furnace 	 0 	0 
Cell Tester 	 0 	0 
Other (please specify) 
FOR MODULE PRODUCERS ONLY 
Equipment list 
	
Today 	At start 
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Glass Wash Station 
Cell Tester 
Tabber/Stringer 
Bussing Station 
Layup Station 
Laminator 
Final Assembly Station 
Module Tester 
Other (please specify) 
5. -iitYMIntIT-VVij-_RV7tArl<J3:1-T)? Who installed the main production 
line and supervised the start-up phase? (please tick one) 
The supplier 0 
Your company with the help of the supplier 0 
Your company alone 0 
Others (please specify) 0 
6. ti (A-1Liff],z -,A0I1,1 -02,A) 
Have you (or somebody in your company) ever taken a technical and/or 
operational training course to operate the production line? 
7 	if1.1 Vaaaitti.din-a-n`rbAinfWrOliff-'? Who is taking care of the 
ordinary and the extraordinary maintenance of the equipment in the production 
line? (please tick one) 
The supplier 0 
Your company with the help of the supplier 0 
Your company alone 0 
Other (please specify) 0 
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9 tixtfLiinti-ki- ritA11111V1W-q? tiVX, 	 Have you 
introduced any modification in the way your production line is installed? If yes 
please elaborate 
10 1 ix4161,±t1-1.inUilt -R*1 tii/1\inetrAik4? (LMHEAT.-4.4410).#m* 
ing*-vi—To Have you introduced any minor modification in your main production 
line's standard equipment? (E.g. home made spare parts or small components). If yes, 
please elaborate 
H_ 	 0 
11 	16-1;, 	-R it frii 	 ZI:1i  	rryv iN lr In KZ 	At*? Have you ever 
designed and/or manufactured entirely new machines or equipment to be used in 
your production line? 
a) tza 	ilifraJA-#1,4a-R* If yes, please specify which equipment 
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b) ttrIVZ, 	 Eri/9 - -31'kri(g -M-- 114"444ittgI 
JJ.,fLUA? If yes, did you manufacture your own machine right at the beginning 
or did you first adopted the standard production line and modify it later on? 
At the beginning 0 	 Later on 0 
c) Eit ikrAVAArrifgfiA -F$111M? Did you design 
and manufacture these machines alone or did you get technical assistance 
from someone outside your business? 
H El 0 II:fftAinfilitIA El 
d) tAMtlthAntilfat, i11 	—T If you used technical assistance, please 
specify 
e) 1( A E $1 	in Rk'T * 	1IYt. 4- sift ? Do the machines that you 
manufactured yourself respect environmental and safety standards? 
12 	 (LriT) kL5nik- T-11:4th -firr9fAiKarii,l-1 (LnifYRAt, '4) 	Have 
the changes (if any) that you introduced in the installation of the production line 
and the new home-made machines you constructed benefited from know-how 
coming from other sectors (i.e. optoelectronics, etc) 
13 	 (ECM-1417) *WM-T-0144,4(IttriPIJIMfil-)ncfiAq? Do you 
have a lab (or a small pilot line) devoted to the development of new products 
based on advanced materials (i.e.: organic materials)? 
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Et 0 
14 ttriVA, iii161i*-ffl-9,71AV.1 91.1J'EffklICRilitlffiii/p? If this is the case, could 
you briefly explain how the lab is organised and who is working in it? 
SECTION C: 
1. piLAtrrsor-uout,/zo 3TmErst, 	 (i-tia-Ffht1-1.H1:-.1V/4) What are 
your products? What were they when you started your business? (please tick all that apply) 
Description 	 Today 	At start 
Monocrystalline Si solar cells / modules 
	 0 
	
0 
Polycrystalline Si solar cells / modules 
Polycrystalline transparent Si solar cells / modules 	 0 	0 
EFG cells 
Polycrystalline ribbon Si solar cells 	 0 	0 
Apex (polycrystaline Si) solar cells 	 0 	0 
Monocrystaline dendritic web Si solar cells 	 0 	0 
Amorphous silicon / modules 	 0 	0 
Cadmium Telluride (CdTe)/ modules 	 0 	0 
Copper-Indium-Diselenide (CIS) / modules 	 0 	0 
Hybrid silicon (HIT) solar cell / modules 	 0 	0 
Other (please specify) 
2. Zit*?_B---Fliff]AlAnVii.JZ_i_1;? ffmrit, tiinins.k.!o Could you 
please specify how many products you produce now annually and how many did you 
produce when you started your business? 
Description 
Monocrystalline Si solar cells / modules 
Polycrystalline Si solar cells / modules 
Quantity/year 	Quantity/year at 
today start 
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Polycrystalline transparent Si solar cells / modules 
EFG cells 
Polycrystalline ribbon Si solar cells 
Apex (polycrystaline Si) solar cells 
Monocrystaline dendritic web Si solar cells 
Amorphous silicon / modules 
Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) / modules 
Copper-Indium-Diselenide (CIS) / modules 
Hybrid silicon (HIT) solar cell / modules 
Other (please specify) 
3. ift4 111ilf1fr 	(MATElt-A-L'IT'ig)? What are the main specs of your 
products (please fill in if appropriate)? 
Product1 	 Product2 
Today 	At start 	Today 	At start 
Min efficiency 
Max efficiency 
Min power out 
Max power out 
Min size 
Max size 
Min Operating 
Temperature 
Max Operating 
Temperature 
Lifetime 
Guarantee 
       
        
4. t:II]intZC 10 rki ? (= 100% - Itt44kA — - i-n-tA31.1W)? 
,!,t>? What is the average yield of your process (= 100% - wasted input — 
output not meeting specs) and what was it when you started your business? 
Today 	At start 
Average yield 
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5. tiifiArrg,e,ri/qt,--A* 	? 	TF 4fi 114 , fEi 	? What is the overall 
manufacturing cost of your product? What was it when you started your business? 
(please fill in only where appropriate to your product. Please specify the year in which you 
started your business) 
Product 	Cost 	 Today 	At start (year____) 
Material 	RMB/cm2 of wafer or RMB/kg of ingot 
Cells 	RMB/Wp 
Modules 	RMB/Wp 
6. II)a± t's41111/M-77*+.&,g,a4)1KnEOIJ 	ofmFf-sr, 	.1)fix? What fraction 
of the overall cost is due to labour now and what was it when you started? 
Product 
	
Today 	At start 
Labour cost (as % of overall manufacturing cost) 
7. Please tell us about the products that have 
been certified by different standard setting bodies 
Description 
	
Certification 	 Country/Area 
Product 1 
Product 2 
Product 3 
8. 1 i4nfl-- alnit4Mitti 1- ,? What is the final application of your products (direct 
or indirect)? (Please tick all that apply) 
Grid connected residential systems 	 0 
Solar villages 	 0 
Office buildings 	 0 
Pumps 	 0 
Solar power stations 	 0 
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Lighting equipment 0 
Traffic signs 0 
Radio relay stations 0 
Telecommunication systems 0 
Off-grid villages 0 
Others (please specify) 0 
9. WrIfiVRCr-rfJ'40=Ickt6Viii4/1\014-60.1? (L n, tifiMiAla*MiV-4,1-FM4 
AtRMIEMMA &I! ? Can you make minor modifications to your products 
to address specific requests from customers? (For example: can you provide modules 
for very humid weather conditions? Or for very extreme temperatures?) 
Er 0 
a. #1Mks , 	 If yes, please specify 
b. tolViit, 1t% 	? If yes, when did you 
start to customise your products? 
10. 1 117.EAt4i4f7nt-Ight'-Priq? (hnu, 	MITZ, 
Are you producing or thinking to produce completely new products (For example: 
products that can have more than one function?). If yes please specify 
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1 1 . 	IT NTH M 	l ( q f)1, ,MV- )$1  iar u rt-q ? Are you thinking to engage in 
products using new materials (i.e. Organics materials)? 
12. zfrjw.ft16_1,i{nri<jf---ivi,tf4-fmn_5? Are you paying royalties to manufacture some of 
your products? 
Et. 
SECTION D: wa R&D 
1 	ti ff iL 17-,7 EitA-1-L4-Jw-LJna[ylii? Does your company engage in in-house 
R&D activities? 
2 	t±,ggcA 	 , EnfjfaifP? How much do you spend in in- 
house R&D activities in terms of percentage on your total turnover? 
3. A YA T.ff qf a13.M. ? How many people are involved in R&D activities? 
4. 16Ji ff NftMY.44L'ff.  .14 ? What is the nature of your R&D activity? (please tick 
all that apply) 
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Modifying existing products/design to suit different markets 	 0 
or/and satisfy specific customer's requests 
Modifying existing production processes 	 0 
Designing new products 	 0 
Developing new products 	 0 
Designing new production processes 	 0 
Developing new production processes 	 0 
Others (please specify) 
5. 1:41']n.  'II IFS 0 ig r N ? (fin, 	- f1J, T. Ak 	t A -A 4 ? ) Do you have any 
protected intellectual properties (i.e.: patents, industrial designs and trade marks)? 
XEL 
	 D 
6. tifilnIrlil=V-43ZInif -Vilq? Are you licensing any of your protected intellectual 
properties? 
7.OVILiinaTFTft.1)TRI-ilf Wkri-r ,.1,9',Iti? If you do NOT undertake any R&D 
activity, why is it the case? (please tick all that apply) 
Nature of products does not require local R&D 	 0 
Shortage of skilled technical personnel 	 0 
Shortage of engineers with relevant expertise 	 0 
Shortage of financial resources 	 0 
Firm was established only recently and R&D activities are not 	 0 
yet underway 
Others (please specify) 
SECTION E: MANPOWER SKILLS 
1. mph 	ic,f/FAfri,.? /wit 	How many employees do you have? How 
many did you have when you started? 
Today 	At start 
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Number of employees 
2. 	Jr APr Err , 16,ruCt 	? MAW? When you started this business, which 
of the following categories of people did you employ? And which do you employ at 
present? 
As % of employees 
Now 
No. of technicians 
No. of engineers, scientists or university-trained designers 
No. of economists or university trained business administrators 
Other (please specify) 
At start 
3. IMI1 nAy3.#R I-FlP-1 	? Have any of your employees received training 
from one of the following entities? (please tick all that apply) 
National government 	 0 
Local government 	 0 
International donor agencies (i.e.: UNDP, GEF, ADB, etc.) 	 0 
Bilateral organisations (i.e. GTZ, etc) 	 0 
Private company (i.e. your supplier) 	 0 
Other (please specify) 
4. tififfl 	0A,MA,5--1,, 11? Have you ever employed people with working 
experience in a foreign company? 
SECTION F: EXPORT AND PRICES 
1. AMV*ik, 	 RA-1431? 
Lolo Measured by sales, where are the buyers of the products in your main 
business line located? Where were they located when you started? Please give the 
% between the following locations 
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Today 	At start 
Within the same district as your plant 
Tigifti:TFffiliF.J,P<, PIA 
Outside the same district as your plant but within the same city 
4VLrtiLANi rli 
Within your country but outside the city where your plant is 
located 
'4* 
Overseas 
2. ttiAlLiffMtI1J4*, 41.1*F1.*: : If you sell products overseas, where do you 
export them to? 
3. tiljkj.liltfiVr 11 	What is your best (large volume) wholesale price of 
your products? 
Best wholesale price 
Product 1 
Product 2 
Product 3 
Product 4 
4. 1_,IiinIntIdJA 2000 	 IA0C-Arl5? #111*,Ik1 .Y.? Has the price you can charge 
for your most important product changed since 2000? If it has, by how much? 
(please tick one box for each market) 
Market Price has increased Price unchanged Price has decreased 
< 10% > 10% < 10% 	> 10% 
L14$A 0 0 
Chinese 
market 
Mt TIT* 0 0 0 
Other markets 
5. 1- ,It1*1at 2000 	IMIA-EYg&IV What has caused the change (if any) to 
prices since 2000? (please elaborate) 
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SECTION G: COMPETITION 
1. •(± 2004 *, 1ki1J12_;q1 ICJ rb 	Ltfil 	In 2004, what percentage of the 
total sales in the domestic market is supplied by your firm? 
2. A.+Nozzithark:nroikrf.4:VIMilifilrli? HAM ? Is the rivalry with 
competitors located within China or in other countries significant today? Was this 
rivalry significant when you started your business? (Please say YES or NO for each 
point in time) 
Significant today 	Significant when you 
started 
Competitors within China 
Competitors from Japan 
Competitors from India 
Competitors form other countries in Asia 
Competitors from Germany 
Competitors from other EU countries 
Competitors from North America 
Competitors form other countries 
3Al+nf-riTM)J13M;grnjig_rAjnif!lifFIN*? How do your most significant rivals 
compete against your most important product or service today? (Please tick one box 
for each of the options provided) 
Very 
significant Significant 
Significant to 
some extent 
Not 
significant 
Lower prices 0 0 0 0 
Higher quality 0 0 0 0 
Faster delivery 0 0 0 0 
On-time delivery 0 0 0 0 
Innovative design 0 0 0 0 
Product variety 0 0 0 0 
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Flexible production volume 0 0 0 0 
Bringing out new products 0 0 0 0 
Customisation 0 0 0 0 
Services linked with products 0 0 0 0 
Respected brand-name 0 0 0 0 
Product/service warranty 0 0 0 0 
Promotion of 
social/labour/environmental 
standards 
0 0 0 0 
Sells direct to end-users 
Other (please specify) 
4 5A1.—*Mtfritiniz7, 5i-E- _!1)A? How much money would a new 
firm have to spend in order to build a production plant and set up a marketing and 
distribution operation which competes with your own? 
SECTION H: INPUTS TO TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Relations with customers 
1. ififrn (fig rVi ? TrM WV Who do you sell your products to? Who did you 
sell them when you started? 
Today 	At start 
Distributors/agents/importers/exporters 
Directly to end-users 
Retailers 
Others (please specify) 
2. 1iint5imiq-m-*.ki ? Which customer segment do you mainly serve? 
On grid (please specify if it is: utility, corporations, government, 
residential) 
Off grid (please specify if it is: industrial, residential, 
government, Bilateral aid funded) 
0 
0 
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3. -HIJAFItrAIVJruEIVI]inr1 ? How important are the following factors to your 
most important customers (based on share of turnover). 
Critical (will 
win an order) 
Very 
important 
Important to 
some extent 
Not 
important 
lowest price 0 0 0 0 
High quality 0 0 0 0 
fast delivery 0 0 0 0 
On-time delivery 0 0 0 0 
Innovative designs 0 0 0 0 
Product variety/range of products 0 0 0 0 
Flexible production volume 0 0 0 0 
Bringing out new products 0 0 0 0 
Customisation 0 0 0 0 
Services linked with products 0 0 0 0 
Associated with a brand name 0 0 0 0 
Product/service warranty 0 0 0 0 
Meeting 
social/labour/environmental 
standards 
0 0 0 0 
Sell directly to end-users 0 0 0 0 
Relations with suppliers 
1 	if,f4+4)AAPT1 1)14 ? NOT M[10 From whom do you buy your raw materials from? 
From whom did buy when you started? 
Today 	At start 
2 	, 165 fr]Mt -DEM -(±[9Q ? MIJYF tzfis ? Measured by sales, where are 
yours plant suppliers located? Where were they located when you started? Please 
give the % between the following locations 
Today 	At start 
Within the same district as your plant 
Outside the same district as your plant but within the same city 
Within your country but outside the city where your plant is 
located 
Overseas 
324 
Relations with Universities and research institutes 
1. 1gsinlYTiffittl- 	r`fsitll? Do you have collaborative R&D projects together 
with universities 
0 
a) 	 If yes, could you please elaborate? 
SECTION J: GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR INNOVATION AND 
RENEWABLES 
1. 1,V1714;q-(± 1998-2004 MIIMV-Lii,h Crlint:*_14:Pi16_,'ills]MligifF11-? Did your 
company receive any public support (financial or other assistance and advice) for 
innovation-related activities in the period 1998-2004? (Note: financial includes: loans, 
grants, subsidies, funds). 
❑  
2. JUI**K T -HOF 	fi ? What were the sources of this public support for 
innovation-related activities? (please tick all that apply) 
Financial 
support 
Other 
types of 
support 
Local or regional government 
Central government 
Other (please specify. Examples: International organisations 
such as UNDP, GEF, ADB, etc. or bilateral programmes) 
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3. 	 1998-2004 11;P 	 1*1 	g 1/P - 	_.f3t0c_hni); 	 ? Did your 
company receive any tax incentives related to innovation activities during the 
period 1998-2004? 
0 
4. lkitaTif 	 fkKitt ? Did your company participated in or 
received assistance from any of the following types of renewable energy-related 
programmes? (please tick all that apply) 
Brightness rural electrification program 
National Rural Electrification Programme (Song Dian Dao 
Xiang = 'Sending electricity to townships') 
REDP (World Bank/GEF renewable energy development 
project) 
Other (please specify) 
SECTION K: OBSTACLE AND VIEW FOR THE FUTURE 
1 	t 3"1- 	 12 iNp 	 'ftl4kr efIVAT-4gIfil-LCIYJM.E07? What has been the 
largest impediment to growth in your main market region (the one which 
contributes to your turnover most, see question 1 in section F) over the past 12 
months? 
2 	14- > ' 1 1.t417 	ifffSI-K/14aritA-IVI*--M? What has been the critical factor that has 
driven the growth/decline of your principal customer segment (i.e. on grid, off-grid) 
over the past 12 months? 
3   34.1*1*.PHIJI.VillEFAMINRIIIRNiftiginiti-K. Please 
choose 5 most important factors that potentially constrain your plant's ability to 
grow in the domestic and international market (Please rank up to 5 factors, with "I" as 
the most important and "5" as fifth important) 
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Getting enough wafers for cells/modules production 0 
Cost or quality of electricity ❑  
High labour cost of skilled personnel, including technicians 0 
Quality of available skilled personnel, including technicians 0 
National government's regulations on licensing, certification and 
qualification 
0 
Local government's regulations on licensing, certification and 
qualification 
0 
International quality standards 0 
National government's taxes 0 
Local or non-national government taxes 0 
Difficulties in establishing distribution outlets 0 
Lack of after-sales service providers 0 
Financial constraints when expanding the production capacity 0 
Others (please specify) 
4 VIAVATffi 12 t-Affl., tiffiT'Aihiti-K/RaLLfi_l'? What rate of 
growth/decline (in electricity output terms) do you expect in your market region 
over the next 12 months? 
5 	-(..t -F1 12 t-jqm, 16_,10)1V9F-t-r1 fM-LEX-&? Which customer segment do 
you expect to grow faster in your market region in the next 12 months? 
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SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS 
NOTE: the two following sections contain information that will be interesting to retrieve 
but that are not vital to achieve the research objectives 
SECTION J: ENTREPRENEURIAL HISTORY 
1. In which year did you start working in the PV industry (not necessarily in this 
company)? 
2. How many years have you held this position? 
3. Before working in this company, what did you do? 
work in another Chinese company producing the same products 	 ❑  
and having the same core business 
work in a foreign company producing the same products and 	 ❑  
having the same core business 
Work in a university or science laboratory investigating related 	 ❑  
issues 
Work in the senniconductor/optoelectronics industry 	 0 
Work in a completely different business 	 0 
4. What is the highest level of education you completed? 
Postgraduate education at home (MSc and/or PhD) 0 
Postgraduate education abroad 0 
Undergraduate education at home 0 
Undergraduate education abroad 0 
High-school education 0 
Secondary education 0 
Primary school education 0 
No education a 
5. If you completed part of your education abroad, in which country? 
SECTION K: LOCATION 
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1. Is your plant located in an industrial park/export processing zone? 
Yes ❑ 	 No ❑  
2. Please list in order of importance (1 to 5) up to 5 factors that: 
a) positively influenced the choice of your plant's location when it was first 
established 
b) would be an advantage for locating a new plant in this location today 
Today 	At start 
Local market size 
Proximity to other firms in the same line of business 
Low rents or costs of buying property 
Proximity to local universities and research institutes 
Quality of local transport infrastructure 
Quality of local telecoms infrastructure 
Supply of skilled labour 
Supply of unskilled workers 
Availability of government services 
Possibility of expanding new products 
Quality of locally provided financial services 
Proximity to suppliers 
Proximity to clients 
Proximity to distribution channels 
Quality of local housing, schools, and social networks 
Levels of local pollution and other environmental problems 
Fewer regulatory requirements and taxes based on government's 
assignments 
Other (please specify) 
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Appendix 2 List of firms interviewed 
during the survey 
Firm's name 	 Location Person(s) interviewed 
CSI Solar Technologies Inc. 	 Suzhou 	Mr. Brian Lu, General Manager 
Hope Industry and Trade Co., Ltd. 	Beijing 	Mr. Wang Haibo, Production 
Manager 
Mr. Yan Jinggang, General 
Manager 
Ningbo Solar Electric Power Co., Ltd 
	
Ningbo 	Mr Zhou Jianhong, President 
Suntech Power Co., Ltd. 	 Wuxi 	Dr Shi Zhengrong, CEO 
Dr Ji Jingjia, Senior Scientist, 
R&D Centre 
Tianwei Yingli New Energy Resources Baoding 	Mrs Ma Yan, Project Manager 
Co. Ltd. 	 of Overseas Business 
Depai 	hnent 
Topsolar Green Energy Co., Ltd 
	
Shanghai Mr Sun Tietun, Vice Chief 
Engineer 
Zhejiang Sino-Italian hotovoltaic Co. 	Ningbo 	Mr Tangjun, General Manager 
Ltd. 
Zhonglian Solar Technology Co., Ltd. 	Beijing 	Dr. An Zhonglin, Director 
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Appendix 3 Contact list created before 
undertaking fieldwork 
Category 	Area of competence 	Name of institution contacted 
Innovation and management , 
(also with special reference 
to PV) 
Academic 
Solar energy technology, 
industry and economics 
Air pollution and urban 
environment 
Industtyl  /Market PV industry, PV systems, market and applications 
Capability building and 
International 	bilateral commercial Cooperation and opportunities 
NGO 
PV market development  
Beijing University (Beijing) 
Research Centre for Innovation and 
Development, Zhejiang University 
(Hangzhou) 
Tsinghua University (Beijing) 
Xi'an Jiaotong University (Xi'an) 
Beijing Solar Energy Research Institute 
(Beijing) 
Solar Energy Institute of Shanghai Jiaotong 
University (Shanghai) 
Department of Physics, Zhejiang 
University (Hangzhou) 
China National PV Technology 
Development Centre (Hangzhou) 
SAES — Shanghai Academy of 
Environmental Science (Shanghai) 
Beijing Jikedian Renewable Energy 
Development Centre 
Beijing Jike Energy New Tech. 
Development Co. 
Bejing Corona Science & Technology Co. 
Ltd 
Institute of Electrical Engineering, Chinese 
Academy of Sciences 
REDP - Renewable Energy Development 
Program, GEF/WB/China National 
Development and Reform Commission 
CCRE - Capacity Building for the Rapid 
Commercialisation of Renewable Energy in 
China, UNDP/GEF/ China National 
Development and Reform Commission 
GTZ — German Development Cooperation 
(Beijing) 
Sino-Italian Cooperation Program for 
Environmental Protection 
IT Power (UK based but with offices in 
Beijing) 
WWF China 
Policy/business Bridge between regulatory 	CREIA (China RE Industry Association) 
authorities, research 
institutes and industry 
The 8 firms who took part in the survey are not included in this contact list. 
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professionals 
Technological and policy 
support to the government's 
RE initiatives 
CRED (Centre for RE Development, 
subordinated to the Energy Research 
Institution of the State Development 
Planning Commission) 
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Appendix 4 Questions for the semi- 
structured interviews 
National R&D trends 
— How many research institutes/universities conduct research on PV in China? 
- What is their main research focus? Mainly conventional c-Si technology or also 
other PV technology families like thin film, high efficiency cells under 
concentration, organic PV? 
- Who are the main national bodies in charge of financing R&D for PV? 
— A part from the government, are there other sources of funding for PV R&D 
(i.e.: VC, international/bilateral organisations, etc.)? 
Market creation and prospects 
— What do you think are the main market barriers to PV development and 
utilisation in China? 
- What do you reckon will be the drivers for future PV development in China? 
- Are there specific mid-long term targets set by the Chinese government for PV 
installed capacity? 
- What are the prospects for future PV market applications in China: off-grid vs 
on-grid? 
Innovation drivers (Role of policy vs market and technology) 
- What is the role of government policy in creating incentives for innovation? In 
what way does policy drive innovation (Research direction? Timing? 
Collaboration?). 
- What are the main organisations involved in promoting policies for PV in China 
(both at the national and local levels)? 
— Are there on the pipeline specific programmes to promote PV? 
- Which is the role (if any) of local governments, including provincial, municipal, 
and county governments, in developing PV (both as far as the installed capacity 
and PV industry development are concerned). 
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— What do you think will be the impact of the new China's RET law in 
stimulating PV? 
— Does a long term policy framework influence innovation? 
— What is the role of market forces in influencing innovation? 
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